Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV

In light of the modern tendency of some to engage in wanton takfir, it would be irresponsible to not point out some complexities that may relate to takfir in the west. There are two extremes with regards to takfir: one that denies its existence, and the other that engages in it excessively in contravention of the established legal rules – the latter extreme amongst contemporary Muslims has been well illustrated by Yusuf Qaradawi in Islamic Awakening: Between Rejection & Extremism and Abdul Rahman al-Luwaihiq’s Religious Extremism in the Lives of Contemporary Muslims. The fact remains that takfir is a method of Islamic law, and is necessary because the Sacred Law does have numerous provisions that differ dependent on whether one is a Muslim or a non-Muslim, in which each of the two is treated differently in a single situation. The most common areas where distinctions in faith are vitally important are the ritual prayer, burials, leadership, testimony, marriage and divorce and inheritance.

Firstly, al-Luwaihiq has spoken of “the judgment that someone else is a disbeliever is a very dangerous judgment with grave consequences [which Qaradawi spells out as examples]. No Muslim may take this step unless he has a clear proof and unquestionable evidence.” Thus Muhammad Salih al-Munajjid has issued the following excellent advice:

“Because the matter of takfir is so serious, and mistakes therein are so grave, the seeker of knowledge, especially if he is a beginner, should refrain from indulging in that, and he should focus on acquiring beneficial knowledge that will set his own affairs straight in this world and the Hereafter.”

Secondly, Nawawi, in his commentary of Sahih Muslim, says that anyone who “denies” (jahada) a

“necessarily known matter of the religion of Islam (ma ya’lam min din al-islam daruratan ) is judged with apostasy and disbelief, unless he is new to converting to Islam or raised in a remote place, or for a similar reason was unknown to him. The latter is to be informed of these matters. Yet if he persists in his previous beliefs, then he is adjudged to be a disbeliever.”

In this regard, I endorse the opinion that I heard from Haitham al-Haddad, who is a scholar who operates as a mufti in England and performs the function through the Islamic Sharia Council of the UK: whereby he said that people facing a legal situation that possibly entails the apostasy or disbelief of a relative or spouse should not make an independent ruling; rather, they should seek an official adjudication before a Council or mufti in case one has not truly understood the position of the one accused of apostasy or disbelief; thus an accused has the legal right to have their side heard fully. This is the safer approach and one that dispels any ambiguity and satisfies Sacred Law considerations, in case one seeks a divorce and wants to remarry or to exclude someone from a will that is consistent with both the Sacred Law and the law of the land in the west. Of course, not every instance of takfir requires recourse to a mufti, but it is best if ambiguity or legal requirements dictate such caution.

Thirdly, Luwaihiq states that “one of the accepted principles among the ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamaah [the people of orthodox Islam] is the principle of differentiating between a general declaration of [an action being] kufr and an individual himself becoming a disbeliever.” This helps further clarify the nuance in the second point above from Nawawi concerning those who deny a necessarily known matter of the religion. Luwaihiq then elaborates on this point by using an explanation from Ibn Taymiyya, whereby innocently ignorant people are initially excused from being considered disbelievers when committing what is considered kufr, especially if from an incorrect interpretation from the sects of the Muslims.

Fourthly, one only has a need of getting into specific takfir if they have a direct legal situation that requires them to determine the status of someone’s Islam, and some practical examples of Islamic law were referred to earlier. Therefore one has no need to form a specific opinion about some author who has no connection with one’s life, although one can identify an argument as kufr without having to definitively say the author is a non-Muslim. Furthermore, one has even more reason to not speculate on the condition of dead Muslims, who can never be raised back to this world in order to be fully challenged on their beliefs in the hope of them clarifying what they actually meant by their words that have caused controversy. If one follows the saying of ‘Ali (may God be well pleased with him) that we stated in the introduction, then one can simply take the good from living  or dead authors and speakers, and simply leave what does not attest to the truth, without feeling the need to establish someone’s particular case in such abstract instances.

The Modern Societal Implications of Belief in Islam’s Finality

The postmodern western philosophical history and outlook has been described by Richard Tarnas in The Passion of the Western Mind, as being “tolerant of ambiguity and pluralism” and a “more sympathetic attitude toward repressed or unorthodox perspectives and a more self-critical view of currently established ones.” Moreover, Tarnas writes that there is an “insistence on the pluralism of truth.” If these features are taken as true – and I do take them to be true – then one understands the reality underlying the following words of Akbar Ahmed, in his Postmodernism and Islam: Predicament and Promise: “While Muslims appreciate the spirit of tolerance, optimism and the drive for self-knowledge in postmodernism, they also recognize the threat it poses them with its cynicism and irony.” The threat, of course, is that Islam’s orthodoxy will fall victim to the intellectual milieu, and the only “Islam” that will be allowed a meaningful space in the postmodern west will be one cast in the dye of postmodernism, as opposed to one dictated to by the sources of Islam. In other words, the fear for Muslims is that only a postmodern reformation of Islam, along postmodernist principles and conclusions, will be considered acceptable on any level.

In this light, one understands the social reasons behind why a heresy like perennial philosophy can get such a welcome from people, Muslim and non-Muslim, in the modern world, in particular the modern west. For those Muslims who develop a leaning towards perennial philosophy, one is able to hazard a guess as to the social factors that might explain such a conditioning; much in the same way that sociologists and anthropologists might explain the orthodoxy of those living in the traditional Muslim heartlands (and Ernest Gellner’s Postmodernism, Reason and Religion is indicative of such controversial attempts at explaining the phenomenon). Only the test of time will prove where the Muslims of the west will sway. Despite being anti-modern, perennial philosophy is decidedly postmodern in its theology, despite their claims to religions’ “orthodoxy” (for example, see their passionate disavowal of the Second Vatican Council of the 1960’s).

The modern liberal drive for the universal validity of all religions and interpretations, with a wider purview than even perennial philosophy, is a means of attempting to make the world a safer place, free from wars and conflicts based on religion, which is a noble goal, although it simply bespeaks of a critical loss of faith or a belief in the God who reveals His messages to mankind through Prophets. In relation to Christian treatment of Muslims, one can see a liberal basis for wanting to draw these religions together because seemingly Christian-inspired massacres of Muslims have occurred through history, from the Crusades and the Christian Re-conquest of Spain to the tragedy of the Bosnian Muslims in the twentieth century. Nevertheless, Islam’s history has been far less intolerant and bloody: starting with acceptance and protection of Christian and Jewish rights under the Prophet Muhammad (may the peace and blessings of God be upon him) and his Companions (may God be well pleased with them all), including ‘Umar upon conquering Jerusalem, and the benevolence and compassion shown by Salah al-Din Ayyubi upon recapturing Jerusalem from the Crusaders. Montgomery Watt sums up the historical and moral high-ground shown by the Muslims, in his Islamic Political Thought: “On the whole there was more genuine toleration of non-Muslims under Islam than there was of non-Christians in Medieval Christian states.”

Thus Muslims have not needed modern liberalism to teach them how to deal justly with non-Muslims, nor to teach them to not force their faith upon others. Yet this is unsurprising for students of Islam. To begin with, God informs us in the Qur’an: There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion (2:256). For Muslims, this verse has not been an abstract ideal, buried away far from their political conscience, but rather it has been their civilizational modus operandi as argued by Thomas Arnold in his Preaching of Islam, whereby he illustrates the peaceful and voluntary spread of the faith’s acceptance in the heart of people: no Inquisitions or conversions by the sword. A Muslim regaining of their faith, its history and the disavowal of an inferiority complex would allow Muslims, collectively, to show that the orthodox belief in Islam’s finality does not mean an intolerant and belligerent attitude. History bears testimony to this, not imaginative fancy. Tim Winter, in “The Last Trump Card”, further elaborates on the issue of Muslim tolerance despite believing in orthodox finality:

“Hick, Knitter and their Muslim travelling-companions are, we may conclude, mistaken in suggesting that foundational claims for the present centrality of one’s own community in salvation history ineluctably lead believers towards hubris, discord and confrontation. While this appears to have been the case with the very absolute claims for uniqueness made by many forms of western Christianity, it is less unambiguously valid in the case of other faith communities such as Islam, where a scriptural doctrine of non-categoric supersession has in practice often underpinned a level of religious coexistence which has been sustained for many centuries, and can today easily support a theology of an authentic esteem for the Other. The demands of living in an intertwined world are urgent, but need not force the religions to renounce core aspects of their self-understanding, as long as that self-understanding does not entail the demonisation of the Other and the adoption of a Manichean view of history and the world.”

[For someone so heavily identified as a spokesman for “traditionalism” in Islam, it is of interest to note Winter’s endorsement in the conclusion of this essay for a reform of Islamic law’s traditional rules for non-Muslims living under Islam, whereby he agrees with Abdul-Hamid AbuSulayman with regards to such “medieval constructs.” This, in itself, opens the scope of inter-Muslim dialogue, aside from the past narrow group polemics of salafis/Wahhabis, traditionalists/Sufis and modernists/activists.]

On the practical level, following on from his sentiments above, Tim Winter (writing under his Arabic penname Abdal-Hakim Murad), in an essay entitled “Can Liberalism Tolerate Islam?”,  has spoken of how Muslim, Jewish and Christian “conservatives”, as opposed to those he calls “liberal religionists” who have dominated – to little success, he argues – the “interfaith industry”, can work together for the achievement of their many common goals and objectives. This is an interesting challenge, and history will narrate if it emerges. [It is hoped that Winter’s inter-religious agenda can be turned to the inter-Muslim divide amongst the most orthodox Muslims (the Shariah-orientated Sufis, salafis and activists). Hitherto, the drive for comprehensive orthodox co-operation on the multitude of matters that they agree upon has not received the same sort of open call to unity as Winter has displayed in “The Last Trump Card” for inter-faith co-operation; and the absence in this regard is not just Winter’s, but is a consistent inadequacy across the board from the various orthodox-striving groups, with very few exceptions of note.]

Mohammed Fadel, in “No Salvation Outside Islam”, makes the following conclusion, which is of great interest for those liberals who greatly fear the consequences of Muslim’s believing that Islam is the sole valid religion today: “20^th century Muslim Modernist theology provides an important historical example in support of Rawls’ contention that not only can democracies tolerate theologies that teach “No salvation outside the Church,” but also that, far from subverting the stability of a democracy, liberal democracy, if anything, is more likely to subvert theological exclusivity.” Many will find his analysis of Yusuf Qaradawi particularly interesting, due to the latter being “vilified” in the west for his views on Israeli-Palestinian affairs and other matters of Islamic law. Fadel points out Qaradawi’s theological and legal discussions – which talk of an expanded existence of an “excuse” for certain non-Muslims in relation to ultimate salvation – and how “The Islamic solution to the political problem of religious and doctrinal pluralism, therefore, is not doctrinal syncretism…but rather the recognition that Islamic substantive law treats just, peaceful non-Muslims differently from those who are unjust and hostile to Islam.” Hence Qaradawi propounds “The Islamic grounds he identifies for political cooperation with non-Muslims…as follows:

• The Muslim’s belief that each individual has dignity without regard to his religion, race or color;
• The Muslim’s belief that religious difference is part of the divine plan that granted human beings freedom and choice;
• Muslims are not obligated to judge non-believers on account of their non-belief, or punish them on account of their error; instead, accountability is for God on the Day of Judgment and their reward (or punishment) is left to God; and,
• A Muslim’s belief that God commands justice and loves fairness, and that He hates injustice and punishes the unjust, even if the perpetrator is a Muslim and the victim a polytheist.”

Now Qaradawi’s views are only one view, but what they highlight is how even those perceived as the most politically extreme of orthodox Muslim clerics are going to great lengths to try and build a future society that greatly accommodates and incorporates those still deemed, theologically, to be unbelievers. This indicates how socially expansive and inclusive the theologically-exclusive position is for vast numbers of Muslims.

In conclusion, the Muslim obligation to treat all people well, and to alleviate harm from them, dictates a natural Islamic compassion that transcends whether the recipient of a Muslim’s good will and actions is a Muslim or not. With the media onslaught against Islam, it is not surprising that many are fearful of what it means to adhere to Islam or to believe that it is God’s final religion to all men. Yet the positive contribution that orthodox Muslims exhibit on a daily basis in the west is enough of a proof to disprove the claim that such a religious outlook is a threat to cordial and brotherly relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. Indeed, a greater orthodox, religious adherence is, arguably, a better means of safeguarding us all from the lawlessness of irreligious Muslims – see the scale of crimes committed by irreligious Muslims in England – and  the threats of violent terror from Muslim extremists (as we have too often sadly seen in the west of late). It is of note that one of the most suspiciously viewed orthodox groups, the salafis, have made rigorous strides to combat terrorism and extremism in the west whilst still proclaiming the right to hold traditional and orthodox opinions on a multitude of issues – for this salafi trend, see the activities of the Brixton Mosque, London, as recounted in the PhD entitled “Countering Terrorism in the UK: A Convert Community Perspective” (Exeter University, 2009) by the mosque’s ex-Chairman Anthony (Abdul Haqq) Baker; and a speech by the Director-General of Mercy Mission and Alkauthar Institute Tawfique Chowdhury entitled “Muslim Scholars—West’s Natural Allies in Fighting Scourge of Terrorism”. Other orthodox groups, like Islamic movement activists and Shariah-orientated Sufis, already have a long history of promoting and achieving cohesive communal relations in England amongst people of different faiths and no faith, so there is no reason to doubt that it can continue to do so in the future, if God so wills. Thus, in the end, it is facts, and not tabloid and gutter journalism, that establishes the positive and beneficial role of Muslims in the west, even when holding the conviction in their exclusivist theology. How sad it would be if this immense contribution was to be ungratefully dismissed and ignored. To God we make our pleas for success and seeing matters for what they really are.

Photo: Christa Lohman

Shaykh Akram is a classicist-traditionalist: he favours classical scholarship, and he fits, on the whole, within the normative intellectual paradigm of late Islamic history. At the same time, he is a great upholder of the highest standards of scholarship so he has a dynamic relationship with the Islamic scholarly tradition that he hails from. This vigour was on full display as a learned audience attended Shaykh Akram being hosted by Doha Mosque and the Safeenah Fellowship over a weekend in which an usul al-fiqh primer – namely, al-Waraqat of Imam Juwayni – was covered. In my own parting gratitude to Shaykh Akram after the course, I mentioned to him that whether we agreed, disagreed or were still undecided about many of his discussions, we were sure that he made us think and had diligently prepared himself for the weekend. As such, teachers like him are priceless and highly under-valued in our community. After the course, Shaykh Akram advised me to do a write-up of the weekend, and with great hesitation (due to knowing my own deficiencies) I agreed and proceeded with the suggestion out of respect and honour for my teacher. What follows is a presentation and discussion of some major themes – not fine details of technical differences of a less practical benefit – that are worth our consideration as a western community that needs to still successfully grapple with the challenge of facing the modern world with an authentic Islamic voice. Nevertheless, this discussion has not been read by Shaykh Akram, so it is not some official representation of him. Moreover, I hope that when my own voice is speaking it is clearly not Shaykh Akram’s.

The Purpose of Teaching

The Shaykh commenced the sessions with his usual disavowal of egotism. Thus Imam Abu Hanifa, he reminded us, taught people to understand, and not to merely follow him. Now such a statement coming from Shaykh Akram cannot possibly be taken as some denouncement of following the Hanafi school, for, as he pointed out, he is himself ninety-nine percent “Hanafi”; hence the one percent of issues where he is seen to be controversial can hardly be taken as casting him out of the Hanafi fold. Instead, such reminders were there to inspire a learned audience to critically engage with the presentations, and to even challenge his assertions. Indeed, this was a gathering of passing around jewels amongst jewellers – apart from me – and not a gathering of casting jewels amongst children to play with them like toys, oblivious of their purpose and true worth. Therefore, Shaykh Akram exhorted the audience to make knowledge their own possession, and not simply the quotation of their teachers (including him). For him, it is the Greek tradition that makes pure followers of their teachers, not Islam!

The Case of Usul al-fiqh

Usul al-fiqh was pointed out as having the same relation to Islamic law as grammar has to language: it is a science that protects you against error. Moreover, the science discusses four matters according to the fuqaha: 1) ahkam (rulings); 2) adillah (sources of the ahkam); 3) how to derive rulings from the sources (culminating in the science of ijtihad, or independent legal reasoning); and 4) qawa’id (legal precepts) and masalih (benefits). The early jurists like Abu Hanifa and Malik had a pure Islamic understanding of the sources; yet, after the second hijri century, Muslim usul came to be dominated by the Muslim engagement with the Greek-Hellenic tradition. This led to the division of the usuliyyin first put forward by Ibn Khaldun in al-Muqaddimah: namely, the division between the tariqa al-fuqaha and the tariqa al-mutakallimin. Of course, such a binary understanding, as is usually the case with such attempts at simplification, obscures the method of those who tried to join the two tariqas. Shaykh Akram lamented that usul al-fiqh lost importance after the third hijri century, as it was not actually used to produce fiqh, because in most cases usul became preoccupied with philosophical generalities (kulliyyat) divorced from practical legal cases and/or fiqh became a process of producing fatwas according to naza’ir (taking a known legal case and then applying it to similar matters, as opposed to looking at the foundational sources for direct answers to new occurrences). In terms of preserving a “pure” theory of usul al-fiqh, Shaykh Akram considered the Hanafis to be less affected by Greek-inspired ‘ilm al-kalam than the other madhhabs.

As with Shaykh Akram’s approach to theology – which favours a commitment to the early community (salaf), without fitting into the modern “salafi school” in its philosophising theology – he favoured a revival of usul al-fiqh along the lines demanded by a profound reading of the foundational sources of the Quran and Hadith, without being hemmed in by any school of thought from any of the religious sciences. In this revival of usul, Shaykh Akram said that the Prophetic method is the only guide and guaranteed way of attaining Divine favour. In this regard, one sees the Prophetic method being one of having a profound understanding and application of the Quran, first and foremost, not as a mere theoretical principle but as a living reality. This was illustrated by one of Shaykh Akram’s personal reflections on the kaffara (atonement) for sexual intercourse (jima’) during the day in Ramadan, which is not mentioned in the Quran, but reflected in the Sunnah in a hadith in Bukhari and Muslim (see Shaykh Salih Munajjid here). Now the Quran does mention three kaffaras for: 1) killing unintentionally (qatl al-khata’); 2) broken oaths; and 3) zihar (a husband making allusive comments about one’s wife and her marital status). Shaykh Akram showed how the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) made qiyas (analogy) with the Quranic kaffara for zihar for illegal sexual intercourse during the day in Ramadan because the former makes the halal into the haram, in a similar way to how illegal sexual intercourse makes the haram into the halal. Furthermore, the reason for the kaffara for illegal sexual relations during the day in Ramadan being different to the atonement to missed ritual prayers (salat) or zakat relates to the distinction between zarf (that which is obligatory in its time and what is similar to it) and mi’yar (that which can only be performed in one time). Whereas a missed ritual prayer or missed hajj can be made-up (qada) at another prayer time or pilgrimage time, respectively, a fast of Ramadan cannot be atoned for in another Ramadan, where only the current obligatory fast can be performed, without a spoiled or missed fast being made-up at the same time.

In the interests of brevity, I will not recount in full an example that Shaykh Akram gave to further highlight the Prophet’s strictly Quranic method. The case referred to al-muharramat, which are women that one cannot marry, and they comprise two categories in the Quran: 1) those forbidden by blood (mother and her ascendants, and daughters and her descendants) (al-asl wa’l-far); and 2) those forbidden through the breastfeeding of milk. Now the Quran outlines all the blood relations, but does not recount a full list for those forbidden through breastfeeding. Now a hadith in Sahih Muslim has the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) outlining that what is forbidden by lineage is forbidden, likewise, through breastfeeding. While some scholars see this hadith as adding (ziyada) to the Quranic list for breastfeeding of milk, Shaykh Akram pointed out that the hadith is actually merely an explanation (bayan) of the Quran, in this instance, whereby the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) has not considered the Quran to be omitting the relevant prohibited women through breastfeeding; rather, the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) saw that the Quran, in its beautiful conciseness, was not going to merely repeat all the categories again that had been stated in relation to those prohibited by blood, thus the Quran was simply mentioning the absolute minimal essential headings of those prohibited by breastfeeding, with the rest of the relevant categories implied.

His project is also conceived as disavowing the kalamist-inspired limitation of the Quran and Sunnah (as exemplified by great and still highly admirable imams like Juwayni), whereby the two sources were seen as very limited and hence the perceived need to produce “foreign” principles (often derived from Greek philosophy – touched upon later in relation to logical concepts like hadd, or definition, and qiyas concepts like qiyas kulli (complete and general analogy)) in order to adequately address peoples’ countless needs. Shaykh Akram said that such an understanding derived from misunderstanding the later division of knowledge into 1) shari’i (scriptural) and 2) aqli (purely rational, non-scriptural). For Shaykh Akram, the shari’i included the aqli, but proponents of the latter often failed to perceive the aqli-comprehensiveness of the shari’i; and he sought to counter this and raise its discussion in western Islamic scholarly discussions. Furthermore, he pointed out that kalamist usuliyyin take knowledge apart from reality (like philosophers), but the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) knew the condition of his people and would rule accordingly (hence the various narrations about what is the best action). In such cases in the Prophetic model, there is, for Shaykh Akram, no ta’arud (conflict) between religious texts, as the text of al-Waraqat states, but simply occasions of ikhtilaf (different contexts addressed accordingly).

While Shaykh Akram emphasised the importance of knowing usul al-fiqh for having a correct understanding of the Quran and Sunnah, so that the Lord’s message can be correctly comprehended, he also outlined its limitations and alternative ways of mastering the Sacred Law. For example, he argued that early jurists like Abu Hanifa and Malik, while being undoubtedly methodical in their own traditions (Malik in the Medinese and Abu Hanifa in the Iraqi tradition of Ibrahim Nakha’i), they were also natural jurists in a way that later great scholars like Juwayni were not. To illustrate the point, he highlighted how knowledge starts as a’yan (individual cases) and then moves into ‘umum (general theories). In this way, one can become a master jurist by reading profoundly and extensively the Quran and Sunnah and the judgements of the early community (through the musannaf literature of ‘Abd al-Razzaq and Ibn Abi Shayba, in particular), without a great deal of philosophical and abstract usul al-fiqh; in the same way that one can master a language by reading a large amount of literature, rather than just merely concentrating on grammar.

Moreover, this natural juristic expertise was encouraged for contemporary jurists to embrace a dynamic perspective on fatwa-giving, as illustrated, firstly, by the Bukhari narration referred above about the Companion (may Allah be pleased with him) who contravened the fast of Ramadan through daylight sexual intercourse. Now the narration gives a great deal of flexibility, whereby the Companion says he could not fast for two months consecutively because of his weakness for sex; and the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) allows him flexibility, apparently, on that basis. Shaykh Akram highlighted that no madhhab displays the flexibility of the hadith in such cases. Instead they often enjoin, in such cases, the fasting of two months consecutively for those who do not own a slave; and Shaykh Akram emphasised that the hadith showed the great nature of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) in calling people back to God (da’i). In addition, Shaykh Akram narrated an example of juristic dynamism displayed by Yahya ibn Yahya al-Laythi al-Maliki (which can also be read here), who was asked for a fatwa from a ruler who had engaged in illegal daylight sexual intercourse during Ramadan; and al-Laythi’s fatwa was that the ruler would have to fast two months consecutively, despite the normative fatwa being that he should (and in this case he could) free a slave, because al-Laythi reasoned that such a ruler could free a slave a day for committing such sexual transgressions throughout Ramadan. Shaykh Akram highlighted thus that contemporary jurists should exhibit such dynamism as exhibited in the hadith and the instance of al-Laythi; however, many jurists do not display such expansiveness and can only work according to an order laid-down in a classical manual, without any deeper understanding. His call is not to dispense with madhhabs, as he is Hanafi, but rather a demand that those who want to deliver public fatwas should be true legal experts, and should not be semi-expert nor unnecessarily rigid!

Complexity of Ahkam

As al-Waraqat states, ahkam can be articulated as seven: wajib, mandub, mubah, mahzur, makruh, sahih and fasid. Shaykh Akram’s concern with the first 5 rulings is that they are not properly defined by later scholars and the implications are not set-out properly. So the wajib, or fard, has many categories that are not the same in all instances. For example, a Shafi’i considering it fard for a follower in a group prayer to recite the fatiha is not the same as the obligation to not drink alcohol. Even actions of sunna mu’akkada (confirmed Prophetic non-obligatory actions) are not the same; for example, the Prophet (may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) once made du’a against someone who did not eat with their right-hand (a confirmed sunna). Ijtihad, he reminded, is only for unclear matters; and for such cases the Prophetic method was not to explicitly set-out the difference between obligations and recommendations; for example, the case (and hence the difference of opinion, or ikhtilaf) on something like the witr prayer. The Shaykh did not completely dismiss following such later distinctions – for he said that non-experts must make taqlid of a legal expert – but he wanted to highlight the theoretical problem; and how the later attempts at specific judgements not explicitly explained in the Prophetic statements did not resolve any perceived confusion.

The Nature of Language

Shaykh Akram conducted a fascinating discussion of language – as one would expect from a Nadwi. This included a respectful presentation of Ibn Taymiyya’s discussion of majaz and haqiqi (metaphorical and literal meanings of words) as contained in his Kitab al-iman (which is included in his al-Majmu’ al-fatawa). In summary, Ibn Taymiyya’s denial of majaz, even if we are not convinced of his theory, is not an ignorant and simplistic one, but one rooted in seeking precision and denying conclusions that are, at best, conjectural. So Ibn Taymiyya’s contention was that nobody in the salaf from the fuqaha employed majaz (as he understood the conjectural nature of assigning majaz to any given word), and who can really assign the meaning of a word? Also, even if a word was first used in the Quran and Sunnah and now has a common meaning, can anyone be certain that the original Arabs had no other understanding of the word that would render a majaz attribution redundant? Finally, Ibn Taymiyya would ask such majaz enthusiasts whether Arabs ever used words unconditionally? Now this sophisticated argument from Ibn Taymiyya is only one that expert linguists can faithfully engage with, it is not one for simple imitative scholarship.

In addition, Shaykh Akram pointed out that the meanings assigned by usuliyyin to matters such as ‘amm, khass, zahir and nass suffer from the same openness to criticism as terms like the fard and sunna. Furthermore, the aqsam al-kalam (types of speech) section in al-Waraqat was subjected to a grammarian’s criticism, where Juwayni’s points of kalam being acceptable if consisting of only a fi’l and a harf (where opponents would say that an ism is required) or that it could consist of simply an ism and a harf (only supported by Jurjani) are matters of contention.

Naskh

During the class, this was the only discussion which Shaykh Akram mentioned should be kept in the classroom. When I later privately discussed it with him, and I mentioned how some might understand it, he advised me to clarify it in this present overview. In light of his definition of naskh, it is appropriate that I do not actually translate it in the normal manner, namely, abrogation. This is because Shaykh Akram defined naskh as taking into consideration the situation and condition of people, so one can bring into effect what has been “abrogated.” In other words, if the circumstances of those “abrogated” verses of the Quran emerge then the significance or wisdom (hikma) of them again becomes effective. To illustrate, by way of clarification (and this is the example I privately used with Shaykh Akram and he agreed with my understanding), wine remains haram, or prohibited, in its ruling, or hukm; but if one encounters a Muslim struggling with the problem of drinking wine, then, although the hukm does not change, the scholar should take guidance from the abrogated, accept the fact that most people only gradually leave sins they have become addicted to, and try to advise a gradually realistic programme for the person to effectively leave the sin. Nevertheless, and this is where Shaykh Akram emphatically cautioned against any abuse of such theory, such efforts to utilise the mansukh could only be performed by completely expert scholars (mujtahids).

This type of hikma, as opposed to fatwa, reminds me of Ibn Rajab’s commentary of hadith 8 in his Jami’ al-‘ulum wa’l-hikam, where he writes: “The Prophet (may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) did not stipulate that those who came to him wishing Islam had to cling to the prayer and the zakah. On the contrary, it has been narrated from him that he accepted Islam from a people who stipulated that they should not have to pay zakah…[After narrating traditions in Musnad Ahmad to this effect regarding converts seeking to leave zakat, jihad and prayer without bowing, or ruku’,] Imam Ahmad took the stand based on these hadith and said, ‘[The acceptance of] Islam can be sound with an unacceptable precondition, but the person is then required to fulfil all of the judgements and rulings of Islam’” (trans. Abdassamad Clarke, in Ibn Rajab, The Compendium of Knowledge and Wisdom, pp. 130-1).

This discussion reminded me of my mother’s case just before she converted to Islam (may Allah have mercy on her and everyone who says amin to this prayer). She did not have the strength of character to immediately adopt the hijab and she worried about converting and not donning the head scarf. I therefore sought the advice of an English-based scholar Shaykh Abdullah al-Juday’, and he advised me to tell my mother to convert, even if she did not adopt the hijab, as long as she did not consider it lawful to not wear the hijab. I mentioned to Shaykh Akram that this story reminded me of what I understood to be his intended meaning behind saying the mansukh would again be applicable. And he agreed with me, Alhamdulillah.

Scholarly Consensus (ijma’) on Juristic Matters

Shaykh Akram praised the ijma’ section in Imam Shafi’i’s Risala. Furthermore, he pointed that often the ijma’ declared in fiqh works in later madhhab history are often instances where no ijma’ exists. He and I discussed in private how madhhab claims of ijma’ on three declarations of divorce being three divorces, even if intended as only one divorce – which is the position of the four Sunni schools of law, in opposition to Ibn Taymiyya and a number of contemporary scholars – is not a clear and binding consensus (al-ijma’ al-sarih), but is rather a non-binding and non-absolute consensus (al-ijma’ al-sukuti). Moreover, he highlighted that the conditions of absolute ijma’ for later generations are simply theoretical and have never occurred as theorised, whereby generations after the Companions (may Allah be well pleased with them) reached such a consensus and bound future generations to it. In addition, he argued that the jama’a (group) that the hadith tell the Muslim umma to follow means the Companions (may Allah be well pleased with them all).

Transmitted Reports (akhbar) and the Sunnah

Our dear teacher (may Allah increase him and his family with all good) gave the logical advice that the science of reports is taken from the experts of hadith rather than texts of usul al-fiqh (including the one being taught). Although he was quite positive about the section in al-Waraqat, he was critical of the hadith section in the Hanafi Usul al-Shashi (which Shaykh Akram had edited and published, with a foreword by Shaykh Yusuf Qaradawi). He also spoke of the brilliance of Imam Bukhari in actually looking at individual hadith on a case-by-case basis, without using general principles in a half-baked way. An example of a half-baked approach to the science of hadith is seen in people performing tad’if (weakening of narrations) or tashih (authenticating of narrations) by merely looking at abbreviated comments on the status of various narrators in something like Ibn Hajar’s Tahdhib al-tahdhib, or applying general principles from an usul al-hadith text like Ibn Hajar’s Nuzhat al-nazar.

With regards to the Sunnah, he adopted the division articulated by Shah Waliullah in his Hujjat Allah al-baligha: 1) sunna al-huda (guidance): which are sanctioned to be religiously followed; and 2) sunna al-‘ada (not part of the mission, such as eating Arab food or dressing like an Arab). He stated that the following of sunna al-‘ada does not attract Divine reward for its performance by itself, but is only rewarded by the Divine if performed out of love for the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), so one is really rewarded for love of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) rather than the action itself.

Qiyas (Analogy)

Some of the most profound discussions related to this topic. He contrasted Prophetic usul which is the qiyas of a juz’i to juz’i, as opposed to the Greek qiyas of kulli to kulli; and how a methodology of qiyas based on early practice accepts one of tamthili rather than the Greek-inspired mutakallim approach that seeks to be shumuli. What all of these contrasting terms come down to is the idea that the early-Muslim approach makes qiyas of one small case to another small case, and the possibility of being mistaken here is limited; while the Greek-inspired mutakallim approach seeks to establish a general rule and then apply it to others (despite struggling to find specific examples of such generalities that they can apply, as highlighted by Ibn Taymiyya in his al-Radd ‘ala’l-mantiqiyyin). It was this Greek-inspired approach to usul that led, according to Shaykh Akram, Imam Juwayni in al-Burhan to accuse Imam Abu Hanifa of not knowing qiyas, because the qiyas which Abu Hanifa was famous for extensively and expertly utilising was not in accordance with the Greek method that Juwayni favoured. The early community derived rulings on the basis of ta’rif (specific-case based characterisation), and not the method of hadd (all-encompassing definition), tasawwur (full conception) and tasdiq (full judgement) that was taken from the Greeks.

Shaykh Akram highlighted the various aspects of traditional qiyas. Included was the fact that the essence of qiyas is tahqiq al-manat, or deriving from general rulings, and everyone agrees on it in principle (even the Zahiris), even if people might differ on application. What is more controversial (and here the Zahiris do disagree) is takhrij al-manat: taking a specific case and applying it specifically to another similar case because the ‘illa or why is present in the new case (far’) as exists in the original case (asl). Moreover, he highlighted important aspects of qiyas:

• Qiyas al-‘illa: the why of the ruling (very important, and stronger than the khabar al-wahid or solitary hadith);
• Qiyas al–shubha: when the same ‘illa is found in another case then the same original ruling is applied – in cases of tard, not ‘aks (when ‘illa is not found and the ruling cannot be applied);
• Qiyas al–dalala: to make effort to understand the hukm beyond the mere outer words.

He highlighted that qiyas al-‘illa is difficult to ascertain in worship (‘ibada), so it was more utilised in social laws (mu’amalat) by Abu Hanifa and Malik. Due to the danger of qiyas being corruptly applied, Shaykh Akram said that it is dangerous and that it should be applied cautiously by the fully qualified. Therefore, he quoted Jassas’ limitations of qiyas: that it should not remove the hukm of a sacred text of Quran or hadith (nass), nor oppose the ijma’ of the Companions. Moreover, he added that qiyas was not to be applied in hudud (Divinely-set penal codes) and kaffara.

Ijtihad and Taqlid

Despite his repeated calls for scholars to become expert scholars, and for expert scholars to throw off all-encompassing taqlid of Islamic schools of thought of all sorts, Shaykh Akram remains traditional Hanafi. Therefore, he naturally asserts that complete laypeople should make taqlid of a qualified scholar; but, in turn, those qualified scholars should strive to be experts and not rest on merely parroting what they have been taught or read in books, because it is upon such a blinded method that mistakes in fatwa occur, as the repetitive scholar does not understand what he possesses and what and how he is to wield that possession. As pointed out, fiqh and ijtihad were one thing in the early community; hence a mufti (one who gives a fatwa) was a mujtahid (capable of independent legal reasoning). Shaykh Akram was dismayed at how now, for example, one can be considered a mufti by just repeating a fatwa that one finds in an Urdu collection of fatwas.

In Shaykh Akram’s opinion, there are three types of people in relation to Islamic law: 1) the mujtahid; 2) general scholars who understand a scholarly argument and only follow with knowledge, and can depart from their mujtahid for another when satisfied by scholarly preference to do so; and 3) common people who only make taqlid of a qualified scholar. Nevertheless, he advised that scholars should provide their evidences to laypeople when passing fatwa, even if the latter do not understand, but they should at least make an effort to understand. Yet, he mentioned the classical principle that an ‘ammi (layperson) has no madhhab, and that they simply ask a qualified scholar whenever and wherever he or she is without being restricted to the issuer of the fatwa being from a particular school, or the school that the ‘ammi associates himself with; so, for him, there is no absolute duty to make one’s purification or ritual prayer according to one school, unless one is confined by circumstance to following one scholar who adheres fully to one school. In this regard, Shaykh Akram quoted Ibn ‘Abidin in his Hashiya where the latter quotes Ibn al-Humam saying that an ‘ammi can follow whichever fatwa from two differing muftis that his heart inclines to, but Ibn ‘Abidin said he can even follow the one that his heart does not incline to because the ‘ammi’s heart is not given consideration in such matters because his heart has no way of being more content with one fatwa or another. Then he quoted Hamid al-Din Farahi reiterating what others have said, namely, that every age must have mujtahids. Nevertheless, he pointed out that our ummatic problem is not that we lack mujtahids, but that we collectively lack God-consciousness (taqwa); and we should therefore make more effort in developing God-conscious people than in trying to cultivate mujtahids.

Shaykh Akram praised the Hanafi Jassas’ work on usul al-fiqh. Thus it was appropriate that he ended by presenting Jassas’ conditions of a mujtahid: 1) fully able to conduct independent research of the earliest and primary sources; 2) morally upright and trustworthy (‘adil); and 3) concerned in improving the situation of believers in society (a da’i).

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In conclusion, I hope that the many young scholars who attended, and those young scholars who will listen to the recorded material, will take these discussions further and enrich Islamic scholarship in the west. In this regard, the Safeenah Fellowship would welcome the opportunity to support and fund such research. The real beauty and blessing of Shaykh Akram is his tireless effort to raise the English-speaking scholarship so that it is empowered to rise to the many challenges of the age. God knows the secrets of people’s hearts, but I have sensed over the years the least amount of ego and desire for scholarly dictatorship in Shaykh Akram, masha Allah. Hence I have seen students and non-students challenge him and for him to respond in the best and most open of manners, without any sense of “Do you know who I am? How can you challenge me?” That is the secret to him being so loved, because even those who are welcomed to challenge him are not met by arrogance, masha Allah. Ultimately, while our leaders talk of the importance of indigenous scholarship being best suited to tackling our problems, it is hard to envisage such a profound scholarship emerging if it does not benefit and engage with scholars like Shaykh Akram in our midst. It is this willingness to challenge traditions on the basis of actual expertise, and not whim and half knowledge, which best sums up why Shaykh Akram is so crucial to this western enterprise, even if the conclusions and look of it end up being quite radically different to Shaykh Akram. In other words, if I can have the liberty of using giants who over-shadow Shaykh Akram, if a refutation of Imam Malik occurs by someone like Imam Shaybani or Imam Shafi’i, or even an Imam Nawawi or Imam Yahya ibn Yahya al-Laythi al-Maliki, then we are all enriched, because they are truly on the level to critique; but a refutation of Imam Malik by less proficient scholars of Islamic law is hardly going to be worth much except a modern Ph.D thesis, with passing and barely noticeable benefit to the world at large.

Undoubtedly, Shaykh Abul Hasan’s thought needs further development. In the passages presented above, one sees the time and audience visible in the nature of the Shaykh’s discourse. He is mainly addressing Muslims in Muslim lands, or Muslim immigrants (still Urdu and Arabic speaking) to non-Muslim lands. The condition of Muslims in the West and the Muslim world has gone through many changes. Applying his thought to current contexts might mean retaining some of his ideas, dismissing others and leaving others to future analysis.

Furthermore, one sees an absence of attention to converts to Islam in the non-Muslim countries in Abul Hasan’s writings; and, although one can logically deduct some general advices for them from the Shaykh’s words, one notices that they and their individual history and needs are never directly approached. This absence is somewhat understandable for the Shaykh because his work concentrated on reality as opposed to dealing with an abstract future, and at the time one had not seen the influx into the faith that one sees now. Moreover, while many of the immigrants to the West who constituted the Shaykh’s audience would have still seen themselves as foreign, this is no longer the case for the children of many of those in those audiences; such children now see themselves as or just are indigenous to a greater extent (even if they are not still fully viewed as indigenous by others who feel more naturally native).

It is interesting how the Shaykh, being foreign to the West yet advising the Muslims of the West, also highlights that the Muslim world as a whole has been beset by many historical tragedies – spiritual, intellectual and political – that have negatively impacted it. These facts, as presented by the noble Shaykh, actually should have the effect of enabling Muslims to reject the idealistic notion that the Muslim world, even the best of their scholars, have the answer to our problems in their entirety or the idea that affairs are necessarily better “over there” rather than here. Shaykh Taqi Usmani, one of the leading conservative Islamic scholars of the age, noted in his Discourses on Islamic Way of Life the inadequacy of the religious scholars to beneficially lead a modern government if they were given even a year’s warning for preparation; and how the “field of research and investigation is only half-way and inadequate” in the realm of “dealings, social living and morality” (in contrast to the emphasis given to “beliefs and worship”). Some of the worst and bitter Muslim polemics in the West have been led by idealistic factions – across the various groups – who have merely imported, wholesale, certain intellectual baggage from the Muslim world, which often has a narrow and merely polemical character, overall; and these have often debilitated the Muslim community as a whole, even if one can point to certain limited benefits that have accompanied the overwhelming negativity. The religious Muslim community in the West is still trying to combat such negative importations.

Therefore we are left with a project that Professor Sherman Jackson has stated specifically for Blackamerican Muslims but meant, and can certainly be taken, as relevant for all Muslims in the West in his Islam and the Blackamerican: Looking Toward the Third Resurrection and Islam and the Problem of Black Suffering. In the former work, he spoke of Blackamerican Muslims who “master Arabic and the Islamic religious sciences, alongside what they deem useful of the critical Western tradition,…return[ing] to a position of full partnership (if not leadership) in the intellectual life of American Islam.” In the latter work, Jackson repeated that such a venture depended on the “ability to access and deploy the intellectual legacy of the classical Sunni Tradition, both as a means of domesticating Black Religion and of moving beyond it to address important spiritual and transracial issues in a manner that is both effective in an American context and likely to be recognised as Islamic in a Muslim one.” Jackson further notes in the latter work, “Actually, I overstated the matter in Islam and the Blackamerican, speaking of the need for Blackamerican Muslims to ‘master’ the supertradition of Islam. All Blackamerican Muslims need to do is gain enough facility in Tradition to display the requisite degree of ‘rhetorical etiquette’ to be recognized as playing by the rules of Islamic ‘public reason’ when vindicating, crafting, or critiquing doctrinal and practical positions.”

A Nadwi project for the West – as I would understand it from Nadwi Shaykhs like Abul Hasan, Akram and Uwais Namazi – would fall very much within the parameters set–out by Jackson. Indeed, when Professor Jackson and Shaykh Akram recently shared a platform in London to discuss the issue of Muslim minorities in the West (organised by Islamic Courses), with Shaykh Uwais in the audience, I – as the chair who spent time with them all – felt a great congruence and shared sense of purpose and way of thinking, despite the obvious fact that they differ on somewhat subsidiary points. Therefore Western Muslims must faithfully commit to the tradition of Islam and their own Western identity, whereby their essential religious principles are not compromised and where their cultural heritage that is at one with those Islamic principles is not needlessly discarded in the pursuit of some “Islamic-ness” which is the mere imitation of a cultural norm of a Muslim people that is not required by Islam. Professor Jackson has defined such a dynamic Western manifestation of Islam as “Modernized Islam”, which he contrasts with “Modern Islam.” In sum, “Modernized Islam” is defined by Jackson “as the classical Tradition of Muslim law, jurisprudence, and theology ostensibly calibrated to the realities of modern times”; and to show it in action he interestingly highlights a legal verdict issued in Shaykh Yusuf Qaradawi’s Fatawa mu’asirah.

In the final analysis, we can see Shaykh Abul Hasan as a vital guide towards attaining “facility” in the “classical Tradition.” Yet, finally, our conclusions on pre-modern Islamic intellectual history, on modern history or even on positions of law and conduct might differ from his, but we will be enriched by engaging his wide attempt at trying to help us tackle the problems we face. A great challenge lies ahead of us. It requires bravery and diligence (as both Shaykh Akram and Professor Jackson have often stressed when addressing the problem), and a great deal of patience, because a “facility” with the tradition does not come quickly and easily. Therefore we must be wary in the West of thinking that any scholarly product with the best publicity package is actually the correct way forward. We must be prepared to dig deep and even be prepared to change course when required; and this changing course is when called for by a commitment to the principles of the religion and not a mere political expediency without principles or even in conflict with our core beliefs (as Professor Jackson has warned). Furthermore, Western Muslims should not be excessively rejectionist about what they perceive to be foreign culture, and to then reject it simply because it is deemed “foreign”; for such a western nationalism and chauvinism would be beyond distasteful and be a gross disservice to the open multiculturalism and global brotherhood of Islam. As an English Muslim, my modern Englishness and Islam are well adjusted and prepared to accommodate “foreign” food, clothing and even outlooks and scholars and scholarly conclusions (whether “native” or “foreign”), whether I choose to follow them myself or merely entertain them as another acceptable point of view. Thus a healthy future project for “Modernized Islam” in the West is going to have to also allow acceptable diversity within its midst, without trying to define a monolithic understanding of what it means to be a “Modernized Muslim” in the West. In the same way we expect global Islam to be culturally sensitive, in part, we should not expect a one-dimensional “English Islam”, or “European Islam”, or “American Islam” or “Western Islam;” in the same way that “Arab Islam” or “Indian Islam” or “African Islam” is not defined narrowly. Those in England, Europe, North America or the West should be even more open to internal cultural diversity in light of us leading globalization and having the most cultural diversity in our cosmopolitan cities. Emotional, cultural and intellectual terrorism is not a healthy way forward for Muslims in the West; and I would love to think that Shaykh Abul Hasan is a bridge that we can cross over our troubled waters, even if the bridge is not a completely smooth one and Abul Hasan is not the only path on that bridge. We ask God for success in trying to meet such challenges.

Note: Shaykh Abul Hasan Ali Nadawi’s opinions below do not necessary reflect the opinions of the author or VirtualMosque.com. To view Andrew Booso’s discussion and review of Shaykh Abdul Hasan’s positions, please be sure to visit the 4th part of the series: Part IV

Shaykh Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi had a clear idea of the role that the Muslim world should play in relation to “the West,” and it was one framed by first understanding the “permanent role of the Muslim world” in light of its “fundamental outlook on life which gives rise to societies and civilizations.” Primarily, “the Muslim community (Ummat-i-Islamia) is the bearer of the Last Message which controls all its deeds and actions. Its place is that of guidance and leadership and its mission is the superintendence of the world…It is, therefore, out of the question for the Muslim Millat to be the camp-follower of any other community and to resign itself to submission and imitation.” Instead, “the Muslims possess a definite purpose in life:” “a message for mankind and their culture and civilization, endeavor and struggle and all other activities are subordinated to their creed and ideals.”

This distinctiveness included:

“Knowledge for the sake of knowledge, power for the sake of power and unity for the sake of unity are meaningless concepts. The conquest of the forces of nature and the triumph of man over matter are nothing but sport and vanity, from the Islamic point of view, if it is intended only for the display of one’s might or intellectual or material superiority…Islam allows, within proper limits, striving and endeavor in the path of life and knowledge provided that it is for a noble purpose and in the interest of mankind…Islam does not regard the earthly life and the present world to be the highest goal of man and the pinnacle of his advancement…The Qur’an asserts that the life of this world is the bridge of the Hereafter and an opportunity for action…The Qur’an condemns those who prefer this perishable, transitory, and imperfect world to the eternal and everlasting, unbounded and faultless Hereafter which is free from every kind of evil and meanness, grief and distress, fear and loss and disease and ill-health…”

Shaykh Abul Hasan lamented that the Islamic world has failed to duly guide the West to the path towards attaining the Divine, and he possessed a clear perception of the consequences of that failure:

“This country [the USA], in brief, seems to be taking a new turn and a new ray of hope is appearing. Due to our shortsightedness and internal dissensions we, in the past, lost the opportunity to come to its aid. Had Islam been propagated in Europe when the Ottomans had established their rule over a part of the Continent, or, even earlier, when the Moors had swept over Spain, the West, today, would not be finding itself in this predicament. It would not have been caught in the quagmire of materialism.

“But, unfortunately, we did not rise to the occasion. How much do I wish that the Muslim evangelists had reached here when they had set out into the world in the early centuries of’ Islam. It is said that the Muslims had discovered America before Columbus. How wonderful it would have been had they taken advantage of it and given the message of Islam to the New World. But it was not to be, and the Islamic countries have been paying the penalty for the last two hundred years. I believe that the way the Muslim countries have, today, become the lackeys of the West and the treatment they are receiving at its hands is a punishment for the failure of the Muslims to convey to it the Message of God at the proper time.”

He was to detail the general principles of the “role of Islamic countries” in propagating this message in the modern age:

“At a time like this when the Western Civilization seems to have attained the highest stage of its evolution and the Islamic countries, because of their peculiar circumstances and reasons of history, cannot hope to participate in it on terms of equality, and, even if it were possible to adopt such a course, it would neither be wise nor proper for them to do so for it would mean the end of all the things they cherish and hold precious in life, their faith, their ideals and their distinctive way of individual and social existence, there is open for them an avenue of endeavour which leads neither to slavery and imitation nor to denial and isolation. To pursue it with all their might and sincerity will be both safe and honourable for Muslims. It will not only be in keeping with their destiny and natural role in the world but also be regarded as the most revolutionary step of the modern age and the greatest and most sacred undertaking of the time. It consists of the guidance of the modern civilization itself, its rejuvenation and reorientation and its enrichment with Apostolic faith and with basic human tenderness and compassion. The duty of guidance and correction of the Western Civilization can be discharged only by the Muslims but, as a first step, they will have to shed their sickly obsessions and moral and cultural consequences of centuries of political enslavement and intellectual inertia and degeneration. They will have to take stock of their situation and analyse the causes of their present plight before they can seal off the sources of the sceptical beliefs and inclinations that are corroding their cultural and spiritual heritage and making them an easy prey to the corrupting influences of the West. In the place of the Western workshops of the mind and heart the Muslims will have to set up their own Islamic workshops and to give themselves a new set of values and standards which will be fully integrated to their past as also to the challenges of the modern times.” 

His spelled out his vision for the future as one in which the Muslims made

“the fullest use of the physical sciences and technology of the West…and then subordinating them by means of their own intelligence and industry to the lofty purposes which the last of the holy Prophets has bequeathed to them and by virtue of which they have won the distinction of being proclaimed as the ‘Best of People.’ This happy co-ordination between the ends and means from the absence of which both the West and the East are suffering at present can alter the destiny of the world. It can save it from the impending annihilation and put it firmly on the road to all-round progress and felicity. The West has all the resources in the world but it is devoid of a healthy sense of purpose; the (Muslim) East is endowed with the soundest of aims and ideals but is very backward materially…The Western civilization is doomed. It has become rotten to the core, and if it is still surviving it is not at all due to its latent qualities of strength and endurance but because no other civilization is at present ready to take its place…The Muslims, therefore, ought to decide whether it is more honourable to approach the West with a begging bowl or assume the exalted position of stewardship and guidance of humanity more than which there is no greater glory in the world after Apostleship.”

He warned Muslims living in the West to

“not be overawed by this civilization. You are the fruit of the tree of Apostleship. Live here, but keep away from the slavish imitation of the Western Civilization. Derive as much benefit as you like from your stay, but do not be swayed by crude and vulgar materialism. Remember your message and be on your guard against the dissolution of your personality. Do not feel ashamed of your Faith, way of life and culture. Do not imagine that you are the beasts and they are men. No, you are men and they are the beasts. This land is glittering with electric lights; even the night here is bright as day; but it is devoid of true effulgence of blessedness and Divine guidance.”

Part of this advice included having an essentially spiritual disposition and living a wholesome life free of excess and vulgarity:

“You should give the Azan [call to the ritual prayer] which may stir their minds and offer Namaz [the ritual prayer] so that they may see and ponder over it. Lead a clean life in order that a revulsion is created in them for their own degenerate ways of living, practice moderation so that a realization may dawn on them of the foulness of sensuality and excessive self-indulgence, and freeing yourselves from the ruthless domination of the machines, live in a cool, calm and collected manner in order that they may know where peace is. Rediscover the world that lies within you and develop the spirituality which might be felt by those who came into contact with you. I wish that devout bondmen of the Lord, men with an illumined heart, came to live here and told these people who are disgusted with life that Verily in the remembrance of Allah do hearts find rest (Qur’an 13:28).”

Again, he saw the essence of a goodly Islamic character to be one founded on a concentration on spiritual efforts, which were the foundation of reforming one’s character in the most comprehensive sense:

 “First, try to produce Faith within yourselves, observe Namaz and spend some time everyday in meditation; produce the warmth that has been destroyed by the smoke of the factories, refresh your soul, set right the aim of your life, read the Quran daily, study the life of the Prophet [may the peace and blessings of God be upon him] and seek light from it, and, then, convey the message of the Religion of Nature to the Americans.”

Shaykh Abul Hasan warned Muslims in the West against complacency and how they must protect their Islamic character if they were to justifiably remain in the West:

“Your stay here is correct. It is not only justified, but also a worship and a great source of preaching and propagation of Faith. And if it is not that then I have great misgivings. As I have said on various occasions, if you do not take full care to safeguard your religious life and arrange for the religious education and upbringing of your children and make sure that your future generations remain true to Islam then your living in this country is a sin and you are in grave danger.”

In this respect, he envisaged great reward for protecting the faith in such seemingly adverse circumstances: “I say that a man who lives in America and takes the Faith unimpaired with him to the next world will, perhaps, merit a greater reward than him who dies in Arabia because he protects the lamp of his faith against all sorts of storms and tempests.

He stressed, passionately, the tenor of the message that the Muslims in the West were to convey to their non-Muslim fellows:

“We are the adherents of that Apostle. We must summon up courage to give to these people what they need, to make them realise that we possess what they are, regrettably, wanting in, and without which the Western Civilization is doomed. This Civilization is ready to commit suicide. If anything can save it, it is the guidance of the Quran. A harmonious blending has to be worked out between material progress and spiritual values. Disaster awaits the world if materialism gains the upper hand over morality. This is the call our Islamic countries should give. They should tell plainly to the West, “Look here. You are drowning and we can save you.””

Nevertheless, he had fears for Muslims living so far from the heartlands of Islam: “The establishment of an Islamic society so far away from the centres of Islamic faith and civilization is open to grave risks and can lead to catastrophic consequences.” Indeed, he specified those fears:

“I fear the day, in America as elsewhere, when we will withdraw into our shells and get entangled in the labyrinth of study and research, and our connecting links with the real fountainhead of Islam and with the Islamic centres will be broken where, in spite of all drawbacks, Islam is still alive, and the springs of Islamic warmth and eagerness will dry up within us. It will be, then, that the American Islam, European Islam, and the Japanese, Iranian, Indian and Pakistani Islams will emerge, making it impossible to distinguish one from the other. They will be as different from each other as an American is from an Asian, or a Japanese from an Afghan, and Islamic societies will appear whose mental attitudes and natural inclinations and values will be widely apart.”

It is, therefore, unsurprising that he advised the following:

“I will advise you to visit your native countries regularly, every two years or so. Maintain a living contact with the places of your origin. It would be better if you could go to India, Pakistan or the cities of Mecca and Medina and spend some time there in a religious environment and in the company of virtuous and godly men. The wells of religious fervour and God-consciousness would dry up within you if you went on living here without a break. The battery of the heart must be charged from time to time by going to your country and passing a few months in it. I have noticed that there is a marked difference between those who maintain a contact with their native lands and those who do not. People who are out of touch with their home-countries generally develop an insensitiveness towards religious feelings, values and ideals…

“Religious environment is in the nature of a power-house. By the grace of God, this environment still exists in India and Pakistan and men of high moral and spiritual stature are found in whose company the rust is removed from the hearts. I am saying it from personal experience. The same way have I felt even in Saudi Arabia which I visit frequently. There, also, I have observed that families who have remained in contact with India are in a much better shape than those who have adopted the Arab culture and severed their ties with India. Mecca and Medina are, of course, the real centres of Islam, but they, too, have started accepting thoughtlessly the influence of the Western Civilization and the petrodollars are playing havoc with the social and cultural values of the Arabs. What is more, a sort of complacency is created when people take up residence in those blessed cities. We are the inhabitants of Hejaz, we live under the shadow of the House of Ka’aba – this is how they begin to feel. On the contrary, the religious condition of those is, definitely, better who maintain a living contact with India, make regular visits to it, do not lose touch with Urdu in which religious books and magazines are published, and make the theologians and spiritual mentors coming from India and Pakistan their guests and learn the laws and principles of the Shariat from them; they go more frequently to Mecca and Medina, perform the Umra (Pilgrimage to Mecca at any time of the year apart from the days of the Haj) more often and bear a greater attachment for the sacred town of Medina.”

Moreover, he exhorted the Muslims in the West to be wary of nationalism and to see themselves united in one spiritual brotherhood across state lines:

“You are not Egyptians and Syrians, but Muslims. You are one community, one brotherhood. You are Ibrahimi and Mohammadi. Know yourself. You have not come here to lose your identity and get fitted into this monstrous machine, like a valueless part or to fill your bellies like the animals. No. Take the Message to the peoples of this land; wake them up; tell them how they have gone out of the right way.”

Furthermore, the Shaykh – in an address that Abul Hasan gave in England in 1982, transcribed by Sulaiman Kazi (Nadwi Foundation) – encouraged the Muslims in the West to eschew a personalised, isolated practise of the religion and, instead, called for them to exhibit their faith in the streets, markets and daily life; hence a living example of the faith’s purity would help draw non-Muslims towards embracing Islam. He warned that the living of an insular existence in the West provided dangers; and just as the Muslims in Spain were wiped out after great power and building of wonderful feats of architecture, the Muslims of the West could also find their presence compromised if they did not bring the faith to the non-Muslims. Thus he commanded the Muslims to prove the benefit of their presence, and to be noble and principled. Therefore he warned against the Muslims living in isolation, content with their detached lives, places of worship, acts of worship and religious institutions. In pursuit of these goals, he demanded that Muslims master the native language, and prepare orators and writers in such tongues, so that the faith could be effectively propagated. He warned the Muslims against being apathetic towards their non-Muslim fellows, but to treat them like family, and aid them in this life against the future misfortune awaiting in the next world for failing to heed the call to the Divine.

Part I

Note: Shaykh Abul Hasan Ali Nadawi’s opinions below do not necessary reflect the opinions of the author or VirtualMosque.com. To view Andrew Booso’s discussion and review of Shaykh Abdul Hasan’s positions, please be sure to visit the 4th part of the series: Part IV

Shaykh Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi saw “almost all the Islamic countries, today, are in the grip of an acute intellectual crisis. Or, shall we say, an unrelenting battle of ideas and ideals is taking place throughout the Muslim world. It can aptly be described as a clash between the Islamic and the Western concepts of life, values and traditions.” Moreover, he argued that “the intellectual make-up, education and upbringing and personal and political interests of the ruling classes in Muslim countries require that Western ideals and forms of life should be pushed forward and the Muslim masses made to walk in the foot-steps of the West, changing or brushing aside, as the need be, whatever religious considerations, social attitudes and national customs and law and tradition came in the way or impeded their advance.”

He saw the influence of “the West” over the Muslim world, and he was fearful of its consequences, so much so that he characterised it as “the biggest and most vital problem before the Islamic world at the present time.” The danger was exacerbated by the fact of “the internal weaknesses of the Muslim countries coupled with the unrivalled ascendency of the Western Civilization and the irrefutable material and political superiority of the Western Powers.” Furthermore, whereas “Western Civilization” was seen as possessing “extensiveness, vitality and [an] all-conquering quality,” the “Eastern countries”  were considered “hollow…both materially and spiritually” and suffering from “a crisis of faith and self-confidence.” In fact, “no nation [such as this] can aspire to maintain its individuality which lacks faith in itself and is plagued by inferiority complex and suffers from spiritual decay and degeneration.”

To prove his point about the fragility of the Muslim world in this regard, he used the example of the Gulf Arabs, often seen as the most conservative and thus protected people against such external influences:

“It did not take much time for Western Civilization to break through the fences the Arabs had erected around themselves and force its way triumphantly into the sacred land of Islam. The bazars and homes of Arabia were inundated with latest mechanical contraptions and the so-called luxury goods, the austerity, industriousness, chivalry and large-heartedness and all those other attributes of mind and character which had been the pride of the Arabs from the earliest days were erased out abruptly from their midst.

“The new contact between Arabia and the West was established through the routes of culture, civilization, politics and oil. It was done in a most hurried and haphazard manner…Beginning with outward forms, customs and usages, even the spiritual moorings of the Arabs have now begun to be threatened by the ever-increasing influence of Western Civilization.

“One by one, almost all the Muslim countries have come under the sway of modern Western Civilization. Their surrender has been brought about without much resistance for the simple reason that the Muslim ruling sections everywhere could not bring forth the mental robustness and perspicacity needed for the task…The educational system in the Islamic countries was out-dated and the blue-prints of its reconstruction had not been drawn with an eye on modern experience. Besides, the rejection of the teachings of Islam had created in these lands a state of affairs for which no justification could be found either in reason or in justice and which did not deserve to survive in any age, to speak nothing of the modern fast-changing one.”

In the context of criticising the educational system of the Muslims at this time, the Shaykh offered particular criticism at his own clerical class:

“As long as the Ulema (scholars) of the Islamic countries are devoid of the courage to discharge the religious obligation of speaking out the truth fearlessly in front of unjust and irresponsible rulers and allow selfish struggles for power and futile disputations and controversies over subsidiary and unimportant issues to eat up their time and energies and practical instances of religious training, piety, self-reliance and moral and spiritual strength and resoluteness remain extinct in their midst, and hostile movements and inimical ideologies are left free to invade the Muslim society, both openly and surreptitiously, and to work themselves out to the full – as long as this unnatural and woefully un-Islamic state of affairs is permitted to prevail in the Muslim countries, the World of Islam cannot hope release from its moral and political chaos and disorder. Revolutions are bound to take place in it, upheavals are sure to rock its foundations at regular intervals so long as the conditions there are so ugly and pathetic. The Muslim countries, today, are virtually sitting on the top of a volcano which is ready to erupt at any moment.

“The religious scepticism and waywardness of the modern-educated classes of the Muslim World is, to a certain extent, due also to the intellectual decadence and inertia that has taken hold of the Islamic educational and literary institutions and their representatives. On account of it, the Islamic sciences, in spite of their innate vitality and dynamism, have not been successful in giving a convincing proof of their richness and ability to offer guidance to the ever-evolving life, particularly during the modern days of ruthless competition and struggle. The syllabi of Islamic studies kept pace with life and went on developing with it in the earlier days when revolutionary upheavals were few and far between and almost of an identical nature. By and large, these convulsions were of a personal nature involving little more than a change of the ruler or the ruling dynasty. The formulators of the Islamic syllabi and other Muslim educationalists, till then, remained active and alert and through making suitable changes in the courses prescribed for study they furnished a steady proof of their social awareness and keenness of mind. When, however, with the dawn of the 18^th century a new era opened in the history of mankind and revolutions assumed a much wider social significance as clashes between different ideologies and programmes of life, the Islamic educational system, including the syllabi, grew cumbrous and became fossilised. In the prescribing of subjects, in the choice of books and in the methods of instruction, the line chalked down by Mulla Nizamuddin in India, or the eighteenth century Deans of Al-Azhar in the Middle East, was religiously adhered to by all as something sacrosanct and inviolable. The principle of Ijtihad was, for all practical purposes, forgotten. It was not employed any more to re-examine the structure of Islamic Jurisprudence and to revise and enlarge it in light of the advancements made in human knowledge and from the point of view of the multitudinous problems thrown up by the new social and economic experiences. Though hedged around by a number of highly important and delicate conditions, Ijtihad constituted a permanent duty of Islamic theologists, and since it embodied the principle of movement in Islam it was the most valuable instrument for keeping pace with time. As an eminent Arab scholar, Mustafa Ahmad el-Zarqa, has remarked, “Though the ulema did not regard it as legally prohibited to open the door of Ijtihad, the key by which it could be opened had been lost long ago.””

Nevertheless, he saw the “greatest vacuum” of the Muslim world to be “leadership.” Such that “not one man is to be found anywhere – earnest, zealous and deep-hearted – who can face the challenge of Western Civilization with faith, courage and imagination and chalk out a new course of thought and action which may be free from the intellectual and cultural servility as well as extremism, and who without getting involved aimlessly in the superficial manifestations of the Western way of life.”

Yet for all these points of criticism, he wrote with hope:

“In spite of all their faults and shortcomings, the vital religious feeling, the readiness to suffer in the cause of God and the spirit of earnestness, fidelity and love that have become extinct among the materialistic nations of the West can still be seen in the Islamic countries. The Muslim peoples, their appalling ignorance and backwardness notwithstanding, are the raw material from which the finest models of humanity can be made. Their greatest asset is their faith and their simplicity, earnestness and enthusiasm…But, thanks to the all-pervading curse of Westernization, the Muslim masses are being robbed of their spiritual vitality and are developing a moral cancer against which nothing can avail.”

Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV

Note: Shaykh Abul Hasan Ali Nadawi’s opinions below do not necessary reflect the opinions of the author or VirtualMosque.com. To view Andrew Booso’s discussion and review of Shaykh Abdul Hasan’s positions, please be sure to visit the 4th part of the series: Part IV

The Nadwi Foundation has recently published the English translation of my dear teacher Shaykh Akram Nadwi’s Arabic biography of his teacher Shaykh Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi (1914-1999) (may the mercy of God be upon him), with complimentary reviews by some leading Western teachers of Islam, such as ustadhs Suhaib Webb, Faraz Rabbani and Muhammad Ibn Adam al-Kawthari (praising the work’s scholarliness and relevance to Muslims in the West.) Shaykh Abul Hasan was one of the most prominent global Islamic scholars of the late-twentieth century, with an esteemed reputation extending from his own Indian subcontinent to Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia and then to England (as Shaykh Akram’s book highlights). He had the noble vision to try and positively impact the lives of Muslims in the West, through his frequent visits to the West and the excellent English translations of his own works in the 1970s and 1980s, of which the translations by Asif Kidwai surpassed in quality so much Islamic literature in English at the time and which have also stood the test of time (especially Kidwai’s translation of Abul Hasan entitled Islam and the World.)

Regarding the new translation by the Nadwi Foundation, I was blessed to see an early draft edited by Jamil Qureshi (formerly a chief editor, most prominently, at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies), which showed signs of Qureshi’s usual editorial prowess, masha Allah, although I understand that the work has since received further editing by people other than Qureshi (work which I have not seen and people whom I do not know). Being the translation of an Arabic work intended, naturally, for an Arab audience, the version of the translation that I saw didn’t focus extensively on Abul Hasan’s attitude to the West and the challenges of being Muslim in the West. Therefore I decided to put together some of the Shaykh’s thoughts on these matters, as gleamed from his numerous works, and present them here. Nevertheless, the current English translation remains highly relevant for English-speaking Muslims, and Shaykh Akram explains such relevance in the preface to the printed edition:

“It is my hope that readers will get a clear sense, from this account of Shaykh ʾAbū al-Ḥasan’s own life and work, of the wealth of resources that Muslims can draw on, how much they love their religion, the range of virtues they seek to nurture and produce in themselves and in others, the diverse ways they try to help and support one another, and their efforts to worship dutifully and speak truthfully, obey the law, be moderate and balanced in their tastes and expenditures, and be mild, kindly, courteous and respectful to others, without the least sacrifice of ardour on behalf of ʾIslām.”

On a passing personal note, Shaykh Abul Hasan has perhaps had the most profound impact on my own outlook on pre-modern Islamic intellectual history, and I’ve then been blessed to explore that vision with people like Shaykh Akram. Therefore it is hoped that this book will be a door for many to benefit from Shaykh Abul Hasan; and my review of his thoughts here will perhaps highlight why a Nadwi project for the West – if one can even coherently conceive of such a thing, given the diversity of approach within the Nadwah madrasah in India – is definitely a work in progress, but certainly one that is worth critically engaging with (and, by no means, slavishly imitating and accepting, as, indeed, one should approach Abul Hasan’s theories on Islamic intellectual history). In fact, the ability to tolerate people’s differences with one’s thought is what characterised Abul Hasan’s own way, as explained by Shaykh Akram in the YouTube clip produced to publicise the English translation of the biography; and Shaykh Akram himself has always told his students and audiences that they are free to differ with him on any given matter. The introduction of a learned and free discourse, as exemplified in the Nadwi way of broad tolerance and brotherly love, holds much potential benefit for the Muslims in the West, especially as much of our discourse is shallow and blindly sectarian.

Speaking to the West

Shaykh Abul Hasan’s experience of the West was initially shaped by his being brought up in India under British colonial rule, and then living through the Indian independence movement (with the British leaving India in 1948). In talking of the West and the Muslim world he was wont to speak in terms of dominant features, as he saw them. Therefore the West for him was represented as essentially “materialistic,” and opposed to the religious method of the Prophets of God (may peace be upon them all). In contrast, the Shaykh constantly reminded the Muslims of their being the sole upholders of the Prophetic path, and warned them against compromising that divine message (of which he understood they were acutely close to compromising). The Shaykh’s focus upon such generalities is to be seen within the context of his revivalist message of guiding and reminding people, both Muslim and non-Muslim, of the divine message.

What is highly indicative of the Shaykh’s and the Nadwah’s seriousness in wanting to engage and instruct an English-speaking audience is the publication of Western Civilization, Islam and Muslims. This latter work began life as an Arabic volume published in 1963 and was then rendered into Urdu. After visiting Europe, and benefiting from the British Museum in London and other reputable libraries in Europe, Shaykh Abul Hasan expanded the material into an enlarged Urdu edition that was almost double the size of the Arabic original. From this expanded Urdu edition was made the first English translation in 1969. This work sets out the Shaykh’s views on the purpose and current condition of the Muslim world, his reflections on the meaning of “Western Civilization,” and the history and possible future between the West and the Muslim world.

A more direct, less academic and more grassroots message to Muslims living in the West can be taken from the 1977 lecture tour of North America by the Shaykh, which eventually found itself compiled, translated and published under the title From the Depth of the Heart in America. Here, many of the themes of his Western Civilization are repeated, but there is a more concentrated effort to deal with the actual practicalities of living as a Muslim minority in the West, whilst being less academic and comprehensive than Western Civilization.

The Meaning of Western Civilization

In no way did the Shaykh see only evil or bad in “Western Civilization.” He understood the complexity of the phenomenon and its mixed qualities: the “good as well as bad, true as well as false, and beneficial as well as harmful”, which “included solid facts of knowledge and self-evident truths as well as hypothetical surmises and groundless presumptions.” Consequently, he criticised Muslim responses that were “negative”, i.e. “reject Western Civilization in toto and refuse to have anything to do with it, without caring to enquire what is good in it and what is bad”. He saw that such a “negative” response “can result only in the further backwardness of the Muslim world and its total isolation from the main current of time”, and as such “the posture of negation or rejection will…be patently foolish and short-sighted…It runs contrary to the spirit of Islam. Being a ‘natural’ religion, Islam lays a great stress on the pursuit of knowledge and urges mankind to take the fullest advantage of all the useful branches of learning.”

In essence, the Shaykh saw “the West” as opposed to the Muslim world, but he also saw that it had many virtues that could be adopted by the Muslims. He lamented that:

“Western Civilization started coming into its own at a time when the European people had been compelled by self-seeking ecclesiastics, who had made religion an instrument of tyranny and self-aggrandisement, to raise the banner of revolt against the basic transcendental truths. The Christian Church had degenerated into a most powerful force of obduracy and reaction. Its guardians, by their ignorance, hideous sensuality and corruption, were proving to be the greatest stumbling block in the path of knowledge and progress. As a natural consequence of it all, a strong feeling of revulsion and disgust had developed throughout the Continent against the Church and its representatives. Religion had come to be looked down upon as a corrupting, degrading and retrogressive institution. Spiritual values had fallen into disrepute. From then on, civilization, industrialization and rank materialism began to march ahead in the West in close unison. It was resolved that life should be organised exclusively on materialistic lines without giving a thought to the spiritual personality of man or to the bond that existed between him and his Maker…Once Western Civilization had set out on its course it never looked back.”

He felt that the “wealth” represented in the qualities of “genuine fear of God and love for humanity” which are only inculcated in man “through the teachings of the holy Prophets…was, sadly, lost by the West centuries ago.” In his Islam and the World, he elaborated at length on the Greco-Roman nature of Western Civilization, and how such roots explained the prominence of materialism, agnosticism, paganism, superstition, religion as a mere “social tradition and a utilitarian formula” (i.e. little concerned with truth and logic), and the desire for “imperialism and exploitation of the weaker nations.” Furthermore, he commented on the “amalgamation of Paganism with Christianity” from the time that the Roman Empire supposedly embraced Christianity; and, thus, the latter lost “its soul and beauty” and “could not bring amelioration of the moral conditions of the Romans.” After the passing through of the Renaissance, the thorough separation of Church and state, and the ascendency of materialist philosophies opposed to religion (such as Marxism, Darwinism and those opposed to traditional Christianity, such as the alleged triumph of science over religion), he saw the true religion of the West to now be “materialism” and not Christianity, and: “All the endeavours in the West, thus, are guided solely by considerations of power, pride and glory. The idea of Divine Approbation has no place in their calculations, while it is the very basis of a Muslim’s thought and action.”

Rarely is the English language graced with a major contemporary scholar engaging a range of current concerns. Hence this work will be eagerly received in many quarters of the English-speaking world. Their anticipation is justifiable, as the work will tackle a variety of topics, including theology, law, customs and spirituality. In the end, it should be viewed simply as an introductory volume, and we can hope for a future volume on more pressing life challenges facing Muslims in the English-speaking world.

Regrettably, Responding from the Tradition gives no background as to how and where the hundred questions answered in the volume were asked. One does not know if they have simply been selected from a wider pool, and if so, upon what criteria they were chosen; or whether Shaykh Gomaa himself decided upon these specific answers for publication in one volume. Such a detail could have been very helpful, especially if we were told that Shaykh Gomaa himself selected these questions, because it would have informed us about what he considered priorities for the English-speaking audience.

From the perspective of theology, the work is Sunni-orthodox, despite being published by a publishing house known for propagating perennial philosophy. The answer to question 1 affirms the orthodox message of Islam being “the final religion sent from God to humanity…and intended for people of every race and geographic location.” Furthermore, the answer to question 2 adds: “God willed Islam to be the seal of all religions in the realm of law, and for it to be the only religion in the realm of belief.”

The general Sunnism of the above is made more specific in answer 33 where Gomaa states that “the orthodox school of Sunni Islam” includes “both the Ash’ari and Maturidi schools.” Defensively, he adds,

“those who criticize these schools are ignorant of their tenets of belief in God. Misunderstandings mostly have to do with the ‘possessive attributes of God’ or what are technically referred to as ‘reported attributes.’”

Moreover, Gomaa distinguishes between early and later Ash’ari theologians. He identifies early Ash’aris as accepting the “possessive phrases and reported attributes used by the Quran in reference to God as they are, without believing in the literal meanings of their linguistic expression.” In contrast, he notes, “the later Ash’ari theologians took the approach of interpretation because they thought that affirming attributes in an ambiguous manner led some to anthropomorphic beliefs and all that they necessitate.” In a final comment, Gomaa effectively concludes the controversy surrounding the attributes of God by approvingly quoting a non-Ash’ari-Maturidi, Ibn Qudama al-Maqdisi in his Lum’a al-I’tiqad, as “perhaps the best commentary”; the latter states

“one is obliged to believe in and accept without reservation all that has come in the Quran or has been soundly narrated by the Messenger of God (s) [may the peace and blessings of God be upon him] concerning the attributes of the most Merciful One. One should refrain from rejecting them, indulging in their interpretation, or drawing comparisons and the likenesses between God and His creation.”

One is left to wonder how far Gomaa would take a revisionist stance to late Ash’ari theology in favour of an earlier minimalist version. For instance, would he also prefer not to engage in specifically defining the contrast between the actual speech of God (kalam nafsi) and the revealed Books of God (kalam lafzi)? Would he just stop at saying that the Qur’an is the Word of God or simply the uncreated Word of God? A comprehensive minimalism of the scholastic schools could be more effective for a modern age, eschewing many past and contemporary polemics, of which the answer to this latter question is a consequence.

The legal method of the work is helpfully explained at the beginning by Gomaa himself, under the title of “The Craft of Issuing a Fatwa.” Centrally, he sees the mufti’s job in this age to be one of making “things easy for people by bringing them into God’s religion, protecting them, and providing a means whereby they can act in accordance with a position that is acknowledged by the Shari’ah.” Gomaa notes the mufti should, when responding to a question, first consult the Qur’an, then the Sunnah if not in the Qur’an, then analogy if not in the Sunnah, and should “not breach consensus.” Furthermore, “the protocol established by the schools of jurisprudence allows the mufti to issue fatwas following any of the mujtahid schools, so long as his own ijtihad does not lead him to believe the truth lies elsewhere.” He explains that the Dar al-Ifta’ al-Misriyyah (the Egyptian House of Legal Judgements) transmits the four Sunni schools (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali), as well as the schools followed by many non-Sunnis (such as the Ja’fari, Zaydi, Ibadi and Zahiri), and even

“widens the scope of the evidence upon which it relies to include the schools of major mujtahids like al-Awza’i, al-Tabari, al-Layth ibn Sa’d, and others from among over eighty mujtahids throughout Muslim history. These schools’ opinions are taken into account and may even be given priority of consideration according to the strength of their evidence, the need for their perspective, the purpose of the greater good, or in order to fulfil the goals of the Shari’ah. This methodology reflects the values adopted by all scholarly societies today, in both the East and the West and throughout the Muslim world.”

In light of such comments, it is not surprising that Gomaa doesn’t show a madhhab bias from a strict ideological stance.

One of the highest points in the legal answers is his response to whether the inheritance laws of Islamic law are oppressive of women (question 9). This answer is so important because there is really very little knowledge, never mind defence, of the inheritance rules in English. His answer is very detailed and its summary is that there are

“…thirty scenarios in which a woman inherits either the same amount as a man or more than him. In some cases she inherits while her male equivalent does not inherit at all. There are only four scenarios, however, in which a woman inherits half the share of a man.”

It is the general failure to know such thirty-four possible scenarios, whilst also being unable to recall that Islamic law has been laid-down by God for all people for all times in all societies (and not one’s personal family and whims), that leads to many modern misgivings. What drove home the importance of this detailed fatwa by Gomaa was the recollection of a BBC series on inheritance, entitled “Can’t Take it With You.” Now one of the series had a Muslim couple from England who wanted to write a will that complied with Islamic and English legal requirements; but they were taken aback when told that the Qur’an stipulated that their daughters were entitled to half of the share that their son was due. Sadly, the programme did not introduce an answer like Gomaa’s, which shows a great understanding of the Sacred Law, as well as fiqh al-waqi’ (comprehension of the social realities). Firstly, the Sacred Law understanding is stronger with Gomaa here because his answer agrees with the Qur’an and the scholars of Islam. Secondly, he highlights the reality of why a brother in such a scenario would be entitled to more than his sister:

“When a group of inheritors, such as the children of the deceased, are equal in the first two aforementioned factors [of degree of kinship to the deceased and generation to which the heir belongs], then their shares are affected by the third [of financial responsibility]. In this specific scenario the misunderstood Quranic verses alluded to in the original question come into play. The Quran has not made the disparity between men and women a general condition, but rather has confined it to this specific situation. When the individuals in a group of heirs are equal in both their relation to the deceased and their age, the male son of the deceased receives twice as much as the female daughter of the deceased. The wisdom behind this arrangement is as follows: the male is responsible for the financial upkeep of his wife and children, whereas his sister’s financial upkeep is the responsibility of an individual other than herself, such as her husband or father. Thus, for all practical purposes, the disparity favours the woman because the wealth she inherits is not applicable to the household expenses and hers is to dispense with as she pleases. This financial advantage also protects her from any circumstances that would place her in financial difficulty. Unfortunately, few today understand this finer point of the Muslim inheritance system.”

Gomaa adds that a man also has financial responsibility to “provide a dowry for his spouse,” which “is an obligation that falls on men, not women”; and “men are also required to financially support the members of their extended family if the situation demands.” This answer truly shows the now clichéd context with the text, without having to alter the ruling. Indeed, Gomaa points out our general superficiality by highlighting that

“…wealth is a broader concept than income. Income becomes part of wealth but is not wealth itself, since wealth is that which remains after all expenditure. In the scenarios where a woman receives half of the man’s inheritance, the woman’s new income is protected by the Shari’ah and is hers to dispense with as she wishes. The man’s new income, on the other hand, is to aid him in supporting family members that have now come under his care. This is why we are able to say that Islamic inheritance laws protect the wealth of women and grant preference to them over men.”

We are helpfully reminded by this answer that Gomaa’s first degree, as mentioned in the translators’ introduction, was in commerce from ‘Ayn Shams University, so he has, hopefully, a full understanding of economic consequences necessary for the question, together with his extensive legal training at al-Azhar University.

Nonetheless, economic and legal training is not political training, and two answers of a political nature in the collection might cause concern for some. The first is the answer to question 23 where he uses the legal understanding of Abu Hanifah and Shaybani to permit Muslims living in bilad ghayr al-Muslimin (non-Muslim lands) – for he prefers to call the latter such, as opposed to dar al-kufr (the abode of disbelief) or dar al-harb (the abode of war), because “the situation, however, has changed” and Muslims are not now prevented from residing in such lands and, he says, “there is no open declaration of war against Islam and the Muslims” – to give and take usury (riba) and other transactions that would be invalid in Muslim lands, such as selling meat that has not been slaughtered in accordance with Islamic law, and to sell pork or alcohol, or to engage in gambling. [This fatwa was discussed on virtualmosque.com previously; see here.] Gomaa’s understanding of Abu Hanifah and Shaybani’s stances is understood as correct, as reported by Taqi ‘Uthmani (in Contemporary Fatawa), ‘Abdullah Bin Bayyah (in the CD series entitled “Sacred Law in Secular Lands: A Survival Guide for Muslims in the West, volume 1” trans. Hamza Yusuf), and Muhammad Hamid (as cited in Reliance of the Traveller, trans. Nuh Keller).

Now ‘Uthmani, Bin Bayyah and Hamid concentrate on why they prefer the stance of those that opposed Abu Hanifah’s allowing Muslims to act differently in dar al-harb to how they are obliged to act in Muslim lands. ‘Uthmani appeals to the “overwhelming majority” who opposed such a stance, while Hamid appeals tentatively to the opposing view of Shafi’i and Abu Yusuf which “is not a feeble viewpoint unsupported by evidence.” Bin Bayyah argues that terms like dar al-harb and dar al-Islam, etc. are not “textual”, i.e. from the Qur’an and hadith (narration), and that the world should be re-evaluated because the modern world has changed so much (for another source for Bin Bayyah’s views, see here); and this accords with Gomaa’s understanding in the answer, as well. As H.A. Hellyer mentions in his Muslims of Europe: the ‘Other’ Europeans, Bin Bayyah prefers to call the west dar al-aman (the abode of trust). Indeed, as explained above initially, Gomaa himself disavows the use of the term dar al-harb in the modern context, but is satisfied to apply a ruling formulated in relation to that currently non-existent state of affairs.

Now, what none of the aforementioned scholars do is address whether Abu Hanifah’s actual ruling would remain in the modern context, according to his own criteria. This is the single argument that would prove the death knell to those who want to uphold the position on the basis that the west is still dar al-harb in Abu Hanifah’s understanding. [I will focus on Abu Hanifah’s position because Shaybani’s view, as discussed below, has potentially more far-reaching consequences, with the whole world perhaps being viewed as dar al-harb.] The editor of ‘Uthmani’s Contemporary Fatawa, Muhammad Shoaib Omar – whom ‘Uthmani praises in the foreword as his “learned brother” who added “explanatory footnotes which elucidate certain answers,” and to which he is “grateful” – tentatively raises the problem in the footnote to ‘Uthmani opposing the permissibility of usury in the west based on Abu Hanifah’s understanding:

“Muslims living as minorities in non-Muslim countries enjoy constitutional rights and protections, within a secular state in common with other citizens. Their status appears to be different from Darul-Harb, literally a state of ongoing military conflict between Darul-Islam and Darul-Harb. There is a need to properly define Darul-Harb in the context of the modern state to determine whether Imam Abu Hanifah’s view [italics in the original, not mine – AB] has any application at all.”

The study called for by Omar was addressed, in large part, by another Azhari, Ahmed Mohsen al-Dawoody, in his Ph.D dissertation (2009) at the University of Birmingham, England, entitled “War in Islamic Law: Justification and Regulations” (subsequently published by Palgrave as The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations). Al-Dawoody notes that Shaybani considered dar al-Islam to be a place where “Islamic law is applied”; but that Abu Hanifah thought that “dar al-Islam is a territory in which Islamic law is applied and Muslims and ahl al-dhimma (non-Muslim citizens of the dar al-Islam) are safe.” Jasser Auda, in a paper entitled “How much of a ‘Land of Islam’ is Today’s Europe? A Study in the Classic Jurisprudence,” quotes Abu Hanifah from Kasani’s Bada’i al-Sana’i:  “The purpose (maqsud)[sic] of calling a certain land a ‘Land of Islam’ or a ‘land of disbelief (kufr)’ is not Islam versus kufr. It is security versus insecurity.”

Bin Bayyah, in “Sacred Law in Secular Lands”, said that the Hanafis, including Sarakhsi and Kasani, said that dar al-Islam is wherever the Muslims have “amn”, or “safety, well-being or security.” Shahrul Hussain, another graduate of al-Azhar, in his Dār al-Islām and Dār al-Ĥarb: An Analytical Study of its Historical Inception, its Definition by the Classical Scholars and its Application to the Contemporary World, quotes the relevant section from Sarakhsi on dar al-Islam in the latter’s al-Mabsut: “A place which is under the authority or ownership of Muslims and the proof (of this) is that Muslims are safe therein.” Al-Dawoody adds, while seizing upon this notion of “safety”:

“In other words, it [namely, dar al-harb] is a territory in which freedom of religion does not exist and the lives of Muslims and dhimmis are not safe. Thus, the classifications of dār al-harb and dār al-Islām refer to the existence or non-existence of safety and peace, specifically the freedom of Muslims to apply and practice Islamic law. It is worth adding here that calling a territory dār al-harb “did not mean actual fighting”, but it clearly indicated a potential state of hostility, enmity or war in cases when territories did not belong to the dār al-Islām and did not have a peace treaty or alliance with it, and specifically if Islamic law could not be applied, Muslims were not safe to profess their belief in Islam and perform prayer, and the lives of the Muslims and dhimmis were imperilled…

“According to [Wahbah] al-Zuhaylī [in his Āthār al-Harb fī al-Islām], the majority of jurists, including Abū Hanifah, did not accept the third conceptual division of the dār al-sulh [the abode of agreement], arguing that, if a territory concludes a peace treaty and pays tax to the dār al-Islām, it becomes a part of the dār al-Islām and thus the dār al-Islām is obliged to protect it…

“Present-day non-Muslim countries would thus be classified as dār al-Islām according to Abū Hanīfah’s definition, since Muslims living there are safe, while in the opinion of other Hanafī jurists, al-Shaybānī and Abū Yūsuf, non-Muslim, as well as most Muslim, countries nowadays would be dār al-harb because some parts of Islamic law are not applied there.”

These scholarly attempts to try and actually understand what Abu Hanifah understood about dar al-harb presents enough material to call into question the idea that he would have upheld his peculiar ruling in question here. Even if one could say that the element of a non-Muslim signatory to a peace treaty with Muslim countries agreeing to pay taxes to the Muslim state is missing, hence calling into question whether he would have called the west dar al-Islam, the other conditions certainly raise doubts about whether he would have held today’s geo-political reality to identically reflect his understanding of his own time. Moreover, one must also question whether Shaybani would have held the same views on the matter. The subject has by no means been categorically finalised, but there are sufficient reasons to question a minority position that has potentially dire consequences if followed in the west.

To take a purely western view on the matter of permitting the taking and giving of usury, buying and selling alcohol and gambling, a mufti from the east should be very careful before giving such a fatwa to us in the west. This is especially the case when our inner city areas, filled with Muslims, are succumbing to the evils and crimes of those who consume alcohol (even as a consequence of Muslims selling the alcohol to them from their shops, as is the case with so many Arab-owned liquor stores in the inner cities of the USA), as well as succumbing themselves directly to the problems of accepting interest-based loans that they cannot maintain repayment of, or even gambling themselves into financial and mental oblivion as they become addicted to gambling and the dire consequences that result thereof to themselves and those closely around them. Moreover, in selling alcohol in the inner cities, how are Muslims going to appear like upright callers to a noble and pristine Islam when they are helping the human degradation complained about by Gil Scott-Heron in his song entitled “The Bottle”? In rejecting such a fatwa, we in the west might not only be able to reject it on the basis that the majority of Islamic jurists, past and present, have rejected it, or that one might be able to argue that even Abu Hanifah and Shaybani might have changed their positions if they lived in our time – as Gomaa says in “The Craft of Issuing a Fatwa”: “fatwas differ according to their specific time, place, people, and conditions” with regards to non-definitive matters that never change – but, rather, we in the west can reject the fatwa on the basis that it realistically holds great danger for us, especially those of us struggling with the already difficult realities of living in the inner cities of the west; and we really do not need Muslims contributing to this problem by making use (or misuse?) of such fatwas.

The second political fatwa that would raise eyebrows is in response to question 16 and the modern applicability of the corporal punishments of Islam (hudud). Gomaa says that these,

“have not been implemented in countries such as Egypt for over one thousand years. This is because the legal conditions for their implementation, which describe specific means for establishing guilt and stipulate the possibility of retracting a confession, are not met…The penal codes of the remainder of the Islamic countries, which number fifty-six out of the one hundred ninety-six countries of the world, remain silent on the issue of corporal punishment (hudud). This is because our age is one of general uncertainty (shubha), and the Prophet [s] [may the peace and blessings of God be upon him] said, ‘Stay the enforcement of corporal punishments when there is doubt.’ Furthermore, the legally accepted witnesses needed to convict offenders in capital cases necessitating corporal punishment have not existed for a long time. Al-Tanuki relates in his book Mishwar al-Muhadara, ‘A judge used to enter a district or a village and find forty witnesses of the sort of whom we are satisfied as to their being just and accurate, while today a judge enters a town and only finds one or two witnesses.’ Thus our age could be generally described as one in which there are no witnesses.”

One wonders at such a fatwa, not only in its grand historical presentation, but that it seemingly equates most of the Muslim world – with its great cities, such as Gomaa’s own Cairo, with their thousands of praying and dutiful believers, and hundreds of righteous scholars – with some rural “district” or “village.” The fatwa is certainly a secularist’s dream. Surprisingly for a leading Islamic scholar, Gomaa’s answer bespeaks of a certain resignation to the current situation, without seeking to remedy the situation which he admits neglects to follow certain Quranic stipulations. It is this seeming apathy and resignation that raises the most surprise. Now, with the greatest of respect, we are reminded by the Arab Spring that scholars – including Gomaa, as compassionately discussed here by Hisham Hellyer – are not always the most politically astute.

The translation of the book is strengthened by its being reviewed by two learned individuals trained in Islamic law, Abdullah ibn Hamid Ali and Musa Furber. Moreover, there is plenty of transliterated Arabic technical terminology in parenthesis, which are very helpful. Also, there is an interesting technique in the footnotes for the names of authors. On the whole, this technique for names is helpful and useful; for example, “Muhammad ibn Isma’il AL-BUKHARI” is first written and thereafter “AL-BUKHARI”, or “Muhmmad ibn ‘Abdullah AL-HAKIM” is thereafter followed by “AL-HAKIM.” In the overwhelming number of cases, the emphasis given to identify the most popular understanding of a name is correct. However, a number of examples indicate a misleading emphasis: for example, “Muslim ibn Hajjaj AL-NAYSABURI” followed by “AL-NAYSABURI” thereafter when it should be “MUSLIM”; and the worst one is “Malik ibn ANIS” who is thereafter written as “ANIS”, which is a double blow to Imam Malik, because his father was called Anas and he was known as Malik, not Ibn Anas or Anas or Anis (sic). There are other examples of this type in relation to Abu Dawud (“AL-SIJISTANI”), Ibn Hibban (“AL-TAMIMI”) and Ibn Abi Shaybah (“AL-KUFI”), so, although infrequent, the reader should be on guard.

In conclusion, this is a worthy and welcome addition in English, with plenty of worthwhile scholarly discussion from Gomaa himself and from some of the greatest scholars of Islamic history, from across the various great schools. Nevertheless, the work is a warning to Muslim minorities in the west that they are to treat Islamic scholarship with caution, even if it comes from the best that Islamic scholarship has to offer at present. This puts a great onus on western Muslims to commit to studying the Islamic sciences, even if they don’t become fully-fledged scholars, but to become sufficiently informed so that they can coherently follow an Islamic scholarly argument, and have a certain limited level of selecting opinions that have the best scholarly strength and benefit (a sort of limited tarjih). Of course, we acknowledge that it is knowledge from the east that has enlightened our hearts, but the light from that region is multi-faceted, so we must be cautious against selecting only one beautiful beam to the exclusion of all others; and, at the same time, we must pray against being colour blind: thinking we truly see things, when we don’t see things as they are at all. Nonetheless, in the west, we are still in dire need of expert scholarship that seeks to empower the audience, and not one that seeks to bully through recourse to narrow authority. Finally, this work is a welcome addition to the English library, and we pray that more publishing houses have a similar goal of producing legal works from experts in the English language. To God is our reliance and to Him we declare our poverty.

Scriptural References to the Spiritual Imperative of Islam

There are numerous ayat (verses or signs) of the Holy Quran that indicate the importance of spiritual purification. God talks of the nafs (self) and says: “Whoever purifies it has succeeded; and failure is the lot of whoever corrupts it,” (Qur’an 91:9-10). Furthermore, Prophet Ibrahim (peace be upon him) is quoted in the Qur’an: “The Day [of Judgement] whereon neither wealth nor sons will avail, except him who comes to Allah with a sound heart,” (bi-qalbin salim) (Qur’an 26:88-9). Moreover, God mentions the role of the Messenger Muhammad ﷺ (peace be upon him): “A similar (favour have you already received) in that We have sent among you a Messenger of your own, rehearsing to you Our signs, and purifying you, and instructing you in the Book and the Wisdom (al-hikma), and in new knowledge that beforehand you did not know,” (Qur’an 2:151).  The following hadith (record) in Sahih Muslim is also of critical importance in this regard: “Allah shall not look at your bodies or your faces, but rather looks into your hearts.”

Defining Islamic Spirituality

When turning to Islamic spirituality, we can use two Arabic words that denote the focus of the activity: firstly, al-qalb, or the heart; and, secondly, al-nafs or the self or ego. ‘Abdal-Qadir ‘Isa says in Haqa’iq ‘an al-tasawwuf: “Purification of the heart (tanqiya al-qalb) and rectification of the self (tahdhib al-nafs) are from the most important of personally obligatory acts and of the imperative Divine commands, as proven by the Book, the Sunna (tradition), and statements of the scholars.” Suyuti says in al-Ashbah wa’l-naza’ir: “As for learning the science of the heart (‘ilm al-qalb) and its diseases, such as envy (hasad), conceitedness (‘ujb), ostentation (riya’) and the like, Ghazzali said its learning is personally obligatory (fard ‘ayn).”

A popular term for describing the science of Islamic spirituality is tasawwuf, whose accepted English translation is Sufism. Sufism, as even acknowledged by certain Sufis, has had its own historical battles against heterodox and outright deviant attempts to subvert it from Islamic orthodoxy. In this respect, ‘Abdal-Qadir ‘Isa notes that Sufism is no different to the sciences of hadith, Qur’anic exegesis (tafsir) and history, which all had “severe opponents and fierce enemies who attempted to demolish” Islam “by defacing its signposts and interpolating falsehoods and superstitions into its sciences.” Thus, in order to dispel any misconception, ‘Abdal-Qadir ‘Isa makes reference to “Islamic Sufism” (al-tasawwuf al-islami).

Furthermore, ‘Abdal-Fattah Abu Ghudda, in his notes to Muhasibi’s Risala al-mustarshidin, after quoting a lengthy passage from Shatibi defending the Sufis in general, distinguishes and endorses “true Sufism” (al-tasawwuf al-haqq) and “true Sufis” (al-Sufiyya al-haqiqiyyin”); hence the mistake, in his opinion, of those who disparage tasawwuf or Sufis “without restriction” (bi’l-itlaq).Yet, after Hasanayn Makhluf praises a host of famous Sufis in his panegyric (taqriz) of ‘Abdal-Fattah Abu Ghudda’s commentary of Risala al-mustarshidin, Abu Ghudda adds a note of caution: that these major, pious figures were not infalliable (ahl al-isma), therefore any of their errors will be pointed out as such, with all due respect (bi-adab), like any other non-Prophet, “and without tearing them up” (wa la tahdimuhum).

Yet many others have simply referred to tasawwuf as the discipline of Islamic spirituality without qualification, on the obvious proviso that the term is meant in the most orthodox terms, in the same way that one encourages one to study theology (‘aqidah), Sacred Law (fiqh) or the other sacred sciences (‘ulum al-din) without adding any qualifying adjective, because one understands the encouragement as calling towards orthodoxy in each instance without having to say so. Conversely, some people only use the term Sufism in a derogatory fashion, as can be seen in the usage of Rabi’ al-Madkhali in his booklet entitled The Reality of Sufism, or even Jamaal al-Din Zarabozo’s use of the term in his Purification of the Soul: Concept, Process and Means. In the latter work, Zarabozo admits that “not all Sufis are the same”, but “by definition and their own admission there must be something in Sufism that is distinct and separate from what all other scholars recognise to be the clear and manifest teachings of the Quran and Sunnah.”

With all that clarification, the following summations of what is Sufism are of great assistance. Ahmad Zarruq, in Qawa’id al-tasawwuf, mentions that tasawwuf has received two thousand definitions; but his thirteenth principle in the work summarises the science as “a knowledge seeking the betterment of the hearts (islah al-qulub) and turning them solely to Allah Most High and nothing else.” Ibn Khaldun, in al-Muqaddimah, placed tasawwuf amongst the “Sacred sciences” (al-‘ulum al-shar’iyya), and was considered “truth” (al-haqq) and “guidance” (al-hidaya) from the earliest times of the Community. Zafar ‘Uthmani, in I’la al-Sunan, stated that tasawwuf is “drawing nearer to Allah through knowledge and action”; hence it “gives life to both the outward and inward”: the “outward” is adorned by “good deeds” that are visible; and the “inner” is adorned “through the remembrance of Allah, leaving reliance on other than Him, adorning oneself with praiseworthy traits (akhlaq), and purifying oneself of the taint of base traits” (trans. F Rabbani).

Perhaps there is some merit in making a distinction between tasawwuf and general tazkiya (purification), because there is a distinctive Sufi method of thinking and training that is reflected in the development of the Sufi Orders (turuq, sing. tariqa) in later Islamic history, which contrasts with the sort of general tazkiya that retains a strict scriptural basis without any submission to the Shaykhs of the Sufi Orders. Alternatively, we can contrast tariqa-based tasawwuf and non-tariqa tasawwuf which is perhaps best given another name like tazkiya al-nafs. There is great overlap between the latter two, which is why it is understandable that non-tariqa scholars would speak of their own tasawwuf, because they have given the science such a general meaning when they are really just talking about the general spirituality of tazkiya (such as Abu Ghudda). Moreover, as one sees above in the very general definitions of Sufism offered by tariqa-Sufis like Zarruq and ‘Uthmani, one can understand why certain scholars still considered themselves Sufis despite not being part of an Order or delving into mysticism.

A reason for dividing general tasawwuf from tariqa-tasawwuf can be seen by simply studying a well-known Sufi manual like the Risala of Qushayri. While Qushayri uses both the Qur’an and hadith as a basis for his chapter headings on spiritual topics, the chapters contain highly mystical theories of late Sufism, such as fana’ (annihiliation), baqa’ (subsistence) and jam’ (union), etc. These theories are taken up as central points by late Sufis of the Orders, although a Sufi like Ahmad Sirhindi, despite endorsing the path that traverses such states, said that the Companions of the Prophet (may Allah bless him and give him peace) did not experience such states. Yet these mystical features are not a feature of general Sufi or tazkiya works like Muhasibi’s Risala and Abu Ghudda’s commentary; indeed, Abu Ghudda praises Muhasibi’s works for eschewing “philosophical Sufism” (al-tasawwuf al-falsafi) and merely being the “call to rectification of knowledge and action, vigilant observance of Allah Most High, purification of the soul from filth, and making it advance to the pleasure of Allah (praised and exalted be He).”

In practical terms, we can therefore distinguish between “Sufis” who speak in the language and the method of the Orders, and “Sufis” who advance a non-tariqa method of spiritual advancement (such as the early Sufis and then most prominently scholars like Nawawi, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim, and latterly Abdal-Fattah Abu Ghudda and Yusuf Qaradawi). Perhaps the latter group are best spoken of as non-Sufis, but it doesn’t really matter, as long as one understands the difference in methodology, even if the title remains the same or differs.

In terms of the various titles for Islamic spirituality – which is Islamic in so much as it always strives to remain true to the Scripture – in addition to what we have previously stated, Taqi ‘Uthmani adds tariqa (the path), suluk (travel) and ihsan (excellence) in his Spiritual Discourses.

In conclusion, one takes any practitioner of Islamic spirituality, regardless of the title that they use, and judges them wholly by the Scripture, and the good is taken, whilst the objectionable is discarded; and perfection is only the case of the Prophets (may the peace and blessings of God be upon them, and may He make us of the purified in this world and the next).

Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV

It is obvious to all, including perennialists, that perennial philosophy is completely at odds with orthodox Islam. Those perennialists who claim to be Muslims do so whilst claiming to believe that the esoteric, metaphysical realisation of the faith confirms the ‘transcending’ of the ‘dogmatism’ or ‘formal theology’ of Islam through ‘spiritual conversion from within’, i.e. by retaining the outer ‘form’ of Islamic practices (in whatever vague form they practically give to such an allegiance to the ‘law’). Perennialists uphold the ‘transcendent unity’ of ‘true religions’, but oppose ‘religious pluralists’ (who seek to do away with the distinctive ‘forms’ of each religion on a ‘horizontal’, i.e. worldly, level) and ‘modern syncretistic cults’ (who seek to form new, idiosyncratic religions considered false even by perennialists). ‘True religions’ are portrayed, by perennial philosophy, as being:

“graphically represented by points on the circumference of a circle, with each point being connected with the centre, that is, with God, by a radius. The points stand for the outward aspects of the religions [namely, the exoteric], whereas each radius is the esoteric path which the religion in question offers those who seek a direct way to God in this life.”

These ‘true religions’ of the present time, according to the perennialists, certainly include Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism and even Native American faith. Perennialism is the explicit rejection of the ‘exclusivist idea that there is only one valid religion.’ Perennialism does not so much dismiss ‘the orthodox dogmas’ of the various religions, but it effectively dismisses its importance by seeing these ‘dogmas from the universal point of view’ as:

“a series of points of reference, conceptual orientations opening out to, or ‘intending’ realities that transcend the dogmas. What can be affirmed is thus the consummation of the orientations, practices, and aspirations set in motion by the beliefs in question: they are ‘true’ insofar as they can lead one to the ‘real’.”

In this statement above, we have a natural acknowledgement of the problem of conflicting dogmas between the various religions. Thus David Ray Griffin, in his debate with the perennialist Huston Smith in Primordial Truth and Postmodern Theology, sets out what any fair-minded person would conclude when looking at the fundamental differences in dogma between various religions:

“It does not seem plausible to me, in any case, to think of the various great religions as equally embodying revelations of the same divine reality. Judaism, Christianity, Islam and Zoroastrianism are oriented primarily to a personal deity, while much of Buddhism and much of Hinduism, especially Advaita Vedanta, are oriented toward an impersonal, infinite, absolute reality. To say that the devotees of both types of religion are really worshipping the “same God” does not seem illuminating. Not sharing Smith’s belief that the personal God is really derivative from, and hence less ultimate than, the impersonal absolute, I cannot agree that the God who inspired the ten commandments, liberation of people from sociopolitical captivity, and the Sermon on the Mount is really the same as the divine reality to which Shankara and Nagarjuna were oriented. To say that all religions are equally adequate for salvation seems equally un-illuminating. That statement implies that the salvation sought by, say, Moslems and Mahayana Buddhists is the same. But meditation on Emptiness and submission to Allah seem to produce strikingly different types of people. While the inclusive doctrine that “we are all on the same path” seems appealing in comparison with the exclusivist claim that “there is no salvation outside of our church,” it is not illuminating of the empirical realities.”

Now the theology of Islam is taken to be based upon the complete understanding of all the texts of the Qur’an and Prophetic sayings (ahadith, sing. hadith), as passed down from the Prophet’s Companions to every subsequent age en masse in every generation, without an interruption in that mass transmission at any generational point; hence the overwhelming number of Muslims have always held the same comprehension of Islam’s finality. To essentially dismiss the creed passed on by a mass of people in each generation from the Prophet ﷺ (may the peace and blessings of God be upon him) (tawatur), whereby the chance of being mistaken is nil, is to effectively accuse the whole collective of being mistaken, or involved in deception or to have spoken in complete allegory to the point that the overwhelming number of their listeners completely failed to make sense of the message – may God forgive us for pointing out these preposterous notions!

It is akin to the challenge that Ghazzali put in chapter five of Fada’ih al-Batiniyya when disputing the idiosyncratic interpretations of the Batinites. He said that if the Prophet ﷺ had to divulge these secrets, then why did he not? Especially when God says in the Qur’an (3:187): “You must make it clear to the people and not conceal it.“ Moreover, the Prophet ﷺ would not have been ignorant of such a truth; and he would never have allowed himself to have been misunderstood, knowing that people would take his words literally. By way of example, I can here add the following saying of the Prophet ﷺ reported in Sahih Muslim: “By Him in whose hand is the soul of Muhammad, any person of this Community, any Jew, or any Christian who hears of me and dies without believing in what I have been sent with will be an inhabitant of hell,” (trans. Keller).

One perennialist argument is that the ‘particularist, exclusivist’ (‘normative Islam’) and the ‘inclusivist, metaphysical’ (perennialist) understandings of the Qur’an are interpretations which are “one of an indefinite number of meanings that are all ‘intended’ by God to be derived from the words” of the Qur’an; and that “no one interpretation can therefore be put forward as right and true to the exclusion of all others.” This recourse to an interpretation as a way of maintaining an Islamic identity is interesting, especially in light of a non-perennialist’s argument that perennialism was not anti-Islamic, but merely “a rather novel interpretation,” “rooted…in the Qur’an” and “rarified [sic] metaphysical considerations that are better pointed out as heterodoxies that fall into a category of opinion and interpretation.” Furthermore, the non-perennialist asserted that perennialism be deemed a mere ‘innovation’ due to it simply being a ‘ta’wil’, or interpretation, and scholars are careful of declaring disbelief in such circumstances, despite the author accepting that the four schools of Islamic law consider it disbelief (kufr) to oppose the orthodox understanding on this specific question (as illustrated above). This well-intentioned attempt by a non-perennialist to retain perennialism as an Islamic heterodoxy, i.e. ‘Islamic’, in so much as it is not other than Islam, seems to result from a literalist understanding of ta’wil, as can be seen from numerous scholars of repute.

An interesting case study for beginning to test the question of whether denying Islam’s finality is disbelief or a mere heterodox interpretation is the Shifa’ of Qadi ‘Iyad, which has elaborate theological discussions contained therein, and which highlights where such an understanding of perennialism as a heterodox interpretation might be developed, yet seem to miss the nuance associated with the point.

The relevant material of the Shifa’ for our purposes comes in the third chapter: on the ruling of one who insults/reviles (sabb) God Most High, and His angels, Prophets, Books, and the people (al), wives and Companions of the Prophet [Muhammad] ﷺ. The second section (fasl) of the chapter opens with a discussion that, in part, covers the fact that the teaching (qawl) of Malik and his Companions differs (wa’khtalaf) on the issue of those who ascribe to God what is not befitting by way of interpretation (qualified by Mulla ‘Ali Qari in his commentary as ‘false’ (al-fasid) interpretation). Lengthy discussions are then presented over the course of the second section into the third section. What is clear from these discussions is that the central controversy here is with relation to the established sects that have emerged amongst the Muslims, such as the Khawarij and the Mu’tazilah. The fact that this discussion of the disagreement concerning the anathematization of those with ‘false interpretation’ is not related to the idea of denying Islam’s finality not being heresy is categorically clarified by Qadi ‘Iyad at the end of the third section (with “Q” designating the commentary by ‘Ali Qari):

“…it is disbelief for one who does not declare the disbelief of a Christian, a Jew and all of those separate to the religion of the Muslims, or hesitates in declaring their disbelief or has a doubt (al-shakk).

Qadi Abu Bakr [Q: Baqillani] said the unambiguous Sacred transmission [al-tawqif; Q: that is, by hearing from the God and His Messenger] and the Consensus (al-ijma’) agree about the disbelief (kufr) of them. Therefore whoever hesitates in that has disowned (kadhdhaba) the text (al-nass) [Q: of the Qur’an] and the unambiguous Sacred transmission [Q: from the Sunna that is correct], or doubts it; and disowning or doubting does not come to pass except from a disbeliever (kafir).”

Muhammad Shafi, in his commentary of the Qur’anic verses 41:40-46 in Ma’riful Qur’an, states that “scholars and jurisprudents have clarified” the meaning of not declaring a muta’awwil (a false interpreter) as a “kafir or Non-Muslim” as being “subject to the condition that the interpretation in matters relating to the self-evident elements (Daruriyyat-ud-din) should not be against their definite (qat’i) meanings.” He adds that ‘false interpretations’ of such definitively-established matters are not included under excusing such an interpreter, because such a person “is actually denying the teachings of the Holy Prophet ﷺ.” Shafi establishes a distinction in this issue between false interpretations that are disbelief and those that can be deemed unlawful innovation, through recourse to a statement from Shah ‘Abdal-‘Aziz Dehlawi: firstly, false interpretation of “definite, unambiguous texts of the Qur’an or of the mutawatir ahadith [mass-transmitted beyond any doubt in every generation] or of an absolute consensus of the ummah [Islamic nation]” are kufr; yet, secondly, “an interpretation against the texts that are, though clear and semi-certain, are not certain or definite in absolute terms,” then such is not kufr, but “fisq and misguidance.”

Furthermore, Ghazzali, in Faysal al-tafriqa, mentions that “disbelief” (kufr) is a designation of the Sacred Law (hukm shar’i), and it therefore has legal consequences. In essence, it is accusing the Prophet ﷺ of lying (takdhib) about something he brought; and faith (iman) is the belief in everything that he brought. The proof of the ruling of disbelief is established by explicit Sacred text (nass), as is the case with the establishment of the disbelief of the Jews and the Christians; or through analogical reasoning (qiyas) with what has been explicitly stipulated (‘ala mansus). Regarding false interpretation, Ghazzali states that kufr is not designated upon such an individual as long as his interpretation does not pertain to the foundational tenets of belief (usul al-‘aqa’id); yet one does charge with disbelief one who interprets against an important, foundational tenet of belief away from its externality (zahir) without a categorical proof (burhan qat’i).

In Fada’ih al-Batiniyya (section two of the eighth chapter), Ghazzali discusses the ‘unambiguous disbelief’ (kufr sarih) of challenging the descriptions of the Garden and the Fire which the Prophet ﷺ described with “clear utterances” (alfaz sarih); and such a refusal to accept is to accuse the Prophet ﷺ of lying (takdhib) and cannot be considered an interpretation (ta’wil). Therefore, again, we see that not every interpretation is free of being considered an accusation of lying against the Prophet ﷺ.

Ghazzali, in Faysal al-tafriqa, specifies that the foundations of faith (usul al-iman) are three: belief in God, in His Messenger ﷺ and the Last Day; he, furthermore, argues that anything else is from the ‘branches’ (furu’); and one can only charge disbelief in the face of a person’s rejection of a ‘branch’ when it is the rejection of one that has been established and narrated through mass-transmission that is beyond doubt, and impossible to have been connived through lying or conspiracy (bi’l-tawatur). Ghazzali then adds that the denial of one of the three foundations of faith or a mass-transmitted “branch” of faith would amount to an absolute accusation of lying (takdhib mahd) against the Messenger ﷺ.

Concerning the Prophetic narration, “If one of the Muslims accuses his companion of disbelief, [the accusation] returns to one of them,” (narrated in Sahih Muslim), Ghazzali argues, in Faysal al-tafriqa, that it relates to what the accuser knows of the accused. Hence if the accuser knows the accused to be a believer, then the accuser falls under the charge of disbelief; however, if the accusation of disbelief is based upon the supposition that one has accused the Messenger ﷺ of lying, but it is an [honest] error on the accuser’s part concerning the condition of the accused, then this would not be disbelief for the original accuser.

In the same way we have expounded on the profundity underlying the classical authorities on the issue of false interpretation of Scripture, one should likewise have a rounded – and not superficial, no matter how politically or personally expedient such superficiality might be – approach to understanding such statements as the one attributed to Abul-Hasan Ash’ari in Dhahabi’s Siyar a’lam al-nubala’: “We do not anathematise anyone from the community of believers; rather, these are semantic issues upon whose meanings we differ”; or the words of Ibn Taymiyya quoted in the same latter work: “We do not anathematise anyone who guards his wudu, as the Prophet said, ‘Only a believer guards his wudu.’” Good sense and good manners mean that we should refrain from placing a post-modern relativism and false representation upon these statements, which are both insulting to the utterers themselves as well as intellectually dishonest. It appears clear that these were uttered in relation to the sects amongst the Muslims, and were not intended to be applied against those who deny core Islamic beliefs.

Finality of Islam: Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV