I want to study Islam: Part I

By Samir Hussain

As we thankfully continue to hear more Muslims in our generation utter this phrase, it becomes necessary to discuss the topic of “studying Islam” in detail. Over the years, I have come to realize that most people like myself were clueless as to how to study Islam. Thanks to a plethora of unqualified individuals ascribing knowledge to themselves (some, unfortunately, held in high regard by many Muslims), this critical problem does not seem close to a resolution. We all understand why Islam needs to be studied; the benefits in both this life and the next are mentioned in enough sources, classical and modern, even online. But very few people today have actually done it properly and then been able to convey effectively why that method was the “proper” way to do it in the first place. Also, older recommendations from the books of usool-ul-fiqh (the science of deducing and inducing rulings and meanings from the texts) may be irrelevant for the vast majority whose goal is not to become a mufti (scholar of Islamic law) or a scholar.

Let’s look at the process one step at a time.

The most important question to discuss is: “What do you want to achieve through your study of Islam?”

I will use this to organize the rest of this series, as differing goals in studying Islam necessitate different methods of studying it. For the sake of brevity, let us suppose that there are 3 categories here:

1) You want to study to be an Informed Muslim and survive the day-to-day challenges of holding on to your faith in a scary world where extremism in all forms is abundant and the demands of a modern lifestyle constantly occupy your attention.

2) You want to be a Muslim Activist, someone who helps to clarify misconceptions about Islam, teach Muslims the basics of their religion and call people to the truth, and help with social issues within the community.

3) You want to be a Scholar, someone who is eventually able to do proper scholarly ijtihaad (original or independent interpretation of Islamic law) and give fatwa (a scholarly religious ruling or opinion on Islamic law) (at some level), raise new generations of scholars, and help the ummah (Muslim community) as a whole deal with novel issues.

I will deal with each separately in turn. As you have obviously noted, the first category consists of the vast majority of Muslims. The second are a small minority and vary in their capability, and the third are a rare few whose names are often obscure to most people and only known to a handful of senior students of knowledge pursuing higher studies. It is important to note that this categorization is specific to levels of knowledge and qualification to speak about the religion only. As for implementing Islam properly, having taqwa (consciousness of God) and being a righteous individual, this applies to all Muslims regardless of the level of knowledge, as both a housewife and a faqih (expert of Islamic law) are obliged to follow the same obligatory and supererogatory actions according to the Qur’an and sunnah (teaching and practices of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ (peace be upon him).

“In the Arabic dictionary, the root  (ج ح د: j-h-d ) is defined as “the exertion of effort on a matter that requires it.” In all of its different applications, the term denotes the expenditure of mental and intellectual effort. A mujtahid, therefore, is a scholar who researches and studies all of the sources, information, statistics, and available material about a subject until he/she is satisfied that he/she has done everything to learn about the subject in question. After expending all of that effort, it may reasonably be assumed that his/her opinion is reliable (Issues in Contemporary Islamic Thought, 2005). “…the Mujtahid is he who derives rulings from the detailed evidences [the Qur’an and Sunnah] (The Relation of Philosophy to Usul al-Fiqh, 1996).

A muqallid by definition is the entire opposite of a mujtahid. By definition, the muqallid is that person who instead of treading the scholarly path of exhaustive research in search of evidence and truth entrusts another with the responsibility of research and understanding. Therefore, he follows the research of others, trusting the judgment of the researcher without knowing the evidence, the basis for the conclusion reached by the scholar. Imam Shaukani (radi Allahu ‘anhu – may Allah be pleased with him) is of the position that the muqallid is he who places a neck brace on the neck of the mujtahid, holding him responsible for the outcome of his research (Taqleed wa Ahkamuhu, 1996). Imam Shaukani (ra) wrote vehemently against taqleed as did his protégé, Allamah Sadiq Hasan al-Khan (ra). What some fail to mention, however, is that Imam Shaukani (ra) in his work Adab al-Arab Muntaha laid down a multistage curriculum that outlined various levels of knowledge and nowhere does he advocate intellectual anarchy or tolerant ignorance. Ijtihad demands learning, and further, a certain rank of learning.

Because in the case of the muqallid there is an absence of knowledge and understanding, the term carries a negative connotation to the degree that taqleed has come to mean one who slavishly follows another, and as some would add, follows blindly. Shaikh al-Albani (ra) was of the opinion that taqleed is prohibited because the essence of taqleed is ignorance. On the other hand, he held that ijtihad was not for an individual but itiba. Itiba is following someone while knowing the basis for the position one is following; this can be termed enlightened following (Ijtihad wa’l Ifta, N.D). A point to be made here is that itiba does not entail understanding the scholarly logic and process employed in reaching a conclusion. Rather, itiba usually entails knowing what ayat of the Qur’an and or hadith is the basis for the ruling that one is following. What is absent, generally speaking, in the case of itiba is that he who follows this principle does not necessarily understand the justification and scholarly process that are invested in coming to a conclusion.

Many have subscribed to the position of Shaikh Nasr ad-Deen al-Albani (ra) on taqleed. The position is widespread in popular understanding, but what is lacking is the understanding that Shaikh al-Albani (ra) did not promote the idea that ijtihad is an individual obligation–rather, itiba is an individual obligation in his school of thought. Consequently, education is obligatory on every Muslim; every Muslim is obligated to come to a mature understanding of Islam. The fundamental crisis that we suffer in the discourse on ijtihad and taqleed is that little mention is made of the need for educational and scholarly rigor. These terms are employed without understanding how they fit into scholarly discourse.

Al-Ghazzali (ra) defined ijtihad as “the expending, on the part of a mujtahid, of all what he is capable of in order to seek knowledge of the Shariah’s injunctions.” In a further clarification of this definition, he then wrote: “Complete ijtihad happens when the mujtahid expends all of his energies in seeking, to a point where he/she is satisfied that no more can be done.”  This definition refers to ijtihad in the field of law, and indicates that the effort expended must be exhaustive and emanate from those who are qualified. If an unqualified person undertakes these same efforts, one cannot say that ijtihad has been performed (Issues in Contemporary Islamic Thought, 2005).” Ijtihad here is restricted to derivation of legal norms from the sacred sources of Islam, so it meaning is fixed on the legal (fiqh). “Among the (difficult issues) is that the investigative study of the Qur’an and the Sunnah for the purpose of recognizing the Shar’iah rulings is at various degrees (Hujjat-Ullah al Baligha, 2003). Put differently, there are different levels of ijtihad, a matter to be discussed and treated in a separate section, insha’Allah.

There are two directions that definitions for “ijtihad” can take. The first of these directions is that the definition remains in the linguistic realm and the second direction is that the definition is terminological. In the first case, the definition is general. Consequently, the term ijtihad is not confined to producing fiqh in a legal sense, but rather, the linguistic definition is capable of carrying a sense which refers to a civilizational project that transcends the meanings confined to the term as understood in the literature of fiqh and its principles (Usul al-Fiqh). (More on this to come, inshAllah.) We should understand, however, that fiqh and its principles (Usul al-Fiqh) have maintained a tight hold on the term ijtihad, thereby restricting its senses. This distinction is relevant when attempting to understand what (احياء تجديد و) revival and resuscitation denote as categories of thought and concepts in Islamic scholarly inheritance and discourses.

Dr. Abdullah Bin Bayyah makes clear to us that ijtihad has customarily been given a restricted meaning confined to the specific effort put forth on the part of the Muslim jurisprudent.  He states, “[i]t is necessary that an exertion of one’s ability is exhausted in the case of the mujtahid, but in the case of the muqallid the exertion of his ability to the point of exhaustion is not deemed ijtihad in the specific meaning of the term (The Craft of Fatwa, 2007).” According to Dr. Taha Jabir, “Ijtihad meant that teachings, ideas and judgments should not be taken at face value, nor adhered to blindly, but ought to be scrutinized and understood within a proper perspective. Ijithad began to develop as a science in its own right, offering a new methodology based on the observation of the objective of the objective world (Jabir, 1993).”

“The Ulema are in agreement that ijtihad is permissible after the passing of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ (peace be upon him)…(Ijtihad and the Consideration of Harm and Benefit, 1984).” “There is no doubt that the role of ijtihad is to regulate and guide man’s actions to accomplish his role as vicegerent of Allah on earth, as Allah intended (Fiqh of Minorities, 2003). “The pivotal issue here, then, is the nature, value, quality and purpose of man’s actions. This is the fundamental objective of legislation, now and in the past, divine or man-made. All divine doctrines were aimed at guiding man’s actions to fulfill the purpose of his being which is to serve Allah in the widest possible sense of the word. Islam made ijtihad an intellectual state of mind that inspires man to think systematically and according to specific rational methods, and not simply a dogmatic activity constrained within the mere formulations of rules and fatwas (Fiqh of Minorities, 2003).”

“One of the most important issues which has faced, and continues to face, Muslim minds today, and which will undoubtedly continue to pose a real challenge to the Ummah in the future, is that of ijtihad. Considering that the accepted juridical sources of Islam [Qur’an and Sunnah] are valid for all times and places, ijtihad may be described as a creative but disciplined intellectual effort to derive legal rulings from those sources while taking into consideration the variables imposed by the fluctuating circumstances of Muslim society.

Islam “…encouraged the use of the intellect in the study and application of these two sources [Qur’an and Sunnah] as human behavior was to be judged and regulated along the new Islamic legislation. As part of this process, and in order to achieve the required transformation in the human intellect and remove any impediment or restriction which would hamper its development, not only did the Prophet ﷺ encourage his Companions to exercise ijtihad, but would also tolerate from them naïve interpretations while wisely and patiently improving their ability in this regard (Ijtihad, 1993).”  “The ijtihad made by the Companions was always in response to situations which actually occurred to them. Later, when they met the Prophet ﷺ, they would explain what had happened and tell him what they had decided. Sometimes, he approved of their ijtihad, and such decisions of theirs (having the approval of the Prophet ﷺ) became part of the Sunnah. If he did not approve of their ijtihad, his explanation of the correct procedure would become Sunnah (Source Methodology, 2003). In this light, we see that ijtihad was practiced in the time of the Prophet ﷺ; in fact, he taught the Companions the proper methods and contours for ijtihad.

No Condemnation in Areas of Ijtihad from ‘How to Deal with the Tradition, Mathabs, and Differences in Opinion’

From the foundations of this fiqh (the fiqh of disagreement) and its focuses is the principle: There is no condemnation in issues of ijtihad¹ (la inkaara fi masaa’il al-ijtihad). This means that it is not allowable for a jurist (mujtahid) to negate another mujtahid in areas of ijtihad. This is because no mujtahid is more deserving of being right, none of them are perfect, and all are equally susceptible to being right or wrong.

It is no wonder then that we see the precise (muhaqqiqun) scholars of our Ummah strongly declaring the impermissibility of condemnation in areas where the scholars disagreed with one another.

The Opinion of Imam al-Ghazali

Imam al-Ghazali mentions the following in the chapter on “Commanding the Good and Forbidding the Evil” in his book Ihya Ulum ad-Din when discussing the pillars of moral policing (al-hisba): “The thing that is being rejected (muhtasab fih) should be a known evil that is not based on ijtihad. Anything that is based on ijtihad cannot be rejected. Therefore a Hanafi cannot reject the action of a Shafi’ and a Shafi’ cannot reject the action of a Hanafi (when each acts according to their mathab² in contradiction to the other mathab).

The Opinion of Imam Nawawi in His Explanation of Sahih Muslim

Imam Nawawi says in his explanation of Sahih Muslim when explaining the hadith, “whoever from you sees an evil should change it by his hand…”: “The scholars rebuke matters upon which there is consensus. As for matters in which there is disagreement, there is no rebuking in them. This is because the scholars are of one of two opinions. The first is that every mujtahid is correct and this is the opinion of many or the majority of the precise scholars (muhaqqiqun). The second is that only one of them is correct, but we do not know which one and the scholar who was incorrect is not sinful. Actually we say that he is rewarded one reward as is established in the authentic hadith.”

The Opinion of Ibn Rajab

The great scholar Ibn Rajab says in The Compendium of Knowledge and Learning: “The evil that must be rejected is that upon which there is consensus. As for areas of disagreement, then from our companions (the Hanbalis) there are those who said that it is not obligatory upon a person to rebuke someone else for what they did based on their ijtihad or their following of the ijtihad of another scholar. The Justice Abu Ya’la mentions an exception to this in his book The Ordinance of Government. He says that if the difference of opinion is weak and leads to something that is prohibited then it should be rebuked. An example of this would be temporary marriage (mut’a) because it leads to fornication.

What is Narrated from al-Thawri

This is also the opinion that is narrated on behalf of many of the great early scholars. Abu Nu’aym narrates in Al-Hilya that the great Imam Sufyan al-Thawri said: “If you see someone who is doing an action upon which there is disagreement, and you have a different opinion than them, do not prevent them.” It is also narrated by al-Khatib al-Baghdadi in his book Al-Faqih wa al-Mutafaqqih that al-Thawri said: “I do not prevent any of my companions from taking an opinion upon which the legal scholars have disagreed.”

The Opinion of Ibn Taymiyyah

Imam ibn Taymiyyah was asked if it is allowable for a governor to force the people to follow his mathab and prevent them from following their mathabs. He responded: “He is not allowed to do so, or anything like it, in areas where ijtihad is permitted, and he does not have evidence for doing so from the Qur’an, Sunnah, or scholarly consensus.”

He was guided in this situation by the story of Imam Malik when al-Rashid or Abu Ja’far asked him about obligating the people to follow al-Muwatta and Imam Malik rejected the idea. He said: “The companions of the Prophet (saw) have spread into different lands and each people has established their legal opinions based on the knowledge that came to them (in another narration he says: so if you obligated them all to follow one opinion it would be fitna).”

Some of the scholars used to say because of this, “Their (the scholars) consensus is a definitive proof and their disagreement is a vast mercy.”

In another situation Ibn Taymiyya was asked about someone who blindly follows some scholars in areas of ijtihad, should he be rebuked? What about someone who acts by one of two opinions? He responded: “All praise is due to Allah. The one who acts by the opinion of some scholars or by one of two opinions should not be rebuked. If the strength of one of the opinions becomes clear to the person he should follow it, otherwise it is okay for him to follow the views of some scholars that he depends upon to clarify for him the strongest opinion.”

The Decision of Imam as-Suyuti

It is not surprising, then, to see that al-Hafiz al-Suyuti placed as the thirty-fifth maxim that should be followed in fatwa and legal cases the following rule: “There is no condemnation in areas where scholars disagreed, rather, only in areas where there is scholarly consensus.”

Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s Application of This Principle

From the examples of how this principle is applied is what the Shaykh of the Arabian Peninsula, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, said about the issue of tawassul (praying to Allah by using someone else as an intermediary), the issue that his followers start ideological battles over with those that disagree with them. However, the Shaykh handled the question with the serenity and composure of the people of knowledge. He said: “About some allowing tawassul through righteous people, others restricting it to the Prophet (saw), and the majority of scholars prohibiting and disliking it: it is a fiqh based question. So even if our opinion on the issue is the position of the majority, that it is disliked, we do not rebuke the one who does it because there is no condemnation in areas of ijtihad.”

This is the exact issue that many of the followers of the Shaykh in our times fiercely criticize Imam Hasan al-Banna for because he said in the fifteenth principle of his twenty principles of understanding: “Supplication to Allah that is accompanied with tawassul through a righteous person is a fiqh issue that is disagreed about in regards to how to make du’a and it is not an issue of belief.”

What Imam al-Banna said in this principle does not stray, even in the slightest, from what Shaykh ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab said, but many times issues are taken too far and become extreme, and moderation is always the best path.

It is Allowable for Someone to Follow the Opinion of a Recognized Mathab

As a result of what has been mentioned it is clear that a person may follow the opinion of one of the established mathabs, the opinion of a Companion of the Prophet (saw), one of their followers, or a recognized Imam, and they should not be condemned for their decision.

What is allowed is for someone to express his or her differing opinion in an objective, knowledge-based way. It should be done without degrading others or attacking them, but merely by showing another opinion and explaining its evidence. In doing so one should maintain wisdom, use kind speech, be loving, and distance themselves from severity and harshness. The latter should never be the approach of the one who is promoting good and preventing harm unless the issue at hand is a matter of clear consensus between the scholars.

This is why Ibn Taymiyyah said: “These issues of ijtihad are not obligated or condemned by force and it is not the right of anyone to force others to follow his opinion in them. Rather, he should discuss them, presenting clear evidence. Then if one opinion appears strongest to someone they should follow it and they should not rebuke someone who follows the other opinion.” This is justice.