There can only be one truth, right? So when it comes to Islamic law this must also be the case. There may be different opinions but only one of them is correct and therefore my ‘shaykh’, ‘madhab’, ‘tariqa’, ‘group’ is usually right to the exclusion of others. This may be the type of logic that leads to much of the intolerance amongst Muslims today, particularly in the West. You only have to momentarily interact on social media or talk to people, usually around the masjids, to experience this.

The more troubling thing is that this type of attitude often comes from people who appear to have little or no religious training apart from being an activist belonging to this or that group or being a follower of Shaykh X. What has led us to this dire situation?

Due to the fact that a Muslim is defined as one who surrenders to Allah and then acts in accordance to Islamic law, issues of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and its associated debates and differences have invariably become an essential part of an ‘active’ Muslim’s life. The shari`ah (Islamic faith, law and ethics) is central to a Muslim’s identity as it informs his or her values and actions.

However, our tradition in general—and our legal tradition in particular—has always been one that accommodated diverse opinions within an agreed framework. Take the Qur’an itself; there are at least seven different but equally valid ways of reciting the Qur’an. These have been narrated widely on the authority of our Imams (leading experts) of recitation all the way from the Sahaba (companions of the Prophet ﷺ) who all learnt the Qur’an directly from the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ (peace be upon him).

Take a look at our legal system. We have four surviving legal schools (madhahib), but there were many more. Muslims throughout history have generally recognised them as equally valid schools. Then within the schools you have a whole range of diverse opinions between the founder of the schools and their students or later scholars of the madhab. However, often the followers or supporters of the very same madhabs or their shaykhs (scholars) become fanatical or go to extremes due to various factors, one of them being their lack of understanding of what a madhab actually is. This misunderstanding is not restricted to a madhab alone; it can be applied to an opinion or a particular scholar.

Shaykh al-Hasan al-Dedew describes the madhab in this respect:  ‘The madhab is a way of dealing with the text (Qur’an and Hadith). Therefore everything that Jibril `alayhi alsalam (Angel Gabriel, peace be upon him) related from Allah subhanahu wa ta`ala (exalted is He) is not the exclusive property of anyone’s madhab.  Everything which is considered qat’i (‘definitive’, clear cut) from the texts is not the exclusive property of anyone’s madhab. Therefore the madhab (exists) only in those issues that require ijtihad (reasoning, in order to arrive at the meaning or legal implication.)’

In other words those texts from the Qur’an or hadith (narrations of the Prophet ﷺ) that are agreed upon, in terms of their meanings and legal implications, are not the exclusive property of anyone’s madhab or shaykh but rather it is obligatory upon all to accept and follow them without any difference. The differences and therefore the existence of madhabs occur in those texts that are ‘speculative’ (dhanni) in terms of meaning, and carry more than one interpretation due to a number of factors, which are outlined in the books of Usul al-Fiqh (legal jurisprudence). The question here is in this regards, where legitimate differences of conclusions occurs, is there only one actual truth in the matter?

Before we proceed to answer this question it is worth clarifying another common confusion. There is a difference between something being legally valid and something being correct or the only truth. There may be several opinions on one issue and if they are issued from qualified scholars who have followed sincerely the procedures of ijtihad and have exerted their utmost efforts to arrive at the truth, then all of the opinions may be legally valid and acceptable. Even though only one of them may have arrived at the actual truth of the matter or the correct answer.

To give an example the Hanafis consider bleeding to invalidate wudu (ablution) whilst other schools like the Shafi’e madhab are of the opinion that it does not. Both opinions are considered by all sides to be legally valid for the layman in that for someone who follows either opinion, his wudu is valid.

So we return to the question as to whether or not there is in actual fact only one correct ruling on the issue, even if others are incorrect but valid. Al-Shawkani says that Imam Abu Hanifah, Imam Malik, Imam Shafi’e and the majority of the jurists (may Allah’s mercy be upon them) are of the opinion that in such matters the truth (haq) is one, but it is not defined or known to us, though it is known to Allah (swt). In other words there is only one correct opinion, which Allah (swt) knows and is not knowable by anyone else with 100% certainty. However, the other opinions, even if they are not the actual correct one, are still valid for the ordinary person to follow.

If we could all just accept a general rule that different madhabs and opinions of the jurists are all equally valid as long as they are as a result of valid ijtihad from qualified scholars and are not from the anomalous (shadh) opinions that have been rejected by the vast majority—we could then begin to understand the nature and dynamics of our shari`ah that would enhance unity amongst our communities particularly in the West where basic Islamic literacy levels are low and where diverse Muslim communities are often living together with access to a plethora of thoughts, madhabs and opinions.

We should ponder on the words of Imam al-Shafi’e who is reported to have said, ‘I believe my opinion is right with the possibility that it is wrong and I believe the opinion of those who disagree with me is wrong with the possibility of that being correct.’ This was the attitude of most of the Imams. The Sahabas who were trained by the Prophet ﷺ differed amongst themselves on legal matters but maintained brotherhood and respect.

Once this is clear, the other logical point to then move on to and accept is to avoid condemning other legally valid opinions as ‘batil (inferior),’ ‘haram (unlawful),’ misguided’ etc. In other words—don’t ‘enjoin the good and forbid the evil’ on issues of valid legal differences as one of the conditions to forbid an evil (munkar) is that it should be an agreed upon evil and not one in which valid differences of opinion exist.

As our communities here in the West grow and develop, our scholars will be called upon to deal with a whole range of difficult and often unprecedented issues. They won’t necessarily all agree but if we understand the above we will respect each other’s differences and remain united as communities in spite of our differences.

“O you, who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result.” (Qur’an 4:59)

“And do not pursue that of which you have no knowledge. Indeed, the hearing, the sight and the heart – about all those [one] will be questioned.” (Qur’an 17:36)

Now my question is, does the above Qur’anic injunction prohibit us to adhere to a madhhab (an Islamic school of thought)? Because our mujtahid Imam differs on a lot of rulings. Since it is addressing all the believers, is it obligatory for us to investigate every aspect before practicing it? Or is it just addressing the people of knowledge? And how is it that all the opinions of the four madhahib are acceptable, even though they differ on the rulings for something as basic as salah (prayer)?

Answer:

Allah subhanahu wa ta`ala (exalted is He) says, “Ask the people of knowledge if you don’t know.” Scholars agree that a person who does not know is obligated to ask the scholars. As in the axiom, “The scholars to the masses are like the evidences to the scholars.” What is obligatory is to ask a trusted scholar and follow what you think is closest to the truth. You are not obligated to go beyond your knowledge, but you are encouraged to ask and learn until you feel comfortable. The four madhahib are important in areas of worship, but in areas related to takhrij al-manat, tehsil al-Masalih and tahqiq of the maqasid (in short, what is best for you in the Hereafter, based on your current situation), I strongly advise you to ask contemporary scholars since “a fatwa [ruling] can change according to its time, place and the reality of the person asking.” Allah knows best.

Between Absolutism and Negligence

Linguistic definition: Arabic linguists say that taqlīd is derived from the root word qalāda, which is a necklace that is fastened around the neck. From it comes the taqlīd of a road; it is as though the follower fastens the ruling around the neck of the mujtahid, like a necklace.

Technical definition: Taqlīd is what Imam Ash-Shaukani describes in Sayl Al-Jarrār as acting upon another’s words without evidence.

It is important to note that this excludes acting upon the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ, acting upon ijmā’ (consensus), a layperson’s acting upon the fatwa of a mufti, and a judge’s consideration of the testimony of trustworthy witnesses – as their authority has already been established. The sayings of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ and ijmā’, for those who recognize it, are both clear sources of authority. A layperson’s acting upon the statement of a mufti has been approved by ijmā’. As for the statements of trustworthy witnesses weighing on a judge’s ruling, its credibility is derived from both the Qur’an and Sunnah – from the command to take testimony – as well as from ijmā’.

Also excluded are the narrations of hadith narrators, as their processes of authentication and legitimacy are already in place. Furthermore, these are not merely the statements of the narrator, but the one narrated about, which is the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ.

A better definition is found in Ibn Al-Humam‘s Tahrīr (died 861 Hijri): “Taqlīd is acting upon the words of someone not recognized as a source of authority, without evidence.” Al-Qaffāl (died 365 Hijri) suggested, “It is accepting the statement (legal opinion) of someone while not knowing where he got it from.” Sheikh Abu Hāmid Al-Asfarayīni (died 406 Hijri) and Ustadh Abu Mansūr Abdu`l-Qāhir Al-Baghdādi (died 429 Hijri) both stated, “It is the acceptance of a legal opinion from one whose authority is not established, without evidence.”

The Ruling on Taqlīd in Following a Madhhab (Islamic juristic school)

There are three opinions on the issue of taqlīd:

1. Requiring taqlīd in following a madhhab
2. Prohibiting taqlīd and requiring ijtihād
3. Permitting taqlīd for one who has not reached the level of ijtihād

Opinion #1: The Requirement of Taqlīd in Following a Madhhab

The first opinion makes taqlīd a requirement on everyone, whether they are lay-people or accomplished scholars. It prohibits modern scholars from practicing any form or level of ijtihād. Rather, ijtihād is considered banned in theory and obsolete in practice, its doors having been closed in the third or fourth centuries, or even earlier than that.

This opinion essentially makes the taqlīd of one of the four madhāhib a religious requirement on every Muslim. Those who hold this view do not even permit modern scholars to prefer an opinion outside of their followed madhhab. Departing from one of the four popularly known madhāhib to follow other madhāhib or opinions (even if they are from the Sahaba or Tabi’īn) is absolutely unacceptable.

If those who hold this view reject choosing or preferring existing sayings and opinions over others, then they are even stronger in their rejection of independent ijtihād – even if it is only partial ijtihād on some issues. They reject it, regardless of the changing circumstances that life creates, and the ideas and ideologies that people are exposed to. All of this is built upon their conviction that the door of ijtihād is to be blocked.

Some later scholars spoke about the requirement of following one of the four madhāhib. Sheikh As-Sāwy Al-Maliki (died 1241 Hijri) who authored the famous “hashiyah” on Imam al-Dardir’s  Ash-Sharh As-Saghīr about jurisprudence, and another “hashiyah” on Tafsīr Al-Jalalayn, said:

“Taqlīd is not allowed except in (following) one of the four madhāhib, even if it agrees with a statement of the Sahaba (companions), an authentic hadith, and/or an ayah of the Qur’an, as one who is outside of the four madhāhib is misguided and misguiding others. Perhaps it would lead one to disbelief, as taking from what is apparent in the Qur’an and Sunnah is from the foundations of disbelief.”

Look at the stringency of this sheikh, who lived at the same time as Ash-Shaukani, and contemplate the disparity between their views. He banned taqlīd except within one the four madhāhib, even if an opinion agreed with a statement of the Sahaba; even worse, if it agreed with the text of an authentic Prophetic hadith; and worse still, even if it agreed with an ayah of the Holy Qur’an!

Another exaggeration is to consider one who is outside the four madhāhib (even if only in a specific case) as “misguided and misguiding others,” and that this may potentially lead to disbelief! All of this is rash and does not follow what the investigative scholars have agreed upon.

The opinion that taqlīd was required was adopted by religious schools and universities in later centuries. The salaf (first generation) from the scholars of these universities passed it down to the khalaf, who began to instill in their students, “One who makes taqlīd of an ʿālim meets Allah sālim (securely)!”

I remember learning this in Azhar’s religious high school in a class on the science of Tawhīd. In my required reading from the Jawharah of Al-Qarni and its explanation by Al-Bājuri, the author states:

“…And Malik and the rest of the Imams / Like Abu`l-Qasim, guiders of the Ummah, (said) Taqlīd is required of the learned man – one of them, / As the people relate in terms (they) understand.”

Abu`l-Qasim here refers to the great sufi, Al-Junaid ibn Muhammad (died 297 Hijri), may Allah have mercy on him. It implies that it is incumbent upon every Muslim to follow an imam from the imams of the four Islamic juristic schools.

Imam Malik is specifically mentioned because the author is Maliki. He suggests that an imam of jurisprudence is to be followed in the same manner that sufi imams are followed on issues of tarbiyah (self-development). Such was the legacy of Junaid with the scholars – the integrity of his tarīqah (method), the soundness of his direction, and his remoteness from extremism and innovation.

Some scholars also mandated the following of a well-known imam in ‘aqīdah (creed), such as Abu`l-Hasan Al-Ashʿari (died 334 Hijri) or Abu`l-Mansur Al-Maturīdi.

The most prevalent tradition amongst our knowledgeable brethren in the Maghrib (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania) and the graduates of Zaytuna, Qayrawiyyin, and other institutes is to follow the Ashʿari madhhab in creed, the Maliki madhhab in jurisprudence, and the madhab or Sufi Path of Junaid in conduct. May Allah be pleased with them all.

To summarize, the integrals and potential pitfalls of this opinion include:

1. Requiring taqlīd on all people, even the people of knowledge.
2. Requiring taqlīd of only the Imams of the four madhāhib, and prohibiting the adoption of any legal ruling outside of these madhāhib.
3. Requiring taqlīd of only ONE of these four imams. Thus, not allowing mobility from one of these four madhāhib to another one of these four, even if only in a few matters where the weakness of the madhhab’s position is apparent.
4. Calling for blocking the door of ijtihād, and standing up against any call for ijtihād, even if only partial.
5. Viewing one’s own madhhab as better than the others, and succumbing to an ethnocentric mind frame.

Many scholars have responded to this outlook on taqlīd, including ibn Abdu`l-Barr, Ibn Hazm, Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Al-Qayyim, As-San’āni, Ash-Shaukani, Al-Dahlawi, and others.

Opinion#2: The Prohibition of Taqlīd and the Requirement of Ijtihād

The second opinion is the exact opposite of the first: prohibiting taqlīd and requiring ijtihād for all people. Those who hold this position obligate every Muslim to take their legal rulings directly from the Qur’an and Sunnah. They fiercely reject the following of the four madhāhib, and even attack those that propagate that view vehemently. Perhaps some of them are excessive in their attack of taqlīd since they bash the madhāhib themselves, and some even extend their slander to the founders of the madhāhib as well.

Historically, the most powerful proponent of this view, from what we know, was the famous Thāhiri jurist, Abu Muhammad ibn Hazm. He authored many books, including Al-Ihkam fi Usūl Al-Ahkām on the foundational principles of jurisprudence, Al-Muhalla on comparative jurisprudence, and Al-Fasl fi`l-Milal wa`n-Nihal on the history of religions and sects, and others.

A great scholar from later times, Imam Ash-Shaukani, helped promote this understanding in many of his books, including Irshad Al-Fuhūl, As-Sayl Al-Jarār, and in his risalah, Al-Qawl Al-Mufīd fi`l-Ijtihād wat-Taqlīd. He emphatically rejected taqlīd, although less fiercely than Ibn Hazm.

In our times, a group from the people of hadith champion this perspective, with Sheikh Muhammad Nāsiruddin Al-Albāni and his followers at the forefront.

The adversaries of those who follow this viewpoint have named them “Al-Lā Madhhabbiyīn” or those with no madhhab, because they reject adopting any madhhab – neither for the scholar nor for the layman Muslim. These adversaries have responded with a plethora of articles and books. Examples include the great Turkish scholar Sheikh Muhammad Zāhid Al-Kawthari’s article, “Al-Lā Madhhabiyyah Qentara illa al-Lā Dīniyyah,” and those by the great Hamawi scholar, Sheikh Muhammad Al-Hāmid, as well as Dr. Muhammad Sa’īd Ramadan Al-Buti’s book, Al-Lā Madhhabiyyah Akhtar Bid’ah Tahaddat Ash-Shari`ah Al-Islamiyyah.

Once again, we can summarize the integrals and pitfalls of this other extreme to include:

1. The prohibition of taqlīd on everyone, even the laypeople who do not have access to the tools of ijtihād.
2. The plethora of claims by young people (who have become superficial and rough) that they have reached the level of mujtahidīn.
3. The audacity of young people to dismiss great scholars and mujtahidīn from previous eras.
4. The disdain for the Ummah’s juristic schools, despite the immense amount of beneficial knowledge they contain.
5. The transgression of some followers in bashing the madhāhib and their Imams.
6. The growth of the tendency towards literalism amongst them, to the point that some have named them “The Neo-Thāhiriyyah.”
7. The occupation of the Ummah in arguments over minor disagreements in jurisprudence, which has led to much infighting.
8. The denunciation of those opposed to their calls, suggesting that they alone are properly following the Qur’an and Sunnah.

Imam Ash-Shaukani and Taqlīd

Imam Muhammad ibn Ali Al-Shaukani (died 1250 Hijri) was a towering leader of revival and ijtihād in the thirteenth century Hijri, as is apparent from his books on ijtihād. For instance, in his As-Sayl Al-Jarrār, which explains the text of Al-Azhār (a foundational text on the Zaydi or Hāduwi jurisprudence), he treads a path of independent ijtihād; he uses the Qur’an and Sunnah, and expresses his own legal opinions, which lie outside the four or eight madhāhib of his time. Another example is his famous Nayl Al-Awtār, where he explains the book Muntaqa`l-Akhbār min Ahadīth Sayyid Al-Akhbār by Ibn Taymiyyah. This book has become a significant resource on modern jurisprudence for both Sunni and non-Sunni schools. Another example is his book, Al-Darārī al-Muḍiyyah, (an explanation of Al-Durar al-Bahiyyah) in which he summarized the independence of his jurisprudence.

In fact, Imam al-Shaukani intensely opposed taqlīd and called for ijtihād in more than one of his books:

1. His famous book on the foundational principles of jurisprudence, Irshad al-Fuhūl.
2. His risalah, Al-Qawl al-Mufīd fī Adillati`l-ijtihad wa`l-Taqlīd.
3. His book Adab al-Tālib wa Muntaha`l-Arab.
4. His extensive work, al-Sayl al-Jarrār.

Al-Shaukani also offers alternate interpretations for what proponents of taqlīd use as the basis of their arguments (i.e. ayāt from the Qur’an, such as: “So ask the people of knowledge if you do not know” (Qur’an, 16:43), and statements of the Messenger ﷺ such as, “Do they not ask if they do not know? The cure for confusion is to inquire”). Al-Shaukani clarifies that these do not entail taqlīd of a specific person in every issue, but rather asking whoever is accessible from the people of knowledge, as was the practice at the time of the Prophet ﷺ and his companions.

Al-Shaukani benefits from the writings of Ibn al-Qayyim – which rejected taqlīd – and also those of Imam Ibn Abdu`l-Barr, Ibn Hazm, and others before him. He also rejects the notion that the door of ijtihād was closed, considering it to be a blameworthy innovation. He explains that the blessing of Allah is vast, and cannot be limited to a specific era, or monopolized by a specific group of people. Rather, it is open to all those whom Allah has gifted with the capability.

Al-Shaukani called for ijtihād and practiced absolute and independent ijtihād. He did not adhere to any of the known madhāhib, neither in foundational principles of jurisprudence nor in the actual jurisprudence – even though he had originally started out as a Zaydi. He even developed his own foundational principles, which he explains in his Irshād al-Fuhūl ila Tahqīq al-Haqq min ‘Ilm al-Usūl.

He did, however, oppose the use of independent legal reasoning and opinion (ra’y) in jurisprudence, and also rejected the legal school of ra’y in its entirety. Instead, he insisted on a complete dependence on revelation, stating that the religion is not formulated by the opinions of imams, but rather by the narrations of the Seal of the religion, the Messenger of Allah ﷺ. He believed that a layperson who is not qualified to perform ijtihād ought to ask scholars to qualify their positions from the Qur’an and Sunnah, and not base it on their opinions.

I agree with Shaukani in some aspects and disagree with him on others. I am with him in:

• His call to the scholars for independent ijtihād.
• His rejection of those who impose taqlīd on everyone in the Ummah.
• His opposition of those who require that one be limited to a single madhhab on every issue.
• His rejection of those who strictly follow a specific madhhab, even on issues where the weakness of their madhhab’s sources is made clear to them.
• His rejection of the idea that the doors of ijtihād were closed after the second or third century after Hijri.
• His encouragement of the Ummah to follow the Qur’an and Sunnah, over the opinion of men.

However, I take issue with his prohibition of taqlīd on the masses and his prohibition of following a madhhab. I do not see anything that prevents people from following an Imam and adhering to his madhhab, like the madhhab of Abu Hanifa, Malik, al-Shafi`i, Ahmad, Zayd, al-Hadi, Ja`far, Jabir and others. This is allowed but not required, according to the Shari`ah. The preferred position is that a lay-person does not keep a madhhab. Rather, his madhhab is the madhhab of the one he asks from among the scholars. As such, he is allowed to go from his madhhab to another, and he may ask whomever he wants from the scholars on whatever issues concern him. He may even leave his madhhab, in some cases, and follow another if he believes that the other madhhab has stronger proofs.

I also differ with Imam al-Shaukani in his opposition to the use of independent legal reasoning and opinion (ra’y) in jurisprudence as being something that is against the Shari`ah. The truth is that there is no jurisprudence without ra’y. Blameworthy ra’y is that which goes against clear texts. However, ra’y on topics where there is no textual basis, and ra’y used to better understand the texts according to their foundational principles and in light of the greater objectives of Shari`ah, is indispensable. There must be ra’y in areas that can be overlooked due to specific legal flexibilities, or in areas that lack definitive texts that clearly require adherence. This occurs through:

• Qiyās (a process of analogical reasoning) using scriptural texts, or
• Istihsān (a process of legal preference) to side-step clear but weak qiyās for stronger but more hidden qiyās, or
• Istislāh (seeking the greater benefit) to act on public interest, with its legal conditions, or
• ‘Urf (custom) in its allotted space, or
• Sadd al-Tharā’iʿ (blocking the means to evil) or
• Istishāb (presumption of continuity), etc.

All of these involve the use of ra’y. Can the jurist really be above using it? For that matter, is the jurisprudence of the likes of `Umar, Uthman, Ali, Ibn Mas`ud, Zaid, Ibn Abbas, and others, free from it?

Is it even possible to understand the texts correctly without ra’y? Did not the companions of the Prophet ﷺ use their ra’y when they prayed `Asr on their way to Bani Quraytha? They were more right than those who delayed their prayer until they arrived at their destination, but after the time of prayer had passed, as suggested by Ibn Taymiyyah.

Are the greater objectives of the Shari`ah not an example of the use of ra’y in understanding Qur’anic and Prophetic texts?

Is not ‘Umar’s moratorium on the punishment for stealing during the famine an example of ra’y? Is not his decision to transfer the liability of blood money from the tribe to the state an example of ra’y? Is not his decision against the distribution of specific conquered lands of Iraq to the Muslim army an example of ra’y? Is not his prohibition on marrying ‘women of the book’ for fear of its impact on Muslim women, an example of ra’y? Is not his decision to combine full brothers with half-brothers (from the mother’s side) in inheritance law – even after having ruled otherwise – an example of ra’y?²

Is not `Uthman’s position that divorce is not binding if uttered while the husband is experiencing a near-death illness an example of ra’y?³ Is it not related that Abu Bakr and other companions said, “I give legal edicts with my ra’y, for if it is correct it is from of Allah, and if it is wrong, then Allah, the Glorified is free of any blame”?

Did the Noble Messenger ﷺ not accept Mu`adh’s response when he sent him to Yemen? When he ﷺ asked, “By what will you judge?”, Mu`adh responded that he would judge by the Book of Allah, then by the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah. If the answer was not to be found in the Book or the Sunnah, he said, “I will make ijtihād by my ra’y.”

Did the companions not differ on some rulings because of the differences in their ra’y and understanding?

Opinion #3: The Allowance of Taqlīd for One Who Has Not Reached the Level of Ijtihād

The third opinion does not impose taqlīd on its adherents, as with the first opinion, nor does it prohibit it, as with the second opinion. Instead, it allows taqlīd for some and prohibits it on others. Imam Hasan al-Banna discusses this in one of his “20 Principles of Understanding”:

“Every Muslim who has not reached the level of understanding the arguments of legal deduction and jurisprudence is encouraged to follow the works of the great Imams of Islamic jurisprudence. While following an Imam, one should try to understand the argument of the Imam. Once the credibility of the Imam is established, one should accept any of this Imam’s guidance, equipped with proper arguments. With that, a Muslim is advised to exert the necessary efforts to acquire such a level of understanding for arguments of legal deduction and jurisprudence.”

Thus, he did not make taqlīd or following a madhhab mandatory, and he did not make it prohibited. Rather, he allowed it, but not for everyone. It is legally sanctioned for “every Muslim who has not reached the level of understanding the arguments of legal deduction” – that is – for the lay person and the like who are not qualified to derive rulings from the Qur’an and Sunnah, or to know ijmā’, qiyās, and the other methodologies which build upon these foundational ones, such as istislāh, ‘urf, istishāb, and the Shari`ah of those before us.

Following vs. Blindly Imitating

In his wisdom, Ustadh al-Banna prefers the word ittibā` (to follow) over taqlīd (to blindly imitate) in his principle, stating Muslims are ‘to follow (yattabi`u) one of the great imams of Islamic jurisprudence.’ The Qur’an too, uses the word ittibā` in contexts that make it praiseworthy and legally acceptable.

This is seen in the statement of Ibrahim: “Oh my father, indeed there has come to me of the knowledge what has not come to you, so follow me; I will guide you to an even path” (Qur’an, 19:43). This ayah invites one to follow the ones who are knowledgeable in areas that one does not know.

We also see in the story of Musa (as) and the famous righteous servant of Allah, Khidr: “Then they found one of Our servants whom We blessed with mercy, and taught from Our knowledge. Moses said to him, “Can I follow you that you may teach me some of the knowledge and guidance bestowed upon you?” (Qur’an, 18:65-66).

Musa (as) asks to be permitted to follow Khidhr (“ittibā`ih”) so he may learn from the knowledge that Allah, the Exalted, had given him. This shows that following the knowledgeable, in certain cases, is not blameworthy.

Imam Abu ‘Umar ibn Abdu`l-Barr said: “The purpose of knowledge is clarity – to grasp the known as it truly is. For when something is made clear to someone, he has come to know it. The scholars say that the one who makes taqlīd has no knowledge, and they do not differ in that.”

Abu Abdullah bin Khuwayz Mindad al-Basri al-Maliki said, “The meaning of taqlīd is to turn to a statement that is not substantiated with proofs.  Ittibā` implies that the statement is grounded in legal justification.  Ittibā` is sanctioned in the religion, while taqlīd is not.”

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TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: While this is just an English rendering of some issues regarding the subject of taqlid and tamadhub, it is in no way an exhaustive or complete discussion of the subject. For more information on this topic, please refer to Sh. Qaradawi’s work, Kayfa Nata`mal Ma`a’l-Turath (How We Deal with the Tradition) in which these pages represent only a small section.