One of the biggest problems facing religion today is modern relevance. For many people of faith, this means coming to terms with reforming their religion to fit modern times by dismissing or “re-interpreting” scripture. The beauty of Islam among religions is in its universality, its compatibility with science, and its versatile legal tradition which remains relevant across times and cultures.

Modernity between Acceptance of Reality and Rejectionism

For the Muslim, the correct attitude is not to resist or reject modernity, rather embrace it with our divine law. Unfortunately, some “conservative” Muslims fear modernity for one reason or another, thus detracting from their relevance. This way of thinking alienates many educated, reasonable Muslims, because they have to live in reality and Islam seems to be at odds with it.

We have ample means of accommodating modernity embedded in the Qur’an, the Sunnah and our vast, rich, 14-century legacy of jurisprudence. So for us, it is not a matter of reform per se, rather that of revivalist research of scriptural interpretation. The Islamic orthodoxy of law is quite vast and versatile. There are two issues that have hindered the proper manifestation of this versatility: closing of the doors of ijtihad (deriving new rulings from legal principles) for centuries, and a huge decline in the general quality of education in the Muslim world in the last two centuries. These two issues have led to some scholars blindly following certain, fixed schools of thought, and in turn to the subjugation of religious values to popular culture; thus our current dilemma/dichotomy.

Female Role in Society

One of the issues of modernity is female leadership. So you have the culture and its supporting fatwas from the Muslim world that women are not to be leaders outside of motherhood. You have a general consensus that women can be scholars and preach Islam, but only to other women, lest they corrupt the men with their sex appeal! In the west, Muslims are divided three ways over the issue of female leadership.

1. Since immigrants are still the major stakeholders in the Mosques, most mosques have not had a female board member, executive director (Amirah) and have never had a woman scholar or preacher speak to the community.
2. Some movements have started to make women Imams, leading prayers and giving Friday sermons to mixed gatherings. This has no traction in mainstream mosques due to the lack of precedent in the history of Islamic Law.
3. Some Mosques are empowering sisters as female board members and executive directors, and inviting female preachers to speak to mixed gatherings. They are reviving some historical precedents of Islamic Law to achieve relevance in dealing with modernity.

Women Scholars Preaching Islam to Mixed Gatherings

The subject I would like to tackle now, with divine providence, is having female scholars who advise and preach to both men and women. Naturally, some people will object, saying it is un-Islamic to have a woman speak to a mixed crowd, counsel or give fatwa to men. The same people would not object to a male scholar counseling a woman, outside of seclusion of course! To give them the benefit of the doubt, they have never seen or heard of this in the Muslim community. Here lies the power of culture in defining our traditions. The resolution of such issues should not be determined by what we see people doing, rather by what Islam says about the matter.

So the question is, what does Islam say about having women scholars, preachers and teachers who address both men and women?

The Holy Qur’an tells us:

“The believing men and women are patrons of each other. They command to good, rebuke evil, establish prayers, give alms, obeying God and His messenger. They will have God’s mercy. Indeed God is Mighty and Wise.” (Qur’an, 9:71)

This verse, like many others, puts men and women on equal footing regarding the practice of religion. It is especially significant regarding our question, because its linguistics equates men and women working together in preaching.

Umar sums up the drastic change to Arabia regarding women

“.كنا في الجاهلية لا نعد للنساء شيئا حتى أنزل الله فيهن ما أنزل وقسم لهن ما قسم،” و في رواية: “فلما جاء الإسلام وذكرهن الله، رأينا لهن بذلك علينا حقا”

 “Back in the days of ignorance before Islam, we didn’t consider women of much significance at all. This all changed with the emergence of Islam in which God mentioned them with respect and gave them new rights then we realized their rights over us.” (Sahih al-Bukhari, 5843)

Aisha – The Founding Mother Scholar, Judge and Orator

There are many texts which unquestionably show that Aisha was a huge precedent for female scholarship. Trained for 9 years in the house of the Prophet ﷺ, Abu Musa al-Ash’ari the great scholar of the companions is reported to have said about her:

“.ما أُشكل علَينا أصحابُ محمَّدٍ صلَّى اللهُ عليْهِ وسلَّمَ حَديثٌ قطُّ ، فسأَلنا عائشةَ ، إلَّا وجَدنا عِندها منه عِلمًا”

“Sometimes we the companions of Muhammad ﷺ would get confused about Islamic teachings. We would then go and ask Aisha about itand we found she always had the knowledge we were seeking in it.” (Jami` at-Tirmidhi, 3883)

It was also authentically transmitted by al-Zubair bin al-Awam, the great companion who was of the six nominated by Umar to decide among them the Caliph after him:

ما رأيت أحدا من الناس اعلم بالقرآن ولا بفريضة ولا بحلال ولا بحرام ولا بشعر ولا بحديث العرب ولا بنسب من عائشة رضي الله عنها

“I never saw anyone more knowledgeable of the Qur’an, Islamic Law, poetry, Arab history and lineages than Aisha radi
Allahu
`anha
 (may God be pleased with her).” (Al-Hakim, 4/11)

In his masterpiece on the biographies of the greatest prominent Muslims of our past, Imam al-Dhahabi relates that the famous scholar and general of the tabi’in (the generation of Muslims who were born after the death of the Prophet ﷺbut who were contemporaries of His companions) in Iraq, Al-Ahnaf bin Qays, said:

سمعت خطبة أبي بكر الصديق وعمر بن الخطاب وعثمان بن عفان وعلي بن أبي طالب والخلفاء من بعدهم فما سمعت الكلام من في مخلوق أحسن ولا أفخم من في عائشة

“I heard the sermons of Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, Ali and the Caliphs after them and yet I never heard speech from the mouth of anyone better or more eloquent than from Aisha.” (Siyar al-A’lam al-Nubalaa)

This should close the case, but some might say that Aisha was an exception. Well, she was in fact unique, since she was the greatest woman scholar among the companions, and greater than the top handful of men as well. That being said, as the mother of the believers, she naturally became a standard of excellence and an example to be followed by other women.

In his famous work Al-Isabah fee Tamyeez as-Sahabah, Imam ibn Hajar al-Asqalani reports on 1543 women scholars of Islamic Law, Hadith and Arabic literature!

As for teaching, the great granddaughter of the Prophet ﷺ Nafeesah bint al-Hasan was reported to have lectured to the masses in the Prophet’s mosque as well as in Cairo. It is also well-documented that scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Hajar, Ibn al-Jawzi and Imam al-Thahabi were all taught by female scholars.

For those of you who are still not convinced that it is acceptable for a sister to assert herself,

Imam Al-Haythami relates a story about the woman Umar put in charge of the policing of the marketplace of Madinah. Yahya bin Abi Saleem said:

رأيْتُ سَمْرَاءَ بنتَ نُهَيْكٍ وكانَتْ قد أَدْرَكَتِ النبيَّ صلَّى اللهُ عليهِ وسلَّمَ عليْها دِرْعٌ غَلِيظٌ وخِمارٌ غَلِيظٌ ؛ بيدِهِا سَوْطٌ تُؤَدِّبُ الناسَ ، وتَأْمُرُ بالمعروفِ وتَنْهَى عَنِ المنكرِ

“I saw Samraa bint Nuhayk, who met the Prophet ﷺ, wearing a rough Hijab with chainmail and a whip in her hand. She would discipline the people commanding to good and rebuking evil.” (Majma’ al-Zawa’id 9/267)

The majority of our scholars throughout history have said that there is nothing wrong with listening to a woman’s speech unless it is flirtatious or provocative. Both men and women were prohibited from (prolonged) looking at an attractive person. To say a woman clergy member cannot speak in front of men because some men may find her attractive is the same as prohibiting women from listening to a male Imam, since women have desires as well, and were equally rebuked from looking where there is attraction.

Just because the Muslims have strayed from the scholarly tradition of old and have become used to certain ways of dealing does not mean that our traditional sources of law do not support a different way of doing things more suitable for the reality we live in today.

It is of the utmost importance that we not judge Islam by the state of Muslims today. Our religion is much bigger and better than that. There were many great generations who were not only relevant but standard setters for civilization in general wherever they were.

There are many causes and struggles going on here in the US right now. Our religion is completely capable of addressing and solving the world’s problems. We are obligated to create a generation that has the right tools to bring moral balance to issues like feminism, economy, racism, class warfare, political corruption, oppression or anything else related to morality or ethics.

There can only be one truth, right? So when it comes to Islamic law this must also be the case. There may be different opinions but only one of them is correct and therefore my ‘shaykh’, ‘madhab’, ‘tariqa’, ‘group’ is usually right to the exclusion of others. This may be the type of logic that leads to much of the intolerance amongst Muslims today, particularly in the West. You only have to momentarily interact on social media or talk to people, usually around the masjids, to experience this.

The more troubling thing is that this type of attitude often comes from people who appear to have little or no religious training apart from being an activist belonging to this or that group or being a follower of Shaykh X. What has led us to this dire situation?

Due to the fact that a Muslim is defined as one who surrenders to Allah and then acts in accordance to Islamic law, issues of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and its associated debates and differences have invariably become an essential part of an ‘active’ Muslim’s life. The shari`ah (Islamic faith, law and ethics) is central to a Muslim’s identity as it informs his or her values and actions.

However, our tradition in general—and our legal tradition in particular—has always been one that accommodated diverse opinions within an agreed framework. Take the Qur’an itself; there are at least seven different but equally valid ways of reciting the Qur’an. These have been narrated widely on the authority of our Imams (leading experts) of recitation all the way from the Sahaba (companions of the Prophet ﷺ) who all learnt the Qur’an directly from the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ (peace be upon him).

Take a look at our legal system. We have four surviving legal schools (madhahib), but there were many more. Muslims throughout history have generally recognised them as equally valid schools. Then within the schools you have a whole range of diverse opinions between the founder of the schools and their students or later scholars of the madhab. However, often the followers or supporters of the very same madhabs or their shaykhs (scholars) become fanatical or go to extremes due to various factors, one of them being their lack of understanding of what a madhab actually is. This misunderstanding is not restricted to a madhab alone; it can be applied to an opinion or a particular scholar.

Shaykh al-Hasan al-Dedew describes the madhab in this respect:  ‘The madhab is a way of dealing with the text (Qur’an and Hadith). Therefore everything that Jibril `alayhi alsalam (Angel Gabriel, peace be upon him) related from Allah subhanahu wa ta`ala (exalted is He) is not the exclusive property of anyone’s madhab.  Everything which is considered qat’i (‘definitive’, clear cut) from the texts is not the exclusive property of anyone’s madhab. Therefore the madhab (exists) only in those issues that require ijtihad (reasoning, in order to arrive at the meaning or legal implication.)’

In other words those texts from the Qur’an or hadith (narrations of the Prophet ﷺ) that are agreed upon, in terms of their meanings and legal implications, are not the exclusive property of anyone’s madhab or shaykh but rather it is obligatory upon all to accept and follow them without any difference. The differences and therefore the existence of madhabs occur in those texts that are ‘speculative’ (dhanni) in terms of meaning, and carry more than one interpretation due to a number of factors, which are outlined in the books of Usul al-Fiqh (legal jurisprudence). The question here is in this regards, where legitimate differences of conclusions occurs, is there only one actual truth in the matter?

Before we proceed to answer this question it is worth clarifying another common confusion. There is a difference between something being legally valid and something being correct or the only truth. There may be several opinions on one issue and if they are issued from qualified scholars who have followed sincerely the procedures of ijtihad and have exerted their utmost efforts to arrive at the truth, then all of the opinions may be legally valid and acceptable. Even though only one of them may have arrived at the actual truth of the matter or the correct answer.

To give an example the Hanafis consider bleeding to invalidate wudu (ablution) whilst other schools like the Shafi’e madhab are of the opinion that it does not. Both opinions are considered by all sides to be legally valid for the layman in that for someone who follows either opinion, his wudu is valid.

So we return to the question as to whether or not there is in actual fact only one correct ruling on the issue, even if others are incorrect but valid. Al-Shawkani says that Imam Abu Hanifah, Imam Malik, Imam Shafi’e and the majority of the jurists (may Allah’s mercy be upon them) are of the opinion that in such matters the truth (haq) is one, but it is not defined or known to us, though it is known to Allah (swt). In other words there is only one correct opinion, which Allah (swt) knows and is not knowable by anyone else with 100% certainty. However, the other opinions, even if they are not the actual correct one, are still valid for the ordinary person to follow.

If we could all just accept a general rule that different madhabs and opinions of the jurists are all equally valid as long as they are as a result of valid ijtihad from qualified scholars and are not from the anomalous (shadh) opinions that have been rejected by the vast majority—we could then begin to understand the nature and dynamics of our shari`ah that would enhance unity amongst our communities particularly in the West where basic Islamic literacy levels are low and where diverse Muslim communities are often living together with access to a plethora of thoughts, madhabs and opinions.

We should ponder on the words of Imam al-Shafi’e who is reported to have said, ‘I believe my opinion is right with the possibility that it is wrong and I believe the opinion of those who disagree with me is wrong with the possibility of that being correct.’ This was the attitude of most of the Imams. The Sahabas who were trained by the Prophet ﷺ differed amongst themselves on legal matters but maintained brotherhood and respect.

Once this is clear, the other logical point to then move on to and accept is to avoid condemning other legally valid opinions as ‘batil (inferior),’ ‘haram (unlawful),’ misguided’ etc. In other words—don’t ‘enjoin the good and forbid the evil’ on issues of valid legal differences as one of the conditions to forbid an evil (munkar) is that it should be an agreed upon evil and not one in which valid differences of opinion exist.

As our communities here in the West grow and develop, our scholars will be called upon to deal with a whole range of difficult and often unprecedented issues. They won’t necessarily all agree but if we understand the above we will respect each other’s differences and remain united as communities in spite of our differences.

Sitting in the mosque board meeting, as one issue after another was raised, I’ll confess it was difficult not to drift into my own thoughts. However, one issue was raised that caught my attention that was, perhaps not surprisingly, the issue of finance and fundraising: the mosque needed funds for refurbishing the ablution (wuḍu) area. Without much progress being made, I identified a possible source, although it was not problem-free. The source I suggested had a large proportion earned from unlawful sources; however, there was an opinion within Fiqh (jurisprudence), which allowed the utilisation of such funds for public good (maslaḥa).¹ This objection was fairly raised by some, but as I started to explain how there was a scholarly opinion – “Forget the scholars!! We only follow the Qur’ān and Sunnah,” shouted a fellow member, whom I found uncharacteristic since this brother seemed to be a calm person. He then explained how Muslims should follow the Qur’ān and Sunnah only and leave aside the scholars to their own mumblings. Unfortunately (or perhaps fortunately) he was older, held a more senior position than me, and most definitely had a louder voice than me and thus the saying “might makes right” had full effect. I looked down; although they took on my suggestion, I was somewhat frustrated at the rather superficial understanding of Islam this brother manifested. He was a brother of good character and a person who usually has a very pleasant demeanour, yet even he, when it came to Fiqh, could not escape this intolerant attitude.

This article aims to briefly take a look at the claim of some who say that they follow nothing but the “Qur’ān and Sunnah” or only the “Qur’ān and ṣaḥīḥ Ḥadīth.”

What is the purpose of this slogan? By merely using this term it seems a person alleges that any community member who does not affiliate with their group or understanding is not following the Qur’ān and Sunnah. When a person juxtaposes a valid legal (Fiqhī) opinion you’re following with “but you should follow the Qur’ān and Sunnah,” it implies that you aren’t. This attitude suggests truth is the monopoly of his/her group and the rest of the people are doomed.

What this also shows is that a person who takes this stance shows a lack of understanding of the process, by which the primary sources – the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth – are interpreted, and through which conclusions are reached.

Understanding How the Scholars Understand (fahm)

Look at the following diagram:

Figure 1

The primary sources in Islam are the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth, both which originate from Allāh. Whilst the Qur’ān is directly from Allāh using His words, the Ḥadīth is relayed to us through the words of the Prophet ﷺ though the meaning is from Allāh. These words are then recorded in the form of a text, thus both the primary sources are texts. These texts are then understood by scholars/jurists/interpreters in efforts to decipher what God intended.² This forms what is known as ‘fiqh’.³

One Understanding

Now in some issues (A – Ijmā’), there is only one understanding, one fiqh (as indicated by the red key colour in fig. 1). This means that the whole community of jurists are certain that what they have understood is actually what God intended. This is because either:

• The primary sources are clear-cut (Qaṭ’ī) in both their authenticity (thubūth) and meaning (dalāla). For example: the belief in monotheism, in the hereafter, the fact that the five daily prayers are Farḍ (obligatory).
• The primary sources are unclear (Dhannī) in either their authenticity or meaning, however a clear (ṣarīḥ), legitimate and genuine consensus has been reached. This means that there is a consensus and not just a claim of consensus.⁴ Yet such issues of agreement form the exceptions rather than the norm, as a brief look at any encyclopaedia of Fiqh proves. Based on this, Ibn Hazm explains how consensus is often erroneously claimed.⁵ What is interesting is that Ibn Hazm himself, may Allāh reward him, seems to fall into this error when he drew up his own list of issues in which he thought a consensus had been reached.⁶ Ibn Taymiyya later followed up Ibn Hazm’s list of issues of alleged consensus, and showed some areas in which Ibn Hazm erroneously claimed a consensus, when there was in fact none.⁷

Thus in such issues everyone is “following the Qur’ān and Sunnah,” therefore repeatedly chanting “only Qur’ān and Sunnah” is made redundant.

Many Understandings

Most issues however have a wide range of scholarly understandings (fig. 1. B – Ikhtilāf, the different views indicated by the different colours), all of which do go back to the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth. These varying views may be due to several reasons, which can be summarised into the following⁸:

• While the sources that relate to the particular ruling are agreed upon, the understanding of that Ḥadīth differs; hence it is the fahm (understanding) that is leading to the Ikhtilāf (difference of opinion). A clear example of this during the time of the companions is the incident of the ^cAṣr prayers at Banī Qurayẓa.⁹
• The source in relation to that issue is differed over, due to reasons such as a dispute in authenticity, or whether it was abrogated or not, or whether it is related directly to the issue under discussion.¹⁰ Thus whilst some jurists use a certain Ḥadīth and base rulings on it, others do not due to the aforementioned reasons.

Less Than Certain – Still No Rebuking
Sometimes jurists are not 100% certain that what they have understood or the ruling that they have arrived at is actually what Allāh had intended. This follows the process as:

1. Their understanding/views are all based on a sound interpretation (Ijtihād);
2. The primary sources are not clear-cut, which means Allāh deliberately did not reveal His will clearly;¹¹
3. There is no other means of verifying the will of Allāh other than through understanding the primary sources, since revelation has ceased with the demise of the Prophet ﷺ.

No one can condemn another for holding a valid view. “There is no inkār (rebuking) in matters of ikhtilāf¹²” and “an Ijtihād is not made redundant by another Ijtihād¹³”. This means that such differences will always exist and no amount of insistence on “ṣaḥīḥ Ḥadīth” will help unify them.

Is There A Way To Certainty In Such Issues?

No. The only situation in which one can be fully certain (Yaqīnan) that he is on the correct opinion in issues to which the primary sources are less than clear-cut, is if they receive further clarification from God. This is known as revelation (waḥi). Now this happened with the Prophet ﷺ when he made an Ijtihād and decided to take ransom from the captives of the battle of Badr. The companion Abu Bakr (ra) agreed with the Prophet ﷺ but `Umar (ra) disagreed. Allāh agreed with `Umar (ra) and made this known to the Prophet ﷺ using stern words (Qur’ān, 8:67-68) which caused the Prophet ﷺ and Abu Bakr (ra) to weep. As the Prophet ﷺ is no longer with us, and there is no prophet coming after him, this medium of clarification from God has ended, and thus no one can claim such an authority. And even if they did, they would have gone against clear-cut (Qaṭ’ī) texts, which negate such a possibility (i.e. wahi) after the Prophet ﷺ and thus anyone claiming this would be committing blasphemy and render their Imān (faith) void.

Points to Consider

There are several points,¹⁴ which are worth keeping in mind so that the simple notion of “only Qur’ān and Sunnah” can be avoided.

1. An Oversimplified Perception

If all that has been mentioned is understood, then it is simple to see how futile it is to continuously hurl the slogan of “only the Qur’ān and ṣaḥīḥ Ḥadīth¹⁵” especially in matter of difference of opinion (disregarding the reasons as to why the differences arose in the first place¹⁶). Indeed as Ibn Taymiyya stated,¹⁷ such differences arise rarely because the scholars based their opinion on whim or arbitrarily formed rulings. If that was the case, then chanting “ṣaḥīḥ Ḥadīth” is understandable, as one would think, “if only they knew of the Ḥadīth, then all differences will cease.” However this is not the case, thus it is useless to suggest that by following the Qur’ān and ‘ṣaḥīḥ’ Ḥadīth, all differences will cease.

Consequently, every time someone acts upon an opinion about which the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth are not clear, they are following an understanding of someone. This person can be a scholar or a non-scholar. Thus Ḥanafis, Mālikis, Ḥanbalis and Shāfi’īs are simply being honest when they admit that they are following one understanding of the primary sources out of many. However the person who refuses to adhere to the legal schools mentioned, nor admits to following any other scholar/jurist, but instead claims to follow the Qur’ān and Sunnah directly, and independently, the question remains: whose understanding are they following?¹⁸

2. Pretentious Certainty

Moreover what this also shows is that if someone, a scholar or non-scholar, gives the impression that their view regarding a dhannī (unclear) matter, is somehow objectively the only correct view, that somehow they have by-passed the ‘fahm’ as indicated in fig. 1 above, and have approached the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth directly as they may say, then one should be cautious of this person’s methodology, as this is impossible. His opinion is only one of many (as indicated by the different colours in fig. 1).  One cannot deny history, or the natural human process of interpretation. Every text thus approached and every ruling issued, was achieved by the human agent through interpretation. If one is not a prophet, then one cannot claim to have just ‘known.’ This means that there must be a methodology upon which such an understanding was based on. It is vital that we know what this methodology is to see the logic and evidence of the said opinion. If this is the case, and this person is denying this very human aspect then either:

• They themselves are unaware of their methodology and somehow think that they are actually approaching the texts ‘directly,’ similar to how Prophets receive information disconnected to history and context.
• They are either knowingly or unknowingly (good opinion obliges us to hold the former) hiding their methodology, to inject their opinion with an aura of false objectivity, and through this they wish to acquire more followers. In other words, to put it in bluntly, it is merely a marketing ploy.¹⁹

An Example

This attitude also seems to manifest itself towards how people approach the text Fiqh al-Sunnah. It is as if many people have misunderstood the purpose of the text and think this is literally what the title suggests, “The understanding of the Sunnah” without the human agent or fahm. Yet this is belied by the fact that the author, Sayyid Sabiq, states various understandings when he covers the many different issues. Thus to take this book as representing the ‘real Sunnah,’ and to take for example the Ḥanafī text Mukhtaṣar al-Qudūrī or the Maliki text Mukhtaṣar al-Khalīl as being ‘biased’ shows that one clearly fails to understand the dynamics of text-understanding, since if this applies to all human beings, it surely applied to the author of Fiqh al-Sunnah.²⁰ The blame in such a case however, rests on the reader and not on the author. One must be careful of a fetish for certainty in an area that offers none. Such indulgences are as bad as the desire for speculation in an area which is clear-cut

1. The Secondary and Tertiary sources

Another obvious fact that seems to be ignored when one insists everything must be mentioned from the primary sources explicitly is the negation of several other sources, secondary and tertiary. The fact is that everything is not explicitly mentioned in the primary texts (Qur’an and Sunnah). A quick look at the Islamic Juristic legacy shows that not only were there primary sources, but based on this, there were also secondary sources of authority – Consensus (Ijmā’) and Analogy (Qiyās) as well several tertiary sources. Moreover, there were different maxims developed after scholars’ surveyed different rulings in order to facilitate the jurist to encompass them with ease. This attitude also overlooks the highly developed maqāsid (teleological) theories of Islamic law by the likes of scholars such as imām al-Shatibi.

2. Ḥasan Ḥadīth

Lastly, when one insists on accepting nothing short of ṣaḥīḥ Ḥadīth, it implies the non-acceptance of another category of Ḥadīth, which is below the ṣaḥīḥ in authenticity, although is still used for purposes of law. This “lower classed” type of Ḥadīth is known as the Ḥasan Ḥadīth.

Is This Really Relevant?

Yes. This subject is relevant since if it was only ‘a few brothers in the mosque’ adopting such an attitude it could easily be avoided or changed. Yet it is worrying when one tunes into Islamic channels to find ‘accepted scholars’ pushing this line of thinking, helping to create a culture of narrow-mindedness and bigotry. It is not surprising that some of the masses are adopting this very attitude. So one is left to think that the TV scholar’s is the only authentic opinion, and the rest are baseless or weak. But this has many negative sociological problems, from breaking the unity in the mosque, to causing rifts within the family, and eventually creating a community at war with each other. Ultimately it means the Muslim community becomes what Prophet Ibrahim supplicated against: from becoming “a fitna²¹ for the Non-Muslims” (Qur’ān, 60:5) as their social discord projects Islam as a backward and intolerant faith.

If one hears someone adopting such an attitude it may help to remain cautious, ask them if there is a difference of opinion on the matter, and the basis of such a difference. One may also want to ask another scholar of a different orientation in order to maintain a balance and not become a fanatic (muta’aṣṣib).

Conclusion

The purpose of this short paper was not to attack specific members of the Muslim community or specific groups. It was rather to highlight an unhealthy trend that breeds a culture of intolerance. Finally it was to highlight and emphasise the fact that legal differences in dhannī matters are part and parcel of Islam, and simply insisting on following ṣaḥīḥ Ḥadīth will not decrease this. The jurists of the past and present, either directly or indirectly, ultimately base their understandings on the Qur’ān and Sunnah, hence it is nothing short of self-delusional to think it’s the luxury of a few individuals in exclusion to the rest.

The world we live in today has brought many tests to the Muslims. Undoubtedly, it has also brought many blessings to us. One new reality—the fact that the knowledge of our religion has become readily available through mass media—can be either a test or a blessing depending upon the scholar you speak to. As a result, we find two extremes. Some who declare that everyone must follow one juristic school or preferred scholar to be the authority without exception. Others declare that they may follow whatever opinion they like and therefore spend much of their time searching for opinions which suit their desires. In this article we beseech the support and ultimate success only granted by Allah subhanahu wa ta`ala (exalted is He) to bring the proper attitude to the availability of knowledge and scholarship in the modern world. This must be done by balancing the two extremes. In order to be witnesses upon mankind, Allah has made us a balanced nation. (Qur’an, 2:143)

Some scholars and schools of thought teach that all laymen must follow a particular juristic school of thought without exception. They remind us of the verses in which Allah enjoined us all to ask someone of knowledge if we were confused or unaware. They also cite how the Prophet ﷺ would designate some of his more knowledgeable companions to be specific references for others. Their points are all true reports, but still do not justify the claim that we should attach ourselves to one juristic school and never seek knowledge outside of it. This is like making that school of thought a legislator with the same authority as the Prophet ﷺ — which is wrong.

The truth is that the science of Islamic law can be quite complicated and not everyone can deduce a sound understanding from just reading the Qur’an and hadith (report of the sayings and actions of the Prophet ﷺ). This requires you to seek a qualified jurist to clarify to you the ruling regarding matters you don’t know about or are unclear to you. That being said, there is nothing in Islam which says that we must follow only one juristic school of thought or only one scholar. Two of the previous scholars of al-Azhar, Shatloot and al-Sayis, wrote in their curriculum about comparative jurisprudence, “This opinion was developed by some juristic schools in the recent centuries when the spirit of difference had become dominant and juristic partiality reigned. So they made up rules that prevent laymen from taking an opinion outside of the school they grew up with. This caused the reality of juristic schools of thought to go from opinions which can be discussed and either accepted or denied by anyone to become obligatory religious truths that one who started with them must always adhere to and can never look into others. By these rules, those scholars prevented the masses from looking into the Qur’an and Sunnah for guidance! (Which all believers were commanded to do in the Qur’an.)” (Muqaranah al-Madhahib fil-Fiqh, 30)

Jad al-Haqq, one of the great scholars of al-Azhar in its prime, says in his book about the flexibility of Islamic Law: “The truth which is the opinion of the majority of scholars is that it is not an obligation to follow a certain juristic school with exception to others. Any follower (muqallid) may follow whichever school or juristic scholar he likes. This is because since the time of the companions people would follow different jurists from time to time and compare what one said with another on a given issue. This opinion was taken by al-Aamidee, Ibn al-Hajib, al-Kamel ibn al-Hamam, and al-Rafi’ee and many others from our great predecessors. This is because obliging someone to follow one juristic school over the other is like claiming for them a distinguished right to legislation whereas Islam is clear that the only obligation in obedience is to the Qur’an and authentic Sunnah. Ibn Ameer al-Hajj said in his commentary on al-Tahreer by al-Kamel al-Hamam, ‘In the foundations (usool) of Ibn Muflih and others from the Malikiyyah, Hanabilah and Shafi’iyyah, it is not an obligation upon anyone to follow a specific jurist or juristic school.’(Muroonah al-Fiqh al-Islami, 134-135) That opinion is confirmed by the many scholars based in different juristic schools who researched for the Encyclopedia of Fiqh of Kuwait (see vol. 13, p.163).

This brings us to the crux of this article. The Holy Qur’an is crystal clear in encouraging all of us to learn about our religion and to spend as much time as we can doing so. So if we find answers and clarification by reading through the Qur’an and Sunnah then that is a good thing. The problem is that there will be many texts that we don’t understand. There will also be many issues of which we aren’t aware. Finally, there will be many other issues which we simply can’t find an answer to at all. So this is why we must seek a sound understanding of Islamic law from a person who is qualified to give a legal ruling. We must go to someone who is a jurist (faqeeh/mujtahid) or has been trained in the Islamic sciences enough to give us the ruling from a qualified jurist.

The scholars have differed on the matter of taking rulings from different scholars. Some scholars allow Muslims to choose any scholarly opinion according to what is easier for them. They cite the major objective of Islamic Law in facilitation and Allah’s compassion for the believers. The well-known authentic hadith says, “When the Prophet ﷺ was faced with two options, he always chose the easier of the two as long as there is no sin in it.” (Bukhari) These scholars remind us that in the time of the companions and thereafter people would seek rulings from different scholars and there was never any blame on them for doing that. Shaikh al-Tayyib Salamah says, “There is no doubt about the fact those who have permitted the follower (muqallid) to choose opinions because he or she finds them easier upon them are not permitting it if it corrupts their religion. They are saying that as long as a qualified jurist has made a ruling then whosoever chooses to follow them is not blameworthy because facilitation is a well-known founding principle in Islamic Law.” (Al-Akhth bil-Rukhas wa Hukmuhuh, 533)

Some scholars who prohibited taking rulings from different schools of thought weren’t doing so because they believe that it isn’t permissible according to their understanding of the Qur’an and Sunnah.  They did so in order to block the means to sinful behavior. They hold that allowing Muslims to pick whichever opinion they want will lead them to picking opinions based upon their desires which they say is sinful. Thus Islamic Law would be serving their desires when the people were meant to serve Islamic law.

The majority of scholars have said that this application of blocking the means is invalid since it would be putting that juristic school on the level of Prophetic legislation when in reality it is just a human’s educated attempt to represent Islamic Law. The correct way to deal with it is teaching the people how to choose an opinion regardless of which juristic school or scholar it comes from. In this approach, the majority has said that it is permissible to follow any qualified jurist or juristic school, but according to a condition. The world-renowned scholar Yusuf Al-Qaradawi said, “Some scholars allowed following any opinion from a qualified jurist even if it is just to suit one’s desires and because they find it easiest without even looking into the proofs and thinking about which one makes sense and is rooted in the texts. I say that this is impermissible because the early generations of Muslims were narrated to have said, ’Whoever seeks the easy opinions amongst jurists has rebelled (fasaq).’ That is because that is simply following one’s desires and playing with our religion which is a mockery… In this case it is as if the believer wants the truth to follow him around whereas it is the believer that should be searching for the truth even if it goes against his desire.” (Fatawa al-Mu’asarah, vol .2, 128-129). Their strongest proof in prohibiting seeking opinions simply because they agree with their desires is in verse 59 of Surah an-Nisaa: “And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger.” (Qur’an, 4:59)

This verse supports the need to compare rulings according to that which seems closer to the Qur’an, Sunnah, and sound logic rather than the opinion that seems easier to you. The esteemed Wahbah Zuhaily said, “My opinion is that it is permissible to look for the facilitations in the juristic schools in the case of dire necessity or pressing need. This is as long as the intention behind it isn’t playing around with the religion to suit one’s desires.” (Al-Rukhas al-Fiqheyyah fi Dow’i al-Kitab wal-Sunnah, 80)

Now some might have the wrong idea of what the scholars mean in serving one’s desires. The following example was given by Shaikh Mustafa al-Taarizee: “Someone wants an illicit relationship. To escape fornication [adultery], he sleeps with her by secret marriage whereby there is no Guardian as in the school of Abu Hanifa and no witnesses as is narrated in the school of Malik…playing around with Islam in this manner makes a mockery of it and no spiritual person of reason would allow it.” (Al-Rukhas al-Fiqheyyah fi Dow’i al-Kitab wal-Sunnah, 81).

Now we must summarize the opinions of the scholars on this matter and set out the guidelines for taking easier opinions so that we don’t fall into sinful behavior.

1. From the established principles of Islamic Law is “إذا ضاق الأمر اتسع” which means roughly, if a situation becomes hard to withstand, then the law accommodates. So you may follow an established opinion which makes your general life easier. An example of this is for people who live in the west and find it difficult to take off their socks to make Wudhu. They may take the Hanbali opinion for the case being permissible and not related to the type of foot covering because there is a حاجة or pressing need.
2. When making such a move, one has to follow an established opinion within the major schools of thought which has been validated by the great scholars throughout history. It is preferred to be an opinion of one of the 4 juristic traditions, but if not it must be at least well documented and recognized by the authoritative juristic works or represented in the modern councils of jurisprudence and committees dealing with new issues.

God willing the next research will cover strange isolated opinions and the rules for dealing with them.

And Allah (swt) knows best.

The Question

Recently, I saw a lecture on YouTube with a man claiming that saying, “jumu`ah mubārak (a blessed Friday)” on Fridays is an innovation? Is that true?

The Answer

Scholars of fatwā (legal opinions) divided acts into worship and customs. Both are central to our faith, and scholars gave each a tremendous amount of attention. For that reason, the first Ph.D. granted at al-Azhar University in the 20’s was on Islam and Custom.

Customs and Cultures are Embraced by Islām

Custom is so important that it forms one of the five major axioms of Islamic law. Al-Qādi al- Hussein al-Shāf’i wrote, “Utilization of custom is one of the five principles that Islamic Law rests on.”

Imām al-Syūtti mentioned them in Kawkab al-Sāti saying,

“Certainty does not remove doubt, and Islam removes every harm.
Hardship brings ease and custom (for fiqh) is a reference point
A few added a fifth: that every act of a person is based his intention.”

Custom in the Tradition

`Abdullah bin Masūd used to say, “What the Muslims deem as good is good.”

In Imām al-Bukhāri’s collection of authentic hadīth (saying or tradition of the Prophet ﷺ – peace be upon him), under the chapter on commerce, we find an interesting title for the 95th section:

بَابُ مَنْ أَجْرَى أَمْرَ الأَمْصَارِ عَلَ مَا يَتَعَارَفُونَ بَيْنَهُمْ فِي الْبُيُوعِ وَالإِجَارَةِ وَالْمِكْيَالِ، وَالْوَزْنِ، وَسُنَنِهِمْ عَلَ نِيَّاتِهِمْ وَمَذَا هِبِهِمِ الْمَشْهُورَةِ

Chapter: Where there is no fixed judgement, the traditions and conventions of a community are referred to – Customs and Norms is an Important Part of our Faith

Commenting on this, Imām bin Hajar wrote, “The purpose of this title is to establish the reliance on custom in Islamic law.”

That is not to say that any custom is recognized by Islam. For more on that, consult a local scholar or see the books of usūl al-fiqh (principles of Islamic jurisprudence).

The Ruling on Customs and Day to Day Affairs is Permissibility

Imām Ibn Taymiyyah wrote, the foundations of Imām Ahmed’s school are two:

1. Customs are permissible unless there is a clear text that forbids them.
2. Acts of worship are forbidden (to invent) unless there is a clear text that allows them.

Then, he defined custom saying, “Customs are habits of people pertaining to food, drink, clothing, transportation, speech and other such normal day to day activities. Thus, they should not be forbidden unless by Allah or his Messenger ﷺ through an explicit text, a general one or a proper analogy. If not, then the general ruling for them is permissibility.”

We understood from Ibn Taymiyyah’s definition that customs divide into two parts: words and deeds.

Ibn Hajar said, “Custom plays a role in determining the explicit meaning of words.” Implying that if a person uses a word that is exclusive to his culture, the known custom is used to determine its implications. For that reason, Imam al-Dardīr noted that the Māliki’s coined an axiom, “Customs are like conditions.” From the important usage of words are greetings and salutations.

Greetings

Scholars agree that greetings fall under mu`amalāt (day-to-day activities), and they are part of customs that are related to speech. Since the general ruling on customs in permissibility, then greetings that are free of evil are considered permissible. For that reason, when Talha (a great companion of the Prophet ﷺ) greeted K`ab with the good news of the latter’s forgiveness, the former was not censured by the Prophet ﷺ, K`ab or the other companions (Allah be pleased with them all).

Based on this important principle and the large number of general texts that encourage us to speak well and be gentle to others, it is a stretch to say that such a greeting in an innovation. Imām al-Sakhāwi noted this in al-Tahina bi al-Shūr wa al-‘Ayād (Greetings Upon Months and Holidays) in greater detail.

May Allah bless us with tawfiq (success).

Suhaib Webb

Usul al-Fiqh Series: Part I

Primer in Conceptualizing Usul al-Fiqh

The following series is intended to introduce usul al-fiqh in a systematic manner. In this section, we will introduce some key concepts that outline briefly what usul al-fiqh is about, what is beneficial about this science, and why it is important.

Defining and Describing Usul al-Fiqh

Usul al-fiqh is the body of knowledge which clarifies the various research methods and principles that aid us in understanding the Qur’an and Sunnah and it shows us how to derive benefit from them.

Secondly, usul al-fiqh outlines for us what is a proof in the Shar’iah, why it is considered a proof and how to understand how to properly work with proofs especially when they are unclear in meaning and or when they appear to contradict each other.

Thirdly, it teaches us the appropriate means by which we can derive rulings from the Qur’an and Sunnah – rulings that guide human action by determining if an act is:

1. Prohibited            (haram)
2. Disliked               (makruh)
3. Obligatory            (wajib)
4. Recommended     (mandub, mustahab)
5. Permissable         (mubah)

Fourthly, usul al-fiqh outlines for us the rules that govern the patterned way the Arabic language works in the Qur’an and the Sunnah so that we know what is being communicated to us and we understand how to properly interpret them based on linguistic or textual evidence.

The process of understanding the primary sources and extracting from them guidance and ruling in a systematic manner is called ijtihad (independent research).

Benefits of Usul al-Fiqh

Usul al-fiqh gives us a research framework for understanding the language of the Qur’an and Sunnah and how to use the various types of evidences in a manner in which they serve as a guide to our Islamic practices and belief. By understanding usul al-fiqh as a research methodology, we also come to understand how scholars construct their positions through the use of evidences found in the Arabic language or in the Qur’an and Sunnah.

Through usul al-fiqh, we also learn that positions that are not constructed by referring to the principles and means found in the sciences are positions which are not considered acceptable to follow, because they are constructed and concluded without properly attending to acceptable research methodology and therefore have no binding authority. Authoritative positions in Islam are only concluded and constructed by way of proper research techniques. These techniques guide research by outlining what constitutes a source for research and what principles are to be used to understand that source. Furthermore, the techniques emphasize how, when, and why a rule is derived from that source under research and what qualifications must he or she possess as a researcher in order to qualify for such an undertaking.

Goal of Usul al-Fiqh

Usul al-fiqh helps us to develop the proper research skills and mental frame that allow us to have a systematic understanding (research method) necessary to properly comprehend the Qur’an and Sunnah. It supplies us with the necessary tools for engaging in ijtihad and developing not only legal minds and juristic capacity, but the mind capable of properly interpreting the source texts of Islam and applying them to life. In short, the goal of usul al-fiqh is ijtihad (independent reasoning, research).

Framing Usul al-Fiqh: Three Primary Concerns of the Science

There are 3 key areas of study in the science of usul al-fiqh:

These key areas of study are focused studies, which clarify the following themes.

Qualities of the Mujtahid:

By understanding these criteria we understand who is skilled and qualified in matters of scholarship versus who is not. The person not skilled in and qualified to practice ijtihad is known in usul al-fiqh literature as a muqalid.  The muqalid is a person not qualified to engage in independent investigation because he lacks the qualifications, meaning that he has not mastered the principles of research methodology. Consequently, this category of persons is obligated to follow the research of those who are qualified to research, but he is encouraged to make an effort to learn and understand with time and gradually how scholars come to conclusions and the reasoning governing their positions.

Linguistic Indications:

The Arabic language is governed by usages and patterns. Upon understanding these, it is possible to conclude what is being indicated by a particular pattern. For simplicity’s sake, we only refer to those indications which tell us if a ruling is a command to do something or not do something, or if the pattern only recommends to do or not to do an action, or just leaves the matter up to decision. There are other patterns found in the Arabic language that refer to understanding if a matter is general or specific, but we will suffice with mentioning that the language is governed by patterns which must be understood in order to conclude their meaning.

Rules for Dealing with Proofs:

In usul al-fiqh we also learn how to weigh, rank and distinguish between proofs by determining their strength and relationship to other proofs and principles. When an apparent conflict arises among these proofs, the scholar must understand how to reconcile these proofs. Upon determining that the proofs cannot be reconciled after thorough and long investigation, it may be determined that one of the two proofs is to be abrogated. The rules governing the process of ranking, reconciliation, and abrogation when working with evidences are a major concern of usul al-fiqh and this is an area wherein only the most skilled of scholarship can maneuver and show itself.

Key Questions:

1. What is the goal of usul al-fiqh?
2. Why is usul al-fiqh important?
3. What are the 3 main areas of study in usul al-fiqh?
4. Why is it proper to have methodology in understanding the Qur’an and Sunnah?
5. Who is the person that can independently research the Qur’an and Sunnah?
6. Can a person research the Qur’an and Sunnah without understanding the criteria that determines research and the researcher?

By the Grace of Allah, we have a beautiful tradition of law filled with rich wisdom that balances between a deep understanding of our scripture and the reality of those to whom it is applied. Consequentially, our scholars have dealt with the modern world by developing two new applications of fiqh. One is referred to as Fiqh al-Nawazil which means the ‘Islamic Jurisprudence of New Realities’ (not present when the schools of jurisprudence were formed) and a subdivision of this is Fiqh al-Aqalliyyaat which is ‘Islamic Jurisprudence for Muslim Minorities’ living in non-Muslim lands. The famous axiom which led to the formation of these modern applications of the principles and objectives of our sacred texts is “The legal ruling on a given matter may change according to different eras, places, or circumstances.” This axiom is held by the vast majority of scholars from the four schools of Islamic Jurisprudence. To my knowledge there is no exception, but I was taught to be cautious about claiming it a consensus.

One of the new realities we face is that the vast majority of Muslims don’t speak Arabic. Similarly many Muslims live in communities where Arabic is not a spoken language and it would be unrealistic to expect the vast majority of them to learn it.

Regarding the language of the Friday Sermon (khutbah) given to majority non-Arab audiences, there has arisen two schools of thought amongst our scholars today.  The majority opinion is that the khutbah may be a mixture of both Arabic and the local language. Even some notable scholars of today hold the opinion that there is no clear requirement for any of the Khutbah to be in Arabic except verses of the Qur’an when it is delivered to a majority non-Arab audience.  The other opinion is that the khutbah is not acceptable unless it is all in Arabic.

More often than not, the literalist school of thought, which tends to issue opinions from centuries old fiqh books, doesn’t benefit these new realities. In dealing with the fiqh of new realities, our scholars and the collective councils often look at what is in the best interest (maslahah) of Islam and Muslims in the new realities they face. When there are texts which relate to an issue, they try and derive the reasoning (‘illah) behind the text in order to form an opinion which is more practical and facilitating. If there is no text prohibiting something then once again they look at the general objectives of Islam and if it fits with those objectives of our Divine law, then they will encourage it.

When dealing with this subject, I thought it to be highly relevant to mention the positions of world fiqh councils and comprehensive works rather than just stating the proofs behind it. This is because the followers of the minority opinion purport that theirs is the undoubtedly correct and majority opinion (it has even been said that there is a consensus for their opinion). With all due respect to them, in my opinion, this is due to the reclusiveness of their group which stems from an extreme form of blind following (taqleed) of their scholars.

Let’s start in the Islamic Encyclopedia formed in Kuwait. This research is the largest comparative fiqh work known to the recorded history of Islam. The idea came collectively from representative scholars of many Muslim countries in world fiqh conferences in the 1950’s. It was started in Egypt and then shifted to the ministry of endowments and religious affairs of Kuwait in the late 60’s. In Kuwait, many scholars from different countries like Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Kuwait based in all four legal schools (madhabs) began researching for the project. It was recently finished at 45 volumes and is being spread across the Muslim world as a primary encyclopedic reference for Islamic Law. The current expert supervisor of the encyclopedia is a Hanafi scholar from Aleppo (Halab), Syria named Dr. Ahmad al-Hajji al-Kurdi who is also on Kuwait’s national committee for issuing religious edicts (iftaa). Aleppo is a stronghold of the Hanafi madhab in Syria with a population of over 5 million and thousands of Hanafi scholars. Shaikh Ahmad and his family are well-known among them. ¹

In the 19th volume on page 177 it describes the pillars of the Khutbah according to the different madhabs, “According to Abu Hanifa it is simply to say alhamdulillah, subhan’Allah or la ilaaha illa Allah. Abu Yusuf and Muhammad added that there should be a longer portion which customarily can be called a khutbah. The Malikis said that however small it may be that anything can be called a khutbah according to Arabs. The Shafi’i school says that it is 5 things: alhamdulillah, salat upon the Prophet, admonishment to taqwa, praying for the Muslims, and at least a clear part of a verse of the Qur’an. That being said, on page 180 it says under the 6^th condition for the soundness of the khutbah, “To be in Arabic. What is meant by this is that its pillars are said in Arabic. This is because they are the obligatory pillars so it is a condition that they must be in Arabic even if the audience doesn’t speak Arabic. This is the majority opinion (Maliki, some Shafi’i and most Hanabilah).” So what’s being said according to these schools of thought here is that the pillars of the khutbah must be in Arabic since that is what is obligatory for the khutbah to be sound and anything added to that whether in Arabic or otherwise will not harm it’s soundness. The only exception is that most Malikis did hold the opinion that the khutbah can only be delivered in Arabic. This is since they held that the khutbah is part of the salah taking the place of the first two rakah’s of Dhuhr prayer and in their school the whole prayer must be in Arabic.

Continuing on page 180 of the 19^th volume, “And Abu Hanifa said – and this is the established opinion of the Hanafi school of thought – the khutbah is sound even if the whole thing is in a language other than Arabic regardless if the khateeb knows Arabic or not. Although Abu Yusuf and Muhammad agreed with the majority opinion except if the khateeb isn’t able to deliver it in Arabic.”

To further clarify this point, we find in the 27^th volume on page 201 under the heading conditions for a sound Khutbah, “It must precede the Salah, it must be a reminder that people customarily consider a sermon. So whenever the Imam fulfilled these two conditions after the time of Dhuhr has begun, then he has surely performed a sound Khutbah regardless if he was standing or sitting, he did one Khutbah or two,  he read Qur’an or not, it was in Arabic or another language…This is the Hanafi opinion.” For this they cited three of the most comprehensive and representative Hanafi fiqh books which all Hanafis refer to in proving what their school says on a given issue. They are Bada’I al-Sana’I 1/262, Hashiyyat ibn ‘Abideen 1/567 and Majma’ al-Anhaar 1/163. ²

Confirming this is a prominent Syrian scholar, Wahbah Zuhayli who is the head of the comparative Fiqh Department in the faculty of Shari`ah in the University of Damascus and also a senior member and advisor of juristic councils in Jeddah, Makkah, India, America and Sudan. In his eleven volume comparative fiqh masterpiece called Islamic law and its proofs, he notes in the second volume on the bottom of page 1304 about the conditions for a valid Friday Sermon according to the Hanafis: “They permitted the sermon to be in other than Arabic even if the khateeb is able to do it in Arabic and regardless if the people were majority non-Arabs.”³ It’s interesting to note that those who are strictest about the obligation of the khutbah being in Arabic consider themselves to be following the Hanafi madhab.

Now some detractors of these proofs might unwisely pass judgment in their bias and say that the scholars who wrote this either do not know what they’re talking about or that they are modernized liberal scholars who are approving an innovation.

Let’s look at the opinions of some of the strictest of scholars in following the Prophet ﷺ – or what some call Salafi or Wahhabi. According to the previous Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Shaykh Abdul Azeez ibn Baz, “If most of the audience of the Khutbah doesn’t understand Arabic then there is nothing wrong with delivering it in their language …” Later in the same Fatwa he notes that he issued this edict with full knowledge that “it is known that the early generations would deliver khutbahs in Arabic to crowds with new non-Arab Muslims and it was not reported that they would translate the khutbah or deliver it in the local language. This was because in those days the honor and glory was with the Muslims who were, in that case, the ruling authority and their language was Arabic.” He then states that what leads him to make this fatwa is that Allah said, ‘We have not sent any messenger except that he preached in the language of his people in order to clarify to them.’ (Qur’an, 14:4)”⁴ I think it’s commendable to note Bin Baz’s understanding of the fiqh of Muslim minorities in what is underlined in his fatwa.

According to another Saudi scholar, the renowned Shaykh Ibn al-Uthaymeen, who is known for his strictness in matters of `aqeedah and a literalist following of the Prophet ﷺ and his companions (may Allah have mercy on them), “The correct opinion in this matter is that it is permissible for the khateeb to deliver the khutbah in the language that the audience is accustomed to…This is because the khutbah was intended to be a means of clarifying the religion and guiding the people.  The only exception is that the verses of the Qur’an must be recited in Arabic and then translated. Verse 4 of surah Ibrahim indicates the permissibility of delivering the sermon in the local language, ‘We have not sent any messenger except that he preached in the language of his people in order to clarify to them.’”⁵

According to the official decision of the Fiqh Council of the Muslim World League, of which Mufti Taqi Usmani and many other of the greatest scholars representing the Muslim World are esteemed members, “The better opinion is that delivering Khutbatul-Jumu’ah in Arabic is not a condition for its validity. The best thing is to deliver the introduction and the Qur’anic verses in Arabic (the pillars). This is so that non-Arabs will get used to hearing Arabic and so it will make it is easy to learn (since it is the language of our holy scripture). Then the khateeb follows that with an admonishment in the language of the audience. Then Iqamatus-Salah.”⁶

According to the standing committee for issuing edicts in Saudi Arabia, the members of which are some of the most revered Saudi scholars, “There is no hadith which indicates that delivering the khutbah in Arabic is a condition for its validity. Indeed the Prophet ﷺ used to speak Arabic in the khutbah and at all other times simply because that was his language and the language of his people…”⁷

I will limit the list of scholarly bodies and their members who hold this view to what has been mentioned for the sake of brevity.

The following are some responses to the opinion that the Khutbah must be in Arabic. First they say that since the Prophet ﷺ and his companions never did it, therefore it must be wrong. I encourage them to read this research. This research proves that the lack of action on the part of the Prophet ﷺ and the early generations is not a proof in itself. We should also review the abovementioned point made by the standing committee for issuing fatwas in Saudi Arabia.

The next argument they make is that the khutbah is like reading Qur’an and prayer which must be said in Arabic. Therefore it is not acceptable to be in any other language. They add to this, if we allow the khutbah to be in other than Arabic then that will open the door to the adhan and prayer being reduced to translations. The response is that, first of all, the scholars are not in agreement that the khutbah takes the place of the first two raka`ahs of Dhuhr prayer. Clearly the Hanafis are not of this opinion because they only hold that delivering one khutbah without sitting is sufficient, thus the absence of the two khutbahs representing the first two raka’ahs of Dhuhr. The Malikis are reported to have this opinion as mentioned before. The response to them is that `Eid prayer comes before the Khutbah and it doesn’t replace Dhuhr, yet it was still the practice of the Prophet to make two sermons and Allah knows best as to why since he never said why. Also in response to the idea that the two sermons are exactly like the first two raka’ahs of prayer is the fact that the Prophet ﷺ would not recite a surah after al-Fatihah in the last two rak’ahs of Dhuhr, yet in Jumu’ah salah which is supposed to replace the final two rak’ahs of Dhuhr he always recited another surah after al-Fatihah. Finally this is an assumption based upon ijtihad not similar to the famous Hadith about Tawaf (circling the Ka’bah) which says that it is like prayer except that talking aloud is permissible.

Finally, it cannot be said that the khutbah is similar to the Qur’an since the Qur’an is the word of Allah and the khutbah is the words of a person. It also cannot be said that the khutbah is like the adhan and prayer since the statements of the adhan and prayer are according to authentically transmitted statements of the Prophet ﷺ who said “Pray as you have seen me praying.” On the other hand, the khutbah is simply the words made up by the khateeb. So whether he made the sermon in Arabic or another language they have no holy textual value like the Qur’an, adhan, or salah as they are the khateeb’s own invention. So no scholarly analogy can be used between the permissibility of giving the khutbah in a local language and translating the adhan.

With all due respect to our beloved scholar Mufti Taqi Usmani, his colleagues and followers, I believe this to be an issue that Muslims need to be on the same page on. It has created fitnah between Imams, community leaders, and their communities. As we have seen, according to the vast majority of today’s esteemed scholars around the world, including Mufti Usmani’s colleagues in the Muslim World league, it is the more balanced and practical opinion to allow the khateeb to deliver the general admonishment of the khutbah in the local language.

Without a doubt it is a priority that local scholars should represent the Muslims in their locality by forming a consultative (shurah) council. There is nothing wrong with individually following a scholar or madhab in matters pertaining to your own worship. In order to avoid fitnah and for Muslims to build upon unity, they should follow scholarly councils in major issues which effect Muslims collectively. This way the scholars can discuss amongst themselves the issues facing Muslims and come to an opinion which is in their best interests. That is what was done in the Fiqh Council of the Muslim World League as mentioned earlier. This is the opinion of the Assembly of Muslim Jurists of America, which is a host of notable PhD level scholars who reside or convene in America yearly to discuss issues relating to Muslims in America.

In its Sixth conference held on the 31^st of October 2009 the sixth collective decision in matters of worship was “The original ruling is that the khutbah is in Arabic. If the khateeb wasn’t able to or the audience doesn’t understand Arabic then the khutbah can be delivered in the language the audience understands. That being said, the pillars of the khutbah, the verses of the Qur’an, and the Hadiths should all be in Arabic.”

I hope everyone understands here that I am not attempting to refute Mufti Usmani’s opinion. I am simply passing on the opinion of his peers in this matter in clarifying the majority opinion as well as an attempt to unite the Muslims upon it. The purpose of this research was to make a case for four main issues which are of more benefit (maslahah) to Muslims in the West than the old opinion. They are: to clarify that this is the position of the majority today’s scholars and councils, to make it obligatory upon the non-Arab Muslims to attend a khutbah that they may benefit from, to promote non-Arab spiritual development by not Arabizing matters which aren’t tawqeefi such as general supplication (du`a’) and the khutbah and to make it clear to non-Muslims and new Muslims that our religion is not an emphatically Arabic religion, but a universal religion.

And Allah knows best!

Further References:

http://islamqa.com/ar/ref/112041
http://ibn-jebreen.com/ftawa.php?view=vmasal&subid=1691&parent=786
http://almoslim.net/node/52334
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-English-Ask_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503546368

By Ali Shareef

The recent upheaval in the Middle East has resulted in the fall of ruthless dictators, toppling them like dominoes. It began in Tunisia and shook the land of the pyramids. At least briefly, justice—the elusive flower—bloomed in the “Arab Spring” on the banks of the Nile.

A highlight of this upheaval was the start of the deposed Egyptian president’s trial. Hosni Mubarak was wheeled in on a bed and placed in the customary cage of the courtroom in Cairo—a humiliating fall after his 30 years of rule. Despite rising to the top as “president” and having stayed at the top for the past three decades, his fall from grace took a mere three weeks. His presidency was marked by corruption, murder, and brutality. During his time his secret police engaged in the most vicious abuses of human rights.

The trial of Mubarak is perhaps one of many awaited events in the Muslim world. That the fall of Mubarak took place through the efforts of the local population at the expense of hundreds of lives and countless injuries is a telling commentary of the desire of people to reclaim the dignity that was for so long denied them. It is also a rebuttal to all those who would accuse Muslims in being complicit in their enslavement to these totalitarian regimes. It is a refutation to all those who want to accuse Muslims and Islam of advocating repressive and dictatorial regimes.

Given that these were “Muslim” leaders in Muslim lands, and considering the ages of oppressive and authoritarian ruler-ship they imposed, the mistake of associating these rulers with the inherent tendencies of Muslims and teachings of Islam is understandable.

However, what Islam teaches in regard to ruler-ship is in sharp contrast with what is prevalent in the Middle East; a contrast between what should be and what is. Islam pervades all aspects of a Muslim’s life, from worship, to business dealings, and to the all-important governance of a society. Muslims consider this life as a test and a fulfillment of this test is the adherence to the teachings of Islam.

Islam does not regard ruler-ship, or the authority to rule, as a right to be seized or a right inherited from family. It is a burden upon those who choose to undertake it, and a curse for those who abuse it. The leadership of any society is a vital part of the success of that society. Corrupt leaders who exploit their constituents for their own personal gain hamper the progress and well being of their citizens. This is precisely the reason why Islam takes such a harsh view of leadership, and requires its proper fulfillment as a moral obligation.

It is reported that the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ (peace be upon him) said, “If Allah puts anyone in the position of authority over the Muslims’ affairs and he secludes himself (from them), not fulfilling their needs, wants, and poverty, Allah will keep Himself away from him, not fulfilling his need, want, and poverty,” (Recorded in the books of Abu Dawud).

In another teaching the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ is also quoted to have said, “Any man whom Allah has given the authority of ruling some people and he does not look after them in an honest manner will never feel even the smell of Paradise,” (Recorded in the books of Bukhari).

It is the responsibility of the leader of a nation to look after the well being of its citizens. This responsibility not only encompasses the physical needs, but also the stability of the society by promoting good and preventing evil.  However, given Islam’s strict view of leadership, how does Islam expect people to take on these roles?

In another narration, the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ advises one of his companions, “O ‘Abdur-Rahman bin Samura! Do not seek to be a ruler, for if you are given authority on your demand, you will be held responsible for it, but if you are given it without asking for it, then you will be helped (by Allah) in it. If you ever take an oath to do something and later on you find that something else is better, then do what is better and make expiation for your oath,” (Recorded in the books of Bukhari).

Clearly, the violent crack-down seen in Syria, and many of the other Muslim countries, against unarmed protestors delegitimizes the leadership of these tyrants. The attempt of these leaders to cling to power through these violent means exposes them to the consequences of their follies.

Many of these leaders are so addicted to the power they have acquired that they cannot relinquish it, as illuminated by the following saying of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ, “You people will be keen to have the authority of ruling which will be a thing of regret for you on the Day of Resurrection. What an excellent wet nurse it is, yet what a bad weaning one it is,” (Recorded in the books of Bukhari).

It was in regards to this influence of power that caused the most senior companion of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ, Abu Bakr, who became the leader after him to say, “I have been given the authority over you, and I am not the best of you. If I do well, help me; and if I do wrong, set me right. Sincere regard for truth is loyalty and disregard for truth is treachery. The weak amongst you shall be strong with me until I have secured his rights, if God wills; and the strong amongst you shall be weak with me until I have wrested from him the rights of others, if God wills.”

There is a story of another famous leader in Islamic history, Umar ibn al-Khattab, another companion of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ, that highlights his dedication to his people. Once he was passing through the suburbs of the city of Medina at night during his rule when he noticed the fire of a destitute family in the desert. He hurried to the site to find a woman stirring in a pot over a fire and her children crying. Upon inquiry the woman stated that the water was only to soothe the children in the hope that food was being prepared and lull them to sleep. The woman, not recognizing Umar, cried out, “Allah will judge between Umar and me, on the Day of Judgment, for neglecting me in my distress.” Umar, troubled, returned to the city to collect food, which he personally served to the family.

The Islamic political system hinges on principles of justice, equality, and shura, also known as mutual consultation. A Muslim leader is bound to these principles. Shura entails that a leader consults with representatives of the general population regarding matters of public affairs. The primary principles of shura are ijtihad jama`i (collective deliberation), rida al awam (consent of the majority), and mas’uliyah jama`iyyah (collective responsibilities).

Briefly, the collective deliberation begins the process of analyzing and resolving issues, which is then accepted by the majority. Thereafter, it is the responsibility of all individuals in the society to uphold and adhere to the decision.

The Islamic political system does not advocate any one form of representative governments such as a parliamentary or a presidential system. It provides guidelines and leaves the specific implementation up to the people as they see necessary.

Shura is mentioned at least twice in the Qur’an where God emphasizes the need for consultation among people for purposes of governance,  “Thus it is due to mercy from Allah that you deal with them gently, and had you been rough, hard hearted, they would certainly have dispersed from around you; pardon them therefore and ask pardon for them, and take counsel with them in the affair; so when you have decided, then place your trust in Allah; surely Allah loves those who trust (in Him),” (Qur’an, 3:159).

In this verse, God is commanding the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ himself to seek the counsel of his companions.

In another verse in the Qur’an, in a chapter titled “Al Shura”, The Consultation, God enumerates the qualities of those people whom He regards highly, “And those who respond to their Lord and keep up prayer, and their rule is to take counsel among themselves, and who spend out of what We have given them (in charity),” (Qur’an, 42:38).

While the burden of governance is on the leadership, the citizens of a state also share in the maintenance of the state. It is the right of the citizens of a state to object to unjust policies, and it is their right to articulate it. Another teaching of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ relates that a person who stands up to a tyrant, voices his concerns, and is killed because of it is a martyr. “The master of martyrs is Hamza, and a man who stands up to a tyrant ruler and gives him nasiha (advice). And so the ruler kills him,” (Recorded in the books of Ahmad).

In the face of the daily toll inflicted on unarmed protestors, it is clear that the leaders in those countries are not adhering to the expectations of any ruler-ship, let alone the expectations of Islam. Living in the U.S., it is difficult to understand the frustrations of people who feel compelled to protest in the streets even under the ruthless conditions imposed by their governments. Yet, there is hope that their conditions can be changed for the better. It was this same hope that drove the founding fathers of the U.S. to sever ties with a ruler who was unjust and undeserving. This spirit, captured in the preamble of the U.S. constitution, led the founding fathers to strive for a Union that establishes justice, tranquility, promotes the general welfare, and secures liberty.

The motivations that drove the founding fathers of the U.S. over 200 years ago are the very same motivations that drive the movements in the Middle East today. Stability and prosperity in the Middle East is a benefit not just to the people there, but in this global village, to the whole world.

However, admittedly whatever the outcome of the trial of Hosni Mubarak, and whatever the immediate outcome of events in Syria, these countries have a long way to go before they achieve a just and fair leadership. The people in these countries are at a critical stage as they experiment with self-determinacy, but this should not be a cause of concern here in the U.S. Stable and prosperous societies do not arise over night. Perhaps the phrase “Arab Spring” to describe the current situation is premature; most likely this is still the “Arab Winter”, and the true “Arab Spring” is yet to come.

Question:

Why do we have to wear Hijab in America? Don’t religious laws change according to time and place? Isn’t there room for this to change?

Answer:

Asalamu `alaykum dearest Sister,

I pray that this message reaches you well and full of faith.

I would like to thank you for taking the time to write this email. Such questions are a sign of one’s faith and concern for Islam. I ask Allah to reward you greatly for this concern and pray that He will bless us all. Indeed, as you noted in your question, there are certain rulings in Islam that can change according to place, time and situation. The general principle is that the rulings themselves don’t change, but the articulation of such rulings can. This means the ruling – whether permissible, forbidden or disliked – is still met; however, it is done so in a manner that facilitates its practice for Allah’s servants, while meeting the requirements set by the faith. Examples of this would be how buying and selling has changed (with the introduction of checks and credit cards), what type of prayer rug one uses, the instrument one might use to hunt, or the means by which one travels to Hajj. However, there are times where one is excused from doing religious acts due to abnormal circumstances. Such situations would need to be addressed by a qualified mufti.

On the other hand we have rulings which are fixed and unchangeable. The only way a change would be possible is under dire circumstances like the threat of death, harm, sickness and other things.

Examples

• Fasting. This is an obligation; however, in the face of sickness, one is allowed to break his fast.
• Prayer. It is an obligation for one to pray while standing; if one cannot do so for health reasons, she can do so sitting.
• Hajj. Although an obligation, its obligatory status is based on one’s ability.
• Even faith itself. If one is threatened with death, he is allowed to deny his faith.

The above rulings, and their exceptions, are prescribed in our holy texts. Scholars say that if one of the following five things are threatened, that is enough for a ruling, even when dealing with a fixed ruling, to change:

• Faith
• Intellect
• Life
• Lineage
• Property

With some adding honor.

Ruling on Hijab

The hijab is identified by all the scholars [except for a few non-Orthodox scholars over the last 20 years] as a fixed obligation which cannot change unless a qualified legal scholar deems that a sister’s situation demands it. Examples of this would be the Inquisition in Spain and the recent wars in Bosnia and Rwanda. However, it should be noted that such a change is, at least most of the time, considered temporal at best as it would fall under what are known as nawazil – temporary trials whose outcomes, for the most part, are not permanent.

In the West

Scholars state that there is nothing that meets this requirement in the West that would allow our sisters, in the general sense, to remove their hijabs. Thus, I hold the opinion of all major scholars, males and females, that sisters must observe the Hijab.

A Look at the Hadith of Asma’ and Other Sound Texts that Support Hijab/Niqab

I certainly understand people’s contentions about the hadith of Asma’ narrated by Abu Dawood where the Prophet ﷺ scolded her saying that the only thing a pubescent woman should show is “these two,” pointing to his face and hands.

Proofs for Hijab and Niqab

In a sound hadith, we have the Prophet ﷺ telling his wife Sawda, “Cover yourself in front of him.” The word he used is ihjabi which means “Cover yourself.” It is an order, and in Islamic law an order means an obligation.

A proof for Hijab (and not Niqab) is found in al-Bukhari’s collection where one of the companions could not remember a woman’s name. He said, “I cannot recall her name, but I remember the mole on her face.”

Niqab was the practice of the Prophet’s ﷺ wives, including Sawda, so if a woman wanted she can choose wear it.

The hadith of Asma’ bin Abi Bakr, mentioned above, is found in the Sunnan of Abu Dawood; it is strengthened by the narrations above, as well as the Hadith of Fadil ‘Abbas found in Bukhari’s collection that clearly mentions him seeing the face of a woman. Thus, taking these  two sound narrations, the narration of Asmah found in Abu Dawood’s collection is at least Hassan li Gharihi or as our scholars noted, “sound.”

One of the Proofs for Niqab

In another narration, found in al-Bukhari’s collection as well as Malik’s Muwatta, we find the hadith of Habibba bin Sahl. She needed to speak to the Prophet ﷺ so she waited for him after the morning prayer. When the Prophet ﷺ approached her, he could not recognize her because she was completely covered [in Niqab] as noted by al-Baji. The Prophet ﷺ asked her, “Who are you?” This is one of the many proofs that, as the Hanbali school holds, a woman should cover her entire body save her eyes.

What We Don’t Have: a Third Option

We do not have an opinion that says hijab is not fardh, that one can show the neck, etc. There are no authentic reports of the Companions taking off their Hijab at all.

I advise you to wear the Hjiab instead of the Niqab. I base this on the fact that it is a contentious issue and we have a legal axiom that allows us, in the face of contentious issues, to take the more appropriate course for our time and place.

Secondly, adapt the method you wear the Hijab. There is nothing wrong with wearing Western clothes as long as they meet Islamic requirements. I hold this opinion is at is articulated by the Maliki school. Abu Barkat in al-Sharh al-Saghir [one of the most reliable books for Fatwa in the school] states that a woman’s  `awrah is in general, “Everything save her face and hands.”

Islam means to surrender and surrender involves struggle. I encourage you to struggle and continue to ask Allah for His help.

Your brother,

Suhaib Webb

Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV

It is obvious to all, including perennialists, that perennial philosophy is completely at odds with orthodox Islam. Those perennialists who claim to be Muslims do so whilst claiming to believe that the esoteric, metaphysical realisation of the faith confirms the ‘transcending’ of the ‘dogmatism’ or ‘formal theology’ of Islam through ‘spiritual conversion from within’, i.e. by retaining the outer ‘form’ of Islamic practices (in whatever vague form they practically give to such an allegiance to the ‘law’). Perennialists uphold the ‘transcendent unity’ of ‘true religions’, but oppose ‘religious pluralists’ (who seek to do away with the distinctive ‘forms’ of each religion on a ‘horizontal’, i.e. worldly, level) and ‘modern syncretistic cults’ (who seek to form new, idiosyncratic religions considered false even by perennialists). ‘True religions’ are portrayed, by perennial philosophy, as being:

“graphically represented by points on the circumference of a circle, with each point being connected with the centre, that is, with God, by a radius. The points stand for the outward aspects of the religions [namely, the exoteric], whereas each radius is the esoteric path which the religion in question offers those who seek a direct way to God in this life.”

These ‘true religions’ of the present time, according to the perennialists, certainly include Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism and even Native American faith. Perennialism is the explicit rejection of the ‘exclusivist idea that there is only one valid religion.’ Perennialism does not so much dismiss ‘the orthodox dogmas’ of the various religions, but it effectively dismisses its importance by seeing these ‘dogmas from the universal point of view’ as:

“a series of points of reference, conceptual orientations opening out to, or ‘intending’ realities that transcend the dogmas. What can be affirmed is thus the consummation of the orientations, practices, and aspirations set in motion by the beliefs in question: they are ‘true’ insofar as they can lead one to the ‘real’.”

In this statement above, we have a natural acknowledgement of the problem of conflicting dogmas between the various religions. Thus David Ray Griffin, in his debate with the perennialist Huston Smith in Primordial Truth and Postmodern Theology, sets out what any fair-minded person would conclude when looking at the fundamental differences in dogma between various religions:

“It does not seem plausible to me, in any case, to think of the various great religions as equally embodying revelations of the same divine reality. Judaism, Christianity, Islam and Zoroastrianism are oriented primarily to a personal deity, while much of Buddhism and much of Hinduism, especially Advaita Vedanta, are oriented toward an impersonal, infinite, absolute reality. To say that the devotees of both types of religion are really worshipping the “same God” does not seem illuminating. Not sharing Smith’s belief that the personal God is really derivative from, and hence less ultimate than, the impersonal absolute, I cannot agree that the God who inspired the ten commandments, liberation of people from sociopolitical captivity, and the Sermon on the Mount is really the same as the divine reality to which Shankara and Nagarjuna were oriented. To say that all religions are equally adequate for salvation seems equally un-illuminating. That statement implies that the salvation sought by, say, Moslems and Mahayana Buddhists is the same. But meditation on Emptiness and submission to Allah seem to produce strikingly different types of people. While the inclusive doctrine that “we are all on the same path” seems appealing in comparison with the exclusivist claim that “there is no salvation outside of our church,” it is not illuminating of the empirical realities.”

Now the theology of Islam is taken to be based upon the complete understanding of all the texts of the Qur’an and Prophetic sayings (ahadith, sing. hadith), as passed down from the Prophet’s Companions to every subsequent age en masse in every generation, without an interruption in that mass transmission at any generational point; hence the overwhelming number of Muslims have always held the same comprehension of Islam’s finality. To essentially dismiss the creed passed on by a mass of people in each generation from the Prophet ﷺ (may the peace and blessings of God be upon him) (tawatur), whereby the chance of being mistaken is nil, is to effectively accuse the whole collective of being mistaken, or involved in deception or to have spoken in complete allegory to the point that the overwhelming number of their listeners completely failed to make sense of the message – may God forgive us for pointing out these preposterous notions!

It is akin to the challenge that Ghazzali put in chapter five of Fada’ih al-Batiniyya when disputing the idiosyncratic interpretations of the Batinites. He said that if the Prophet ﷺ had to divulge these secrets, then why did he not? Especially when God says in the Qur’an (3:187): “You must make it clear to the people and not conceal it.“ Moreover, the Prophet ﷺ would not have been ignorant of such a truth; and he would never have allowed himself to have been misunderstood, knowing that people would take his words literally. By way of example, I can here add the following saying of the Prophet ﷺ reported in Sahih Muslim: “By Him in whose hand is the soul of Muhammad, any person of this Community, any Jew, or any Christian who hears of me and dies without believing in what I have been sent with will be an inhabitant of hell,” (trans. Keller).

One perennialist argument is that the ‘particularist, exclusivist’ (‘normative Islam’) and the ‘inclusivist, metaphysical’ (perennialist) understandings of the Qur’an are interpretations which are “one of an indefinite number of meanings that are all ‘intended’ by God to be derived from the words” of the Qur’an; and that “no one interpretation can therefore be put forward as right and true to the exclusion of all others.” This recourse to an interpretation as a way of maintaining an Islamic identity is interesting, especially in light of a non-perennialist’s argument that perennialism was not anti-Islamic, but merely “a rather novel interpretation,” “rooted…in the Qur’an” and “rarified [sic] metaphysical considerations that are better pointed out as heterodoxies that fall into a category of opinion and interpretation.” Furthermore, the non-perennialist asserted that perennialism be deemed a mere ‘innovation’ due to it simply being a ‘ta’wil’, or interpretation, and scholars are careful of declaring disbelief in such circumstances, despite the author accepting that the four schools of Islamic law consider it disbelief (kufr) to oppose the orthodox understanding on this specific question (as illustrated above). This well-intentioned attempt by a non-perennialist to retain perennialism as an Islamic heterodoxy, i.e. ‘Islamic’, in so much as it is not other than Islam, seems to result from a literalist understanding of ta’wil, as can be seen from numerous scholars of repute.

An interesting case study for beginning to test the question of whether denying Islam’s finality is disbelief or a mere heterodox interpretation is the Shifa’ of Qadi ‘Iyad, which has elaborate theological discussions contained therein, and which highlights where such an understanding of perennialism as a heterodox interpretation might be developed, yet seem to miss the nuance associated with the point.

The relevant material of the Shifa’ for our purposes comes in the third chapter: on the ruling of one who insults/reviles (sabb) God Most High, and His angels, Prophets, Books, and the people (al), wives and Companions of the Prophet [Muhammad] ﷺ. The second section (fasl) of the chapter opens with a discussion that, in part, covers the fact that the teaching (qawl) of Malik and his Companions differs (wa’khtalaf) on the issue of those who ascribe to God what is not befitting by way of interpretation (qualified by Mulla ‘Ali Qari in his commentary as ‘false’ (al-fasid) interpretation). Lengthy discussions are then presented over the course of the second section into the third section. What is clear from these discussions is that the central controversy here is with relation to the established sects that have emerged amongst the Muslims, such as the Khawarij and the Mu’tazilah. The fact that this discussion of the disagreement concerning the anathematization of those with ‘false interpretation’ is not related to the idea of denying Islam’s finality not being heresy is categorically clarified by Qadi ‘Iyad at the end of the third section (with “Q” designating the commentary by ‘Ali Qari):

“…it is disbelief for one who does not declare the disbelief of a Christian, a Jew and all of those separate to the religion of the Muslims, or hesitates in declaring their disbelief or has a doubt (al-shakk).

Qadi Abu Bakr [Q: Baqillani] said the unambiguous Sacred transmission [al-tawqif; Q: that is, by hearing from the God and His Messenger] and the Consensus (al-ijma’) agree about the disbelief (kufr) of them. Therefore whoever hesitates in that has disowned (kadhdhaba) the text (al-nass) [Q: of the Qur’an] and the unambiguous Sacred transmission [Q: from the Sunna that is correct], or doubts it; and disowning or doubting does not come to pass except from a disbeliever (kafir).”

Muhammad Shafi, in his commentary of the Qur’anic verses 41:40-46 in Ma’riful Qur’an, states that “scholars and jurisprudents have clarified” the meaning of not declaring a muta’awwil (a false interpreter) as a “kafir or Non-Muslim” as being “subject to the condition that the interpretation in matters relating to the self-evident elements (Daruriyyat-ud-din) should not be against their definite (qat’i) meanings.” He adds that ‘false interpretations’ of such definitively-established matters are not included under excusing such an interpreter, because such a person “is actually denying the teachings of the Holy Prophet ﷺ.” Shafi establishes a distinction in this issue between false interpretations that are disbelief and those that can be deemed unlawful innovation, through recourse to a statement from Shah ‘Abdal-‘Aziz Dehlawi: firstly, false interpretation of “definite, unambiguous texts of the Qur’an or of the mutawatir ahadith [mass-transmitted beyond any doubt in every generation] or of an absolute consensus of the ummah [Islamic nation]” are kufr; yet, secondly, “an interpretation against the texts that are, though clear and semi-certain, are not certain or definite in absolute terms,” then such is not kufr, but “fisq and misguidance.”

Furthermore, Ghazzali, in Faysal al-tafriqa, mentions that “disbelief” (kufr) is a designation of the Sacred Law (hukm shar’i), and it therefore has legal consequences. In essence, it is accusing the Prophet ﷺ of lying (takdhib) about something he brought; and faith (iman) is the belief in everything that he brought. The proof of the ruling of disbelief is established by explicit Sacred text (nass), as is the case with the establishment of the disbelief of the Jews and the Christians; or through analogical reasoning (qiyas) with what has been explicitly stipulated (‘ala mansus). Regarding false interpretation, Ghazzali states that kufr is not designated upon such an individual as long as his interpretation does not pertain to the foundational tenets of belief (usul al-‘aqa’id); yet one does charge with disbelief one who interprets against an important, foundational tenet of belief away from its externality (zahir) without a categorical proof (burhan qat’i).

In Fada’ih al-Batiniyya (section two of the eighth chapter), Ghazzali discusses the ‘unambiguous disbelief’ (kufr sarih) of challenging the descriptions of the Garden and the Fire which the Prophet ﷺ described with “clear utterances” (alfaz sarih); and such a refusal to accept is to accuse the Prophet ﷺ of lying (takdhib) and cannot be considered an interpretation (ta’wil). Therefore, again, we see that not every interpretation is free of being considered an accusation of lying against the Prophet ﷺ.

Ghazzali, in Faysal al-tafriqa, specifies that the foundations of faith (usul al-iman) are three: belief in God, in His Messenger ﷺ and the Last Day; he, furthermore, argues that anything else is from the ‘branches’ (furu’); and one can only charge disbelief in the face of a person’s rejection of a ‘branch’ when it is the rejection of one that has been established and narrated through mass-transmission that is beyond doubt, and impossible to have been connived through lying or conspiracy (bi’l-tawatur). Ghazzali then adds that the denial of one of the three foundations of faith or a mass-transmitted “branch” of faith would amount to an absolute accusation of lying (takdhib mahd) against the Messenger ﷺ.

Concerning the Prophetic narration, “If one of the Muslims accuses his companion of disbelief, [the accusation] returns to one of them,” (narrated in Sahih Muslim), Ghazzali argues, in Faysal al-tafriqa, that it relates to what the accuser knows of the accused. Hence if the accuser knows the accused to be a believer, then the accuser falls under the charge of disbelief; however, if the accusation of disbelief is based upon the supposition that one has accused the Messenger ﷺ of lying, but it is an [honest] error on the accuser’s part concerning the condition of the accused, then this would not be disbelief for the original accuser.

In the same way we have expounded on the profundity underlying the classical authorities on the issue of false interpretation of Scripture, one should likewise have a rounded – and not superficial, no matter how politically or personally expedient such superficiality might be – approach to understanding such statements as the one attributed to Abul-Hasan Ash’ari in Dhahabi’s Siyar a’lam al-nubala’: “We do not anathematise anyone from the community of believers; rather, these are semantic issues upon whose meanings we differ”; or the words of Ibn Taymiyya quoted in the same latter work: “We do not anathematise anyone who guards his wudu, as the Prophet said, ‘Only a believer guards his wudu.’” Good sense and good manners mean that we should refrain from placing a post-modern relativism and false representation upon these statements, which are both insulting to the utterers themselves as well as intellectually dishonest. It appears clear that these were uttered in relation to the sects amongst the Muslims, and were not intended to be applied against those who deny core Islamic beliefs.