Over the last few days, several institutions and mosques asked me about suspending juma prayers due to the CoronaVirus. AMJA has an excellent paper written on the subject that offers clear advice. I encourage folks to read it. More importantly, however, I encourage people to stay in touch with their local public health providers, Imams, and fiqh councils.

That being said, I thought to share some justifications from religious texts and scholarly works for suspending large gatherings, Jumu’a, and even the congregational prayers, during this difficult time. This is no simple matter. Years ago, in Boston, we had to suspend Jumu’a because the state government asked us to. Decisions like this are sensitive, but I hope the logic of Islamic law on this issue is clear.

Suhaib Webb

A Foundational Principle

A primary principle of Islam is that “preventing harm takes precedent over the acquisition of benefits.” For that reason, alcohol and gambling are prohibited, even though Allāh recognizes their benefits:

يَسْأَلُونَكَ عَنِ الْخَمْرِ وَالْمَيْسِرِ ۖ قُلْ فِيهِمَا إِثْمٌ كَبِيرٌ وَمَنَافِعُ لِلنَّاسِ وَإِثْمُهُمَا أَكْبَرُ مِن نَّفْعِهِمَا ۗ وَيَسْأَلُونَكَ مَاذَا يُنفِقُونَ قُلِ الْعَفْوَ ۗ كَذَٰلِكَ يُبَيِّنُ اللَّهُ لَكُمُ الْآيَاتِ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَتَفَكَّرُونَ

“They ask you about alcohol and gambling. Reply that in both is a great sin, and a benefit for people, but the sin is greater.” (Quran 2:219)

The Books of Usūl al-Fiqh

In the books of Usul Al-fiqh (foundations of jurisprudence), we find dispensations for things when there is a threat to the health and well being of people:

Imām’ Izz al-Din ‘Abd al-Salām explained this dispensation when he wrote,

فصل في بيان تخفيفات الشرع، وهي أنواع: منها تخفيف الإسقاط: كإسقاط الجمعات والصوم والحج والعمرة بأعذار معروفات
The section on shari’a dispensations and their types. One is the dropping of an act, like congregational prayers, fasting, hajj, or ‘Umra due to a shari’a approved reason.” (Qawa’id al-Ahkam fi Masalih Al-Anam, Vol. 2, Pg. 9)

Thus, there are times when acts can be modified to prevent considerable, often public, harm.

Illness and the Threat of Illness

Ibn Rushd mentioned a consensus that Illness allowed people to miss congregational prayers:

أما المتفق عليهما: فالذكورة، والصحة، فلا تجب على امرأة، ولا على مريض باتفاق
What scholars agree on is that gender and health determine if a person should attend prayers. Thus the consensus is that Juma is not an obligation upon women and the sick.” (Bidaya al-Mujtahid wa Nahaya al-Muqtasid, Vol. 1, Pg. 224)

The Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم excused those who were sick from attending congregational prayers:

مَنْ سَمِعَ الْمُنَادِي فَلَمْ يَمْنَعْهُ مِنَ اتِّبَاعِهِ عُذْرٌ لَمْ تُقْبَلْ مِنْهُ تِلْكَ الصَّلاةُ الَّتِي صَلاهَا” قَالُوا: مَا عُذْرُهُ ؟ قَالَ: خَوْفٌ أَوْ مَرَضٌ
“Who hears the caller to prayer, but finds no excuse not to respond, his prayer that he prayers (alone) will not be accepted.” The companions asked, “What is an ‘excuse.'” He responded, “Fear or sickness.” (Al-Sunna al-Saghir, Hadith 241.)

Fear of Potential Harm is Recognized by Islam

An axiom states,
ما اقترب الشيء يعطى حكمه
When something is near to something, it is given the latter ruling.

And,
الظن الغالب معتبر شرعاً
A strong assumption is considered in Shari’a.

I say that because the most excellent defense against this disease is social isolation. Public health experts in China, Italy, and other parts of the world discourage large gatherings, and as of now in Italy, the entire country is under quarantine. Thus, in this situation, legitimate fear of sickness, based on the opinions of experts, should be treated as sickness, especially with such a contagious virus. This is the advice of experts in the field. It’s a pandemic.

Today, Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, testified before congress,

“We would recommend that there not be large crowds. If that means not having any people in the audience as the NBA plays, so be it.”

Commands & Capacity

It is well known that the orders of Allah and His messenger are conditioned on ability.

Allah says,
فاتقوا الله ما استطعتم
“Be dutiful to Allah as best you can.” (Quran 64:16)

The Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم said:

وَمَا أَمَرْتُكُمْ بِهِ فَأْتُوا مِنْهُ مَا اسْتَطَعْتُمْ
“When I command you do do something, do it to your ability.” (Bukhari in his Sahih and Muslim)

A Mistaken Notion
I’ve heard some folks contend that this is “not a big deal; I’m young, and I’ll be fine.” While that may be true, the danger is that a person may be asymptomatic, but he may engage with or sit next to older people, or he may even infect a younger person who has elders at home. Our approach to this virus should not be rooted in selfishness. It is going to take us as a community to defeat it, inshallah.

If You’ve Tested Positive
First, lots of prayers and thoughts your way. I ask Allah to cure you and make this a means of your forgiveness. Second, it is not allowed for you to attend community events or congregational acts of worship.

The Fatwa Council of Iraq wrote,

“It is not allowed for a person who tests positive for the virus to attend public gatherings such as the Friday prayers and congregational prayers. He should pray at home on in isolation until he is cured.”

And, The Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم said:

لا يُورَدُ مُمْرِضٌ على مُصِحٍّ
A sick person should not mix with a healthy one. (Bukhari in his Sahih collection)

Inshallah, this pandemic will continue to grow, so I suggest suspending jumu’a and other large gatherings as well, especially if public health officials warn against them, and of course, if local governments request the same. This answer rests on the shoulders of those two entities, as well as local Imams, local fiqh councils and leadership. It is essential to engage them and heed their advice. My hope here was to show the leeway and mercy Islam provides in this situation.

Allah knows best,
Suhaib

Originally posted in July 2010

Since we are in the month of Rajab, I thought it would be timely to discuss an event from life of the Prophet ﷺ (peace be upon him). The average, educated Muslim and even many scholars have little to no knowledge about this subject. It is an established part of the guidance Allah revealed and preserved for us and carries much divine wisdom. Since the 4^th of July just passed, I’d like to research this issue and see what we kind of fiqh (jurisprudence) we get from it.

In looking at this issue, we must acquaint ourselves with a common practice among the Arabs during the times of Jahiliyyah (the times of ignorance before the Qur’an was revealed). According to the major Arabic dictionaries and historical encyclopedias, al-Ateerah was an occasion in which Arabs would slaughter animals during the first 10 days of Rajab seeking to fulfill their vows (al-nathr) and to receive the favor of their gods.¹ Then, according to the well-established biography of the Prophet ﷺ, the Prophet ﷺ was guided to Islamicize this tradition.²

In Islamicizing these traditions, the Muslims were commanded to slaughter in the name of Allah alone and give the meat to the poor, family and friends, just as we do the udhiyyah (slaughter for Eid al-Adha). The proof for this is in the hadith (narration) that states, “The Prophet was asked about al-Ateerah and he said it was haqq (truth).”³ The Prophet ﷺ also said, “Indeed every year, each household is responsible for the slaughter of al-Udhiyyah and al-Ateerah.”⁴ In the following set of authentic ahadith, the practice was allowed or seen as sunnah (established tradition of the Prophet ﷺ). Abu Razeen al-Uqaylee asked the Prophet ﷺ, “We used to slaughter animals in Rajab. We would eat from its meat and give it to those who came to us.” The Prophet ﷺ responded, “Laa, ba’s” meaning “no problem” or “that’s fine.”⁵ At his farewell pilgrimage three months before he passed away, the Prophet ﷺ said, “…Whoever wishes let him slaughter…and whoever wishes not [to] then let him not…”⁶

On the other hand, there is another hadith, which is the most common and authentic of all, that says, “No far and no Ateerah.”⁷ To a layman, this seems to be a contradiction, but it is far from that. Imam Shafi’i and his students hold that this hadith combined with the aforementioned ahadith only abrogates the obligation of al-Ateerah. So their position is that al-Ateerah remains a sunnah and thus the meaning of the vague hadith is “No far or Ateerah is an obligation.” This was the position of Ibn Seereen and Imam Ahmad as well as many of the Scholars of Hadith.⁸

Some Malikis, as noted by Ibn Rushd in al-Bidayah, took this hadith as a full abrogation,  thus making it makrooh (disliked) to take part in al-Ateerah. Al-Allamah ash-Shawkani disagrees with the Malikiyyah based upon solid usool (method used to derive fiqh). He said, in agreement with the Shawafi’, “In combining the hadith it must be said that the meaning is ‘there is no obligation of Far or Ateerah’ thus making it a sunnah which the Prophet ﷺ allowed. This can be the only opinion because we don’t know the exact chronological order of these texts except that they are all within the last couple years of the Prophet’s life… There is no doubt that the hadith ‘No Far and No Ateerah’ by itself indicates prohibition. That can’t be the case after we combine this hadith with the other ahadith and the fact that full abrogation cannot be established except with knowledge of the order of the statements or by a clear claim that it is abrogated.”⁹

The majority of scholars from the Hanafi and Hanbali schools of thought said that this hadith came as an abrogation of the legislation of these practices as a sunnah, and thus it was replaced by al-Udhiyyah. They hold that this abrogation was not that of prohibition but rather that of negating it as an Islamic practice like the Udhiyyah, yet it still remains an acceptable and permissible cultural act.¹⁰ Ibn al-Qayyim said, “If it we gather these ahadith then we see that this hadith of abrogation is that of it being a sunnah (Islamic practice) without there being a prohibition or dislike in it. So if a person wanted to slaughter an animal in Rajab for whatever reason and he wanted to give the meat to the poor, then that would not be disliked ¹¹

I decided to do this research after seeing a forum where some modern Saudi scholars and Salafi brothers were demeaning the honorable Shaikh Abdullah ibn Bayyah for using this issue as a proof in allowing Muslims in the West to take part in non-religious holidays or occasions. The fact is that it is solid proof indeed. The Saudi scholars and their followers contended that the hadith “No Far and No Ateerah” is a case-closing hadith which is – as we have seen in this article – far from the majority position of ahle Sunnah (Sunni Muslims). When doing this research, I read many modern scholars  from the Muslim world claiming that this issue is a clear cut abrogation that led to the prohibition of this act and any others like it. They make a point to mention that celebrating any day other than the two holidays revealed to our beloved Prophet ﷺ would be an innovation rejected by the masses. The fact is that I believe they’re seeking to hide the legitimate majority opinion based in the established schools of fiqh in order to serve their expression of political frustration. I believe they are frustrated that not only are the Muslims nowhere near becoming a superpower, but we have also become very weak in the world today. Our scholars see our governments as cowardly and unable to stand up to Western injustices, and they feel like they must stand up as representatives of this deen (religion) and do something. The problem, however, is that the “don’t be Western in any way, shape, or form” attitude has only alienated us more and weakened our  ability to articulate our message to the masses.

These are indeed noble intentions, but the act is against very harsh injunctions of the Qur’an. Allah said, “Indeed those who conceal what We have sent down of clear proofs and guidance after We made it clear for the people in the Scripture – those are cursed by Allah and cursed by those who curse,”(Qur’an, 2:159). There are numerous more Islamic and practical ways to deal with the political frustration we all face.

Before concluding, I will have to clarify a couple issues to our readers who, like me, were brainwashed with this un-Islamic anti-Western rhetoric that keeps us segregated and reclusive and not “Western.” We should be seen as a unique, integrated (not assimilated), positively-contributing identity in Western society. The hadith that says “whoever acts like or imitates a people is one of them” is not usable in this context because the Prophet ﷺ “Islamicized” al-Ateerah by making the slaughter for Allah alone. The fact is that the explanation of this hadith, according to the consensus of commentators, is that we are prohibited from looking like or imitating the disbelievers in matters that represent shirk (associating partners with Allah) or sin or that specifically identify them as disbelievers.  This does not include what clothes you wear or how you eat, as the Prophet ﷺ did these things just like any other polytheist of his time. Another hadith relates, “Whoever innovates something in this affair of ours (Islam) something that is not from it then they will be rejected.” Again this hadith, according to all the commentaries, means a religious matter, not a secular one that is common to all peoples of faith and atheists alike.

In conclusion, I stand with our Shaykh, the distinguished Abdullah ibn Bayyah, by saying that according to these texts, there is nothing wrong with celebrating occasions and holidays which are customary and are not representing a certain religion. This is as long as Muslims conduct themselves in an Islamic manner and do not participate in acts that can lead to sinful behavior.

Originally posted in September 2010.

I begin in the name of Allah, the most kind and merciful:

Summarized Answer

Scholars, past and present, have differed over this issue, so it should not be turned into a matter of dispute. It appears to me that Muslims should pray both the ʿĪd and Friday prayer. However, whoever decides to follow the other opinion must pray Ẓuhr and will not incur any sin, since this is a legitimate opinion based on proper reasoning and evidence as well. Mosques must organize the Friday prayer for those people who would like to attend.

Reason for the Difference of Opinion

Pieces of Evidence

A: The verse of the Qur’an stipulates that Friday prayer is an obligation: “O you who have believed, when [the adhan] is called for the prayer on the day of Jumu`ah [Friday], then proceed toward the remembrance of Allah and leave trade. That is better for you, if only you knew.” ((Qur’an 62:9))

B: There is a report that the third khalīfah (caliph), Uthmān ibn ʿAffān, gave permission for some people to skip the prayer: “…then I witnessed the ʿĪd with Uthmān ibn ʿAffān, and that was on Friday. He prayed before the sermon [khutbah], then gave a speech and said: ‘People. This is a day where two ʿĪds have fallen on the same day. So whoever from amongst the people of the outskirts ((The word used is “al-ʿawālī” which refers to people living about one or two miles from the mosque in Madinah. See al-Laknawī, ʿAbdul Ḥayy, al-Taʿlīq al-Mumajjad)) of Madinah wants to wait for the Friday Prayer, they may; and whoever wants to return [home], I have given them permission.” ((Bukhārī 7:103 #5572, Muwaṭṭa’ 2:249 #613))

C: There are reports that the Prophet ﷺ (peace be upon him) allowed people to skip the ʿĪd prayer.

Zayd ibn Arqam reported that the Prophet ﷺ performed the ʿĪd prayers early in the day but then offered an exemption for Friday prayer and said, “Whoever wants to may pray it.” ((Abū Dāwūd 1:281 #1070, Al-Nasā`ī 3:194 #1591. Scholars differed over the authenticity of this report))

“Two ʿĪds were on the same day during the time of Ibn al-Zubayr [a Companion]. He delayed people from coming out until the daylight had spread. When he came out and gave a sermon, he made it long. Then he descended and prayed but the people did not pray the Friday Prayer on that day. This was then mentioned to Ibn ʿAbbās who said: ‘He has acted according to the Sunnah [the way of the Prophet].’” ((Al-Nasā`ī 3:194 #1592))

Abū Hurayrah reported that the Prophet ﷺ said, “Two ʿĪds have synchronized together on this day, so whoever prefers, it may suffice for Friday prayer. We will soon gather.” ((Abū Dā`ūd 1:281 #1073. Scholars differed over the authenticity of this report))

D: There is a report that the Prophet ﷺ himself performed the Friday prayer on ʿĪd day: “The Prophet used to read surah al-Aʿlā and al-Ghāshiyah in the two ʿĪd Prayers and the Friday Prayer. When the day of ʿĪd and Friday would come together on the same day he would still read both of them in both prayers.” ((Muslim 2:598 #878, Nasā`ī 3:112 #1424))

First Opinion

Only people living in isolated areas [who are normally exempted from attending the Friday prayer] coming from out of town to attend the ʿĪd prayer are exempted from the Friday Prayer. This is the opinion of Abū Ḥanīfah ((Al-Shaybānī, Muḥammad, al-Muwatta’)) , Mālik ((Ḥāshiyah al-Dassūqī 1:391)) , and al-Shāfiʿī ((Nawawi, al-Majmūʿ)) .

Reasoning Behind the First Opinion

Verse A cannot be overridden by any report that indicates something different unless it is of the highest authenticity. It must also be reported by several different people because this is not something that would only be heard/observed by one or two people only.

There doesn’t seem to be any rational reason why one obligation should be dropped due to another being performed. This is similar to the way people must still pray Ẓuhr after praying ʿĪd. ((Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughnī 2:265))

Report B indicates that the leader of the Muslims exempted only a specific group of people [who normally don’t need to pray the Friday prayer because they don’t live in a city] and none of the Companions objected to his decision. This implies they understood that it was in line with the practice of the Prophet ﷺ.

Evidence C may be general in wording but should be understood as being confined to a specific group of people based on the other evidence.

Much of evidence C is of doubtful authenticity.

Report D indicates that the Prophet ﷺ himself prayed it and he obviously had other people with him.

Second Opinion

Whoever performed the ʿĪd prayer is exempted from the Friday prayer ((With the exception of the imām, unless no one shows up)) , but must still pray Ẓuhr. This is the opinion of Aḥmad ((Ibn Qudāmah, al-Kāfī fī Fiqh al-Imām Aḥmad 1:338, Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughnī 2:265)) . It is also the opinion of later scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah ((Majmū’ Fatāwā Ibn Taymiyyah 24:211-213)) , al-Shawkānī, Ibn Bāz ((Majmūʿ Fatāwā Ibn Bāz 13:13. His opinion is that it is preferable to pray the Friday prayer.)) , and Sayyid Sābiq.

Reasoning Behind the Second Opinion

Evidence C is sufficiently authentic to prove that the Prophet ﷺ made an exception to the rule in order to make life easier for the Muslims.

The sermon for Friday prayer is an addition to the prayer of Ẓuhr. Since one set of sermons was already heard, there is no need for another set later in the day.

Friday prayer is a type of ʿĪd and there is no need for two of them in one day. When two acts of worship of the same genre combine together, one of them drops, the way wuḍū’ (ablution) is not needed when taking a bath [ghusl]. ((Majmūʿ Fatāwā Ibn Taymiyyah 24:211))

Conclusion

There is clearly a legitimate difference of opinion due to both the clarity and authenticity of the two reports in question.

The world we live in today has brought many tests to the Muslims. Undoubtedly, it has also brought many blessings to us. One new reality—the fact that the knowledge of our religion has become readily available through mass media—can be either a test or a blessing depending upon the scholar you speak to. As a result, we find two extremes. Some who declare that everyone must follow one juristic school or preferred scholar to be the authority without exception. Others declare that they may follow whatever opinion they like and therefore spend much of their time searching for opinions which suit their desires. In this article we beseech the support and ultimate success only granted by Allah subhanahu wa ta`ala (exalted is He) to bring the proper attitude to the availability of knowledge and scholarship in the modern world. This must be done by balancing the two extremes. In order to be witnesses upon mankind, Allah has made us a balanced nation. (Qur’an, 2:143)

Some scholars and schools of thought teach that all laymen must follow a particular juristic school of thought without exception. They remind us of the verses in which Allah enjoined us all to ask someone of knowledge if we were confused or unaware. They also cite how the Prophet ﷺ would designate some of his more knowledgeable companions to be specific references for others. Their points are all true reports, but still do not justify the claim that we should attach ourselves to one juristic school and never seek knowledge outside of it. This is like making that school of thought a legislator with the same authority as the Prophet ﷺ — which is wrong.

The truth is that the science of Islamic law can be quite complicated and not everyone can deduce a sound understanding from just reading the Qur’an and hadith (report of the sayings and actions of the Prophet ﷺ). This requires you to seek a qualified jurist to clarify to you the ruling regarding matters you don’t know about or are unclear to you. That being said, there is nothing in Islam which says that we must follow only one juristic school of thought or only one scholar. Two of the previous scholars of al-Azhar, Shatloot and al-Sayis, wrote in their curriculum about comparative jurisprudence, “This opinion was developed by some juristic schools in the recent centuries when the spirit of difference had become dominant and juristic partiality reigned. So they made up rules that prevent laymen from taking an opinion outside of the school they grew up with. This caused the reality of juristic schools of thought to go from opinions which can be discussed and either accepted or denied by anyone to become obligatory religious truths that one who started with them must always adhere to and can never look into others. By these rules, those scholars prevented the masses from looking into the Qur’an and Sunnah for guidance! (Which all believers were commanded to do in the Qur’an.)” (Muqaranah al-Madhahib fil-Fiqh, 30)

Jad al-Haqq, one of the great scholars of al-Azhar in its prime, says in his book about the flexibility of Islamic Law: “The truth which is the opinion of the majority of scholars is that it is not an obligation to follow a certain juristic school with exception to others. Any follower (muqallid) may follow whichever school or juristic scholar he likes. This is because since the time of the companions people would follow different jurists from time to time and compare what one said with another on a given issue. This opinion was taken by al-Aamidee, Ibn al-Hajib, al-Kamel ibn al-Hamam, and al-Rafi’ee and many others from our great predecessors. This is because obliging someone to follow one juristic school over the other is like claiming for them a distinguished right to legislation whereas Islam is clear that the only obligation in obedience is to the Qur’an and authentic Sunnah. Ibn Ameer al-Hajj said in his commentary on al-Tahreer by al-Kamel al-Hamam, ‘In the foundations (usool) of Ibn Muflih and others from the Malikiyyah, Hanabilah and Shafi’iyyah, it is not an obligation upon anyone to follow a specific jurist or juristic school.’(Muroonah al-Fiqh al-Islami, 134-135) That opinion is confirmed by the many scholars based in different juristic schools who researched for the Encyclopedia of Fiqh of Kuwait (see vol. 13, p.163).

This brings us to the crux of this article. The Holy Qur’an is crystal clear in encouraging all of us to learn about our religion and to spend as much time as we can doing so. So if we find answers and clarification by reading through the Qur’an and Sunnah then that is a good thing. The problem is that there will be many texts that we don’t understand. There will also be many issues of which we aren’t aware. Finally, there will be many other issues which we simply can’t find an answer to at all. So this is why we must seek a sound understanding of Islamic law from a person who is qualified to give a legal ruling. We must go to someone who is a jurist (faqeeh/mujtahid) or has been trained in the Islamic sciences enough to give us the ruling from a qualified jurist.

The scholars have differed on the matter of taking rulings from different scholars. Some scholars allow Muslims to choose any scholarly opinion according to what is easier for them. They cite the major objective of Islamic Law in facilitation and Allah’s compassion for the believers. The well-known authentic hadith says, “When the Prophet ﷺ was faced with two options, he always chose the easier of the two as long as there is no sin in it.” (Bukhari) These scholars remind us that in the time of the companions and thereafter people would seek rulings from different scholars and there was never any blame on them for doing that. Shaikh al-Tayyib Salamah says, “There is no doubt about the fact those who have permitted the follower (muqallid) to choose opinions because he or she finds them easier upon them are not permitting it if it corrupts their religion. They are saying that as long as a qualified jurist has made a ruling then whosoever chooses to follow them is not blameworthy because facilitation is a well-known founding principle in Islamic Law.” (Al-Akhth bil-Rukhas wa Hukmuhuh, 533)

Some scholars who prohibited taking rulings from different schools of thought weren’t doing so because they believe that it isn’t permissible according to their understanding of the Qur’an and Sunnah.  They did so in order to block the means to sinful behavior. They hold that allowing Muslims to pick whichever opinion they want will lead them to picking opinions based upon their desires which they say is sinful. Thus Islamic Law would be serving their desires when the people were meant to serve Islamic law.

The majority of scholars have said that this application of blocking the means is invalid since it would be putting that juristic school on the level of Prophetic legislation when in reality it is just a human’s educated attempt to represent Islamic Law. The correct way to deal with it is teaching the people how to choose an opinion regardless of which juristic school or scholar it comes from. In this approach, the majority has said that it is permissible to follow any qualified jurist or juristic school, but according to a condition. The world-renowned scholar Yusuf Al-Qaradawi said, “Some scholars allowed following any opinion from a qualified jurist even if it is just to suit one’s desires and because they find it easiest without even looking into the proofs and thinking about which one makes sense and is rooted in the texts. I say that this is impermissible because the early generations of Muslims were narrated to have said, ’Whoever seeks the easy opinions amongst jurists has rebelled (fasaq).’ That is because that is simply following one’s desires and playing with our religion which is a mockery… In this case it is as if the believer wants the truth to follow him around whereas it is the believer that should be searching for the truth even if it goes against his desire.” (Fatawa al-Mu’asarah, vol .2, 128-129). Their strongest proof in prohibiting seeking opinions simply because they agree with their desires is in verse 59 of Surah an-Nisaa: “And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger.” (Qur’an, 4:59)

This verse supports the need to compare rulings according to that which seems closer to the Qur’an, Sunnah, and sound logic rather than the opinion that seems easier to you. The esteemed Wahbah Zuhaily said, “My opinion is that it is permissible to look for the facilitations in the juristic schools in the case of dire necessity or pressing need. This is as long as the intention behind it isn’t playing around with the religion to suit one’s desires.” (Al-Rukhas al-Fiqheyyah fi Dow’i al-Kitab wal-Sunnah, 80)

Now some might have the wrong idea of what the scholars mean in serving one’s desires. The following example was given by Shaikh Mustafa al-Taarizee: “Someone wants an illicit relationship. To escape fornication [adultery], he sleeps with her by secret marriage whereby there is no Guardian as in the school of Abu Hanifa and no witnesses as is narrated in the school of Malik…playing around with Islam in this manner makes a mockery of it and no spiritual person of reason would allow it.” (Al-Rukhas al-Fiqheyyah fi Dow’i al-Kitab wal-Sunnah, 81).

Now we must summarize the opinions of the scholars on this matter and set out the guidelines for taking easier opinions so that we don’t fall into sinful behavior.

1. From the established principles of Islamic Law is “إذا ضاق الأمر اتسع” which means roughly, if a situation becomes hard to withstand, then the law accommodates. So you may follow an established opinion which makes your general life easier. An example of this is for people who live in the west and find it difficult to take off their socks to make Wudhu. They may take the Hanbali opinion for the case being permissible and not related to the type of foot covering because there is a حاجة or pressing need.
2. When making such a move, one has to follow an established opinion within the major schools of thought which has been validated by the great scholars throughout history. It is preferred to be an opinion of one of the 4 juristic traditions, but if not it must be at least well documented and recognized by the authoritative juristic works or represented in the modern councils of jurisprudence and committees dealing with new issues.

God willing the next research will cover strange isolated opinions and the rules for dealing with them.

And Allah (swt) knows best.

By the Grace of Allah, we have a beautiful tradition of law filled with rich wisdom that balances between a deep understanding of our scripture and the reality of those to whom it is applied. Consequentially, our scholars have dealt with the modern world by developing two new applications of fiqh. One is referred to as Fiqh al-Nawazil which means the ‘Islamic Jurisprudence of New Realities’ (not present when the schools of jurisprudence were formed) and a subdivision of this is Fiqh al-Aqalliyyaat which is ‘Islamic Jurisprudence for Muslim Minorities’ living in non-Muslim lands. The famous axiom which led to the formation of these modern applications of the principles and objectives of our sacred texts is “The legal ruling on a given matter may change according to different eras, places, or circumstances.” This axiom is held by the vast majority of scholars from the four schools of Islamic Jurisprudence. To my knowledge there is no exception, but I was taught to be cautious about claiming it a consensus.

One of the new realities we face is that the vast majority of Muslims don’t speak Arabic. Similarly many Muslims live in communities where Arabic is not a spoken language and it would be unrealistic to expect the vast majority of them to learn it.

Regarding the language of the Friday Sermon (khutbah) given to majority non-Arab audiences, there has arisen two schools of thought amongst our scholars today.  The majority opinion is that the khutbah may be a mixture of both Arabic and the local language. Even some notable scholars of today hold the opinion that there is no clear requirement for any of the Khutbah to be in Arabic except verses of the Qur’an when it is delivered to a majority non-Arab audience.  The other opinion is that the khutbah is not acceptable unless it is all in Arabic.

More often than not, the literalist school of thought, which tends to issue opinions from centuries old fiqh books, doesn’t benefit these new realities. In dealing with the fiqh of new realities, our scholars and the collective councils often look at what is in the best interest (maslahah) of Islam and Muslims in the new realities they face. When there are texts which relate to an issue, they try and derive the reasoning (‘illah) behind the text in order to form an opinion which is more practical and facilitating. If there is no text prohibiting something then once again they look at the general objectives of Islam and if it fits with those objectives of our Divine law, then they will encourage it.

When dealing with this subject, I thought it to be highly relevant to mention the positions of world fiqh councils and comprehensive works rather than just stating the proofs behind it. This is because the followers of the minority opinion purport that theirs is the undoubtedly correct and majority opinion (it has even been said that there is a consensus for their opinion). With all due respect to them, in my opinion, this is due to the reclusiveness of their group which stems from an extreme form of blind following (taqleed) of their scholars.

Let’s start in the Islamic Encyclopedia formed in Kuwait. This research is the largest comparative fiqh work known to the recorded history of Islam. The idea came collectively from representative scholars of many Muslim countries in world fiqh conferences in the 1950’s. It was started in Egypt and then shifted to the ministry of endowments and religious affairs of Kuwait in the late 60’s. In Kuwait, many scholars from different countries like Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Kuwait based in all four legal schools (madhabs) began researching for the project. It was recently finished at 45 volumes and is being spread across the Muslim world as a primary encyclopedic reference for Islamic Law. The current expert supervisor of the encyclopedia is a Hanafi scholar from Aleppo (Halab), Syria named Dr. Ahmad al-Hajji al-Kurdi who is also on Kuwait’s national committee for issuing religious edicts (iftaa). Aleppo is a stronghold of the Hanafi madhab in Syria with a population of over 5 million and thousands of Hanafi scholars. Shaikh Ahmad and his family are well-known among them. ¹

In the 19th volume on page 177 it describes the pillars of the Khutbah according to the different madhabs, “According to Abu Hanifa it is simply to say alhamdulillah, subhan’Allah or la ilaaha illa Allah. Abu Yusuf and Muhammad added that there should be a longer portion which customarily can be called a khutbah. The Malikis said that however small it may be that anything can be called a khutbah according to Arabs. The Shafi’i school says that it is 5 things: alhamdulillah, salat upon the Prophet, admonishment to taqwa, praying for the Muslims, and at least a clear part of a verse of the Qur’an. That being said, on page 180 it says under the 6^th condition for the soundness of the khutbah, “To be in Arabic. What is meant by this is that its pillars are said in Arabic. This is because they are the obligatory pillars so it is a condition that they must be in Arabic even if the audience doesn’t speak Arabic. This is the majority opinion (Maliki, some Shafi’i and most Hanabilah).” So what’s being said according to these schools of thought here is that the pillars of the khutbah must be in Arabic since that is what is obligatory for the khutbah to be sound and anything added to that whether in Arabic or otherwise will not harm it’s soundness. The only exception is that most Malikis did hold the opinion that the khutbah can only be delivered in Arabic. This is since they held that the khutbah is part of the salah taking the place of the first two rakah’s of Dhuhr prayer and in their school the whole prayer must be in Arabic.

Continuing on page 180 of the 19^th volume, “And Abu Hanifa said – and this is the established opinion of the Hanafi school of thought – the khutbah is sound even if the whole thing is in a language other than Arabic regardless if the khateeb knows Arabic or not. Although Abu Yusuf and Muhammad agreed with the majority opinion except if the khateeb isn’t able to deliver it in Arabic.”

To further clarify this point, we find in the 27^th volume on page 201 under the heading conditions for a sound Khutbah, “It must precede the Salah, it must be a reminder that people customarily consider a sermon. So whenever the Imam fulfilled these two conditions after the time of Dhuhr has begun, then he has surely performed a sound Khutbah regardless if he was standing or sitting, he did one Khutbah or two,  he read Qur’an or not, it was in Arabic or another language…This is the Hanafi opinion.” For this they cited three of the most comprehensive and representative Hanafi fiqh books which all Hanafis refer to in proving what their school says on a given issue. They are Bada’I al-Sana’I 1/262, Hashiyyat ibn ‘Abideen 1/567 and Majma’ al-Anhaar 1/163. ²

Confirming this is a prominent Syrian scholar, Wahbah Zuhayli who is the head of the comparative Fiqh Department in the faculty of Shari`ah in the University of Damascus and also a senior member and advisor of juristic councils in Jeddah, Makkah, India, America and Sudan. In his eleven volume comparative fiqh masterpiece called Islamic law and its proofs, he notes in the second volume on the bottom of page 1304 about the conditions for a valid Friday Sermon according to the Hanafis: “They permitted the sermon to be in other than Arabic even if the khateeb is able to do it in Arabic and regardless if the people were majority non-Arabs.”³ It’s interesting to note that those who are strictest about the obligation of the khutbah being in Arabic consider themselves to be following the Hanafi madhab.

Now some detractors of these proofs might unwisely pass judgment in their bias and say that the scholars who wrote this either do not know what they’re talking about or that they are modernized liberal scholars who are approving an innovation.

Let’s look at the opinions of some of the strictest of scholars in following the Prophet ﷺ – or what some call Salafi or Wahhabi. According to the previous Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Shaykh Abdul Azeez ibn Baz, “If most of the audience of the Khutbah doesn’t understand Arabic then there is nothing wrong with delivering it in their language …” Later in the same Fatwa he notes that he issued this edict with full knowledge that “it is known that the early generations would deliver khutbahs in Arabic to crowds with new non-Arab Muslims and it was not reported that they would translate the khutbah or deliver it in the local language. This was because in those days the honor and glory was with the Muslims who were, in that case, the ruling authority and their language was Arabic.” He then states that what leads him to make this fatwa is that Allah said, ‘We have not sent any messenger except that he preached in the language of his people in order to clarify to them.’ (Qur’an, 14:4)”⁴ I think it’s commendable to note Bin Baz’s understanding of the fiqh of Muslim minorities in what is underlined in his fatwa.

According to another Saudi scholar, the renowned Shaykh Ibn al-Uthaymeen, who is known for his strictness in matters of `aqeedah and a literalist following of the Prophet ﷺ and his companions (may Allah have mercy on them), “The correct opinion in this matter is that it is permissible for the khateeb to deliver the khutbah in the language that the audience is accustomed to…This is because the khutbah was intended to be a means of clarifying the religion and guiding the people.  The only exception is that the verses of the Qur’an must be recited in Arabic and then translated. Verse 4 of surah Ibrahim indicates the permissibility of delivering the sermon in the local language, ‘We have not sent any messenger except that he preached in the language of his people in order to clarify to them.’”⁵

According to the official decision of the Fiqh Council of the Muslim World League, of which Mufti Taqi Usmani and many other of the greatest scholars representing the Muslim World are esteemed members, “The better opinion is that delivering Khutbatul-Jumu’ah in Arabic is not a condition for its validity. The best thing is to deliver the introduction and the Qur’anic verses in Arabic (the pillars). This is so that non-Arabs will get used to hearing Arabic and so it will make it is easy to learn (since it is the language of our holy scripture). Then the khateeb follows that with an admonishment in the language of the audience. Then Iqamatus-Salah.”⁶

According to the standing committee for issuing edicts in Saudi Arabia, the members of which are some of the most revered Saudi scholars, “There is no hadith which indicates that delivering the khutbah in Arabic is a condition for its validity. Indeed the Prophet ﷺ used to speak Arabic in the khutbah and at all other times simply because that was his language and the language of his people…”⁷

I will limit the list of scholarly bodies and their members who hold this view to what has been mentioned for the sake of brevity.

The following are some responses to the opinion that the Khutbah must be in Arabic. First they say that since the Prophet ﷺ and his companions never did it, therefore it must be wrong. I encourage them to read this research. This research proves that the lack of action on the part of the Prophet ﷺ and the early generations is not a proof in itself. We should also review the abovementioned point made by the standing committee for issuing fatwas in Saudi Arabia.

The next argument they make is that the khutbah is like reading Qur’an and prayer which must be said in Arabic. Therefore it is not acceptable to be in any other language. They add to this, if we allow the khutbah to be in other than Arabic then that will open the door to the adhan and prayer being reduced to translations. The response is that, first of all, the scholars are not in agreement that the khutbah takes the place of the first two raka`ahs of Dhuhr prayer. Clearly the Hanafis are not of this opinion because they only hold that delivering one khutbah without sitting is sufficient, thus the absence of the two khutbahs representing the first two raka’ahs of Dhuhr. The Malikis are reported to have this opinion as mentioned before. The response to them is that `Eid prayer comes before the Khutbah and it doesn’t replace Dhuhr, yet it was still the practice of the Prophet to make two sermons and Allah knows best as to why since he never said why. Also in response to the idea that the two sermons are exactly like the first two raka’ahs of prayer is the fact that the Prophet ﷺ would not recite a surah after al-Fatihah in the last two rak’ahs of Dhuhr, yet in Jumu’ah salah which is supposed to replace the final two rak’ahs of Dhuhr he always recited another surah after al-Fatihah. Finally this is an assumption based upon ijtihad not similar to the famous Hadith about Tawaf (circling the Ka’bah) which says that it is like prayer except that talking aloud is permissible.

Finally, it cannot be said that the khutbah is similar to the Qur’an since the Qur’an is the word of Allah and the khutbah is the words of a person. It also cannot be said that the khutbah is like the adhan and prayer since the statements of the adhan and prayer are according to authentically transmitted statements of the Prophet ﷺ who said “Pray as you have seen me praying.” On the other hand, the khutbah is simply the words made up by the khateeb. So whether he made the sermon in Arabic or another language they have no holy textual value like the Qur’an, adhan, or salah as they are the khateeb’s own invention. So no scholarly analogy can be used between the permissibility of giving the khutbah in a local language and translating the adhan.

With all due respect to our beloved scholar Mufti Taqi Usmani, his colleagues and followers, I believe this to be an issue that Muslims need to be on the same page on. It has created fitnah between Imams, community leaders, and their communities. As we have seen, according to the vast majority of today’s esteemed scholars around the world, including Mufti Usmani’s colleagues in the Muslim World league, it is the more balanced and practical opinion to allow the khateeb to deliver the general admonishment of the khutbah in the local language.

Without a doubt it is a priority that local scholars should represent the Muslims in their locality by forming a consultative (shurah) council. There is nothing wrong with individually following a scholar or madhab in matters pertaining to your own worship. In order to avoid fitnah and for Muslims to build upon unity, they should follow scholarly councils in major issues which effect Muslims collectively. This way the scholars can discuss amongst themselves the issues facing Muslims and come to an opinion which is in their best interests. That is what was done in the Fiqh Council of the Muslim World League as mentioned earlier. This is the opinion of the Assembly of Muslim Jurists of America, which is a host of notable PhD level scholars who reside or convene in America yearly to discuss issues relating to Muslims in America.

In its Sixth conference held on the 31^st of October 2009 the sixth collective decision in matters of worship was “The original ruling is that the khutbah is in Arabic. If the khateeb wasn’t able to or the audience doesn’t understand Arabic then the khutbah can be delivered in the language the audience understands. That being said, the pillars of the khutbah, the verses of the Qur’an, and the Hadiths should all be in Arabic.”

I hope everyone understands here that I am not attempting to refute Mufti Usmani’s opinion. I am simply passing on the opinion of his peers in this matter in clarifying the majority opinion as well as an attempt to unite the Muslims upon it. The purpose of this research was to make a case for four main issues which are of more benefit (maslahah) to Muslims in the West than the old opinion. They are: to clarify that this is the position of the majority today’s scholars and councils, to make it obligatory upon the non-Arab Muslims to attend a khutbah that they may benefit from, to promote non-Arab spiritual development by not Arabizing matters which aren’t tawqeefi such as general supplication (du`a’) and the khutbah and to make it clear to non-Muslims and new Muslims that our religion is not an emphatically Arabic religion, but a universal religion.

And Allah knows best!

Further References:

http://islamqa.com/ar/ref/112041
http://ibn-jebreen.com/ftawa.php?view=vmasal&subid=1691&parent=786
http://almoslim.net/node/52334
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-English-Ask_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503546368

1. Making up the days we didn’t fast during the month of Ramadan (for women) and
2. Fasting the six days of Shawwal (like a simultaneous fast).

I read on a scholar’s website that we cannot fast the six days of Shawwal before actually finishing the fasting of the month of Ramadan, i.e. – the way I understood it – the concept of two niyyah does not apply. Any suggestions?

Answer: The correct opinion is that one cannot combine intentions because each act is a separate act of worship. The contention that one must fast the days of Ramadan first, while respected, is not the strongest based on the dalil (evidence):

1. Many of the companions would delay their Ramadan fasts until the month of Sh’aban. We can assume that before that time they observed other fasts.
2. The obligation to make up the days of Ramadan is for the entire year (as held by most jurists) and according to many, for one’s entire lifetime. There is no explicit proof that one must make the days up in a year’s time save an implicit narration of `Ayesha radiallahu ‘anha (may Allah be pleased with her): “It happens that I have to make up days of Ramadan and I will not make up (these days) but in Sh’aban.” (Imam Muslim)

What does this mean?

1. Do not combine intentions.
2. Fast the six days first.

And Allah knows best.

Let’s take a practical example in order to demonstrate the truth of this claim. If someone were to open up Sunan Al-Tirmidhi, which is one of the very famous early collections of narrations [Ahӑdith], they might come across the following:

Hannӑd and Mahmud ibn Ghaylӑn informed us that Waki’ informed us on the authority of Sufyӑn on the authority of Abi Qays on the authority of Huzayl ibn Sharhabil on the authority of Al-Mughira ibn Shu’ba who said: “The Prophet ﷺ made ablution [wudu] and wiped over his socks and sandals.” Abu Isa [At-Tirmidhi] said: “This narration is authentic [hasan sahih].”

Whether this was read in Arabic or in English you might conclude from it that you can wipe over your feet when making wudu without having to take off your socks or sandals. You might naturally go even further and consider it ridiculous that anyone could have a doubt about this since it is so clear. The Prophet ﷺ did it and the narration is authentic so we can do it too.

However, a major problem arises when we look into Islamic history. We realize that virtually none of the scholars of Islamic Law came to the same conclusion based upon this narration. This means two things:

1. No scholar worthy of the name opened up a book like Sunan Al-Tirmidhi, read this hadith, and then made a conclusion based upon what he read.
2. No scholar came to the conclusion that anyone can unconditionally wipe over their socks and sandals because the Prophet ﷺ did it and the narration is authentic.

The first point has to do with methodology. The Prophet ﷺ said, “When someone in authority makes ijtihad [decrees a ruling regarding Islamic Law] and is correct then he receives two rewards. However, if he is wrong he only receives one reward.” In Islam, anyone who makes ijtihad and is qualified to do so will be rewarded even if he is wrong.  The important thing is that he used the correct methodology. On the other hand, anyone who undertakes ijtihad without being qualified and knowing the correct methodology will get no reward. In fact, it is feared that he may even be held accountable for doing so. This is demonstrated by an incident where a group of people were asked a question and gave the wrong answer which resulted in the death of the questioner. Later, the Prophet ﷺ was informed about what had happened and he exclaimed in contempt, “They killed him! If they don’t know, why don’t they ask?! Asking is the cure for ignorance.”

The second point has to do with putting history into perspective. If most scholars didn’t come to the same conclusion as the one who read this hadith then it might be concluded that they have never come across this hadith before. Maybe they didn’t have a copy of Sunan Al-Tirmidhi. Maybe they didn’t read the part about it being authentic. This conclusion would result in a very negative view of Islamic history. Now that we use the printing press, books like Imam Tirmidhi’s can be printed and distributed for everyone to read in order to supposedly correct the mistakes of all of those scholars of the past.

Let us look at the issue in detail in order to clear up these misconceptions. First, we will look at the authenticity of the narration and then we will take up what it implies.

Authenticating a Narration

After the death of the Prophet ﷺ, Muslim scholars came up with the most rigorous and ingenious method of authenticating history ever known. This was in order to properly preserve the statements of the Prophet of Islam ﷺ.

The casual reader might notice that Abu Isa Al-Tirmidhi graded the narration in question as authentic. However, we must also see what other scholars had to say about the same narration since Al-Tirmidhi is not the only authority in the field of hadith criticism.

Imam Abu Daud said, “Abdur Rahman ibn Mahdi used to refrain from narrating this hadith because it is well known that Mughira reported that the Prophet ﷺ wiped over his leather socks [khuffayn].” One of the most knowledgeable early hadith scholars of his time, Imam ibn Mahdi, was very well aware of this hadith, and had it memorized as well, but refused to narrate it to others because he considered it to be unauthentic. The vast majority of scholars agreed with him, among them: Sufyan Al-Thawri, Yahya ibn Ma’in, Ali ibn Al-Madini, Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Daud, Ahmad ibn Hambal, Al-Nasai, Al-Bayhaqi, Al-Nawawi, Ibn Hajar, and Ibn Al-Qaiyyim.

The question might arise then, on what basis did scholars like Al-Tirmidhi and Ibn Hibban as well as contemporary scholars like Al-Albani authenticate this hadith? In order to understand this phenomenon we must first understand that there are five tests that a hadith must go through before being declared authentic:

1. Ittisal – The chain of narration must be uninterrupted. For example, assume Imam Al-Bukhari is relating a statement of the Prophet ﷺ and there are three people between him and the Prophet ﷺ (i.e. I heard from X who heard from Y who heard from Z who heard the Prophet ﷺ say…). If Imam Bukhari happened to mention in his book person Y by his nickname which was unknown to other people then this hadith would automatically be deemed unauthentic because person Y would be considered as missing from the chain of narrators since we are unable to find out anything about him.
2. Adl – All of the narrators must be upright. This means that they must be good Muslims, honest, have good behavior [akhlaq], etc.
3. Dabt – All of the narrators must be precise. This means that they only narrate after knowing the general context and implication of the narration and are familiar with the various wording that was used.
4. Shudhudh – The narration should not contradict another narration about the same incident which is established. The narration in Sunan Al-Tirmidhi about wiping over socks suffers from this defect as will be shown.
5. Illa – The narration should be free from any other major defect that is usually found after researching all the narrations on the same topic.

Once we understand these principles we begin to understand why ibn Mahdi refused to narrate this hadith. He realized that Al-Mughira ibn Shu’ba saw the Prophet ﷺ wiping over his leather socks [khuffayn] and that this is established by several authentic narrations. However, the narrators Abu Qays and Huzayl made a mistake by narrating that Al-Mughira said “socks” [jawrabayn] instead of “leather socks” [khuffayn]. Since the difference between the two words makes a very significant difference, the narration of Abu Qays and Huzayl have been declared unacceptable.

The Implication of a Statement

Let us assume that the hadith in question is indeed authentic. Is the assumption that “anyone can wipe over their socks and sandals because the Prophet ﷺ did it” correct?

If we look at what the scholars had to say on the subject, we will not find even one that unconditionally allowed wiping over the unqualified term “socks.” Rather, they stipulated certain conditions which must be met and defined what types of socks are allowed to be wiped over.

Every scholar began by looking at the Qur’an, since that is the undisputed word of God. What does it have to say about this subject? “O you who believe, when you stand for prayer wash your faces, your arms up to the elbows, wipe a part of your heads, and wash your feet up to the ankles.” (5:6) This verse clearly states that you mush wash your feet up to the ankles when performing ablution. However, the Qur’an also says, “Take whatever the Messenger gives you and refrain from whatever he forbids you. (59:7)” Therefore, if it can be established that the Messenger ﷺ taught his followers any exception to the rule then it may be taken as a concession.

The scholar then looked at all of the narrations on the same topic. Imam Abu Hanifa’s statement clarifies this important principle, “I did not pass a judgment about wiping over socks until the overwhelming narrations proving its validity became manifest to me like daylight.” What he meant was that he did not consider wiping to be an established exception to the rule until he collected several authentic reports. His reasoning was this:

• the Qur’an is the word of God and its authenticity is undisputed;
• any single narration, even after passing the five tests of authentication, still has a possibility of being wrong due to the human element of the narration;
• no report should be allowed to be used as an exception to the rule until its authenticity is such that it leaves no room for any reasonable doubt.

After it became clear to him that several of the Companions of the Prophet ﷺ had narrated regarding wiping over socks he went further and said, “I fear that whoever denies wiping over socks has almost left Islam because the narrations regarding it have almost reached the level of tawatur.” Ibn Hajar verifies this by saying, “The experts of hadith have confirmed that the narrations which establish the permissibility of wiping over socks have reached the status of tawatur.”

After checking all of the narrations on the topic the scholar noticed the following:

• The Prophet ﷺ was not only seen wiping over his socks but he also instructed some of his companions to do so as well;
• He set a time limit as to how long anyone may wipe over their socks before having to take them off;
• He set a prerequisite that they must be worn in a state of purity before they may be wiped over;
• He wiped over the top of the sock rather than the bottom.

None of the preceding points apply to the narration of Abu Qays and Huzayl mentioned by Al-Tirmidhi and all of the narrations are unanimous that the socks mentioned were khuffayn and not jawrabayn.

The purpose of this discussion was not to deny that wiping is only restricted to leather socks (it is definitely not) but rather to correct the false assumption that reading a single verse or a single narration can qualify as evidence for a ruling on any issue. From this example, we should learn the following lessons:

• Some texts of the Qur’an and the Prophetic narrations require more than just a casual reading in order to understand their context and true import.
• No one should assume that they have fully understood any Qur’anic verse or Prophetic statement and then make judgment upon others unless they are familiar with all of the evidence on the topic.
• To properly understand Islam one should study on an issue by issue basis rather than a text by text basis.
• Sincerity, without knowledge, does not justify ignorance.

Does this mean that we should not read the Qur’an or hadith? Absolutely not. In fact, this should be an encouragement to read even more. The more knowledge you acquire the more things will begin to fit into place. One of the beautiful things about Islam is that there are no Divinely appointed clergy or priests. Anyone can study, increase in knowledge, and understand the Qur’an and Sunnah for themselves. If you only read this article with the hope of knowing whether or not you can wipe over the socks that you are wearing then go ask your local scholar rather than reading a collection of hadith. If that idea bothers you, then set out on the path of knowledge, the Muslim community is in need of more knowledgeable people.

Valid vs. Invalid

From the outset, it should be known that differences that are valid are a source of mercy and leniency. Invalid differences however, are a source of deviancy. Thus to label valid differences as ‘‘deviant” is precisely an act of deviancy!

What not to base validity on

Whether or not ikhtilāf (difference of opinion) on a given matter is valid or not should not be based on the subject matter. This means that the common notion that differences are allowed in Fiqh (Islamic Law) but not allowed in ʻAqīda (Theology), or are allowed in ‘furūʻ (subsidiary matters) but not allowed in uṣūl (foundational matters) is inaccurate and is likely to lead one to categorize legitimate differences as deviant.

The correct criteria on which to base validity

The correct method is to base the criterion for validity on the uṣūli epistemological distinctions between qatʻī (definitive) and dhannī (obscure).

A text (aḥadīth or Qur’ānic verse), can be qatʻī or dhannī in two aspects.

1. thubūt (its authenticity)
2. dalāla (its meaning)

al-qatʻīyāt

When a text is qatʻī in both its authenticity and its meaning, the matter is then qatʻī; hence differing in this matter is impermissible. Thus, such a difference is a source of deviancy and is not a source of mercy. For example, the texts that establish the prohibition of homosexuality in Islām are qatʻī in both its authenticity and meaning because Qur’ānic verses clearly prohibit it and these verses are supported by Aḥādīth to provide a clear cut consensus. Therefore, to say under the guise of ‘Ijtihād’¹ (interpretation) that homosexuality may be allowed is nothing short of heresy. Indeed in such clear cut matters, to deviate from the established positions is tantamount to kufr (blasphemy). Such matters, whether they are related to Islāmic law or theology, are not areas in which Ijtihād is allowed. Hence, the famous maxim: There is no Ijtihād in a matter wherein there is a clear-cut text.

al-dhannīyāt

If however one of these aspects is dhannī (its authenticity or meaning is not definitive), Ijtihād will be permissible, and as a logical consequence, differences of opinion arising out of such an Ijtihād (performed by qualified bona fide scholars) is also valid, though not necessarily correct. The ṣifāt of Allāh mentioned in the Qur’ān is such a matter, even though they are matters of theology. Hence, so long as the rules of interpretations are followed, it is not correct to exclude vast numbers of this Ummah outside the fold of Sunnī Islām as some have done so based on this issue alone. If however there is a clear cut consensus (Ijmāʻ), the matter would then be rendered as qatʻī and negate the option of Ijtihād.

What is dhannī and what is qatʻī?

For someone who is not fully proficient in the Arabic language, finding out which matter is dhannī and which is qatʻī may be difficult. The most practical way is to ask a reliable source of knowledge. On the other hand, a person who knows Arabic may consult earlier books of Fiqh to see whether classical scholars have differed, which will indicate that the sources relating to the matter is dhannī. Alternatively books listing clear cut consensuses also indicate what matters are qatʻī; what is excluded is usually dhannī.

Our attitude in those matters that are qatʻī

Since the primary sources are clear on such matters, we should ascertain the truth from the untruth. It is in these matters that one engages in ‘commanding the good and forbidding the evil’² (amr bil maʻrūf wan nahy ʻan’l munkar). Yet care should be taken in declaring matters as belonging to this category since very few issues belong here.

Our attitude in those matters that are dhannī

Since ikhtilāf in these matters are allowed, we must show tolerance in such issues. This means that we must not label the opinion of others which may be different, but valid as:

1. Deviant (tafsīq)
2. Innovation (tabdīʻ)
3. Blasphemy (takfīr)

It is in these matters that we must try to show and inculcate within us the ‘ethics of differing’ (ādāb al-Ikhtilāf). Furthermore, the fact that the matter is dhannī does not mean it is synonymous to being the correct opinion. Thus we should follow scholars we trust in such matters and we should not venture alone (unless qualified) in deciphering the correctness or incorrectness of a legal opinion.

Some examples of qatʻī matters:

1. The oneness of God
2. The finality of the message of Muḥammad ﷺ
3. The prohibition of unlawful murder
4. The prohibition of homosexuality
5. The prohibition of adultery/fornication
6. The prohibition of drinking alcohol
7. The obligation of the five daily prayers
8. Dealing with people justly
9. Abusing, cursing and defaming others
10. Sectarianism and breaking up Muslim unity
11. Backbiting and slander
12. Spying  and unwarranted suspicion
13. Declaring the companions of the Prophet as apostates (May Allāh protect us)

Some examples of dhannī matters:

1. The permissibility of taking usurious loans in non-Muslim countries
2. The obligation of the face veil (niqāb)
3. The permissibility of gelatine/animal rennet and other animal derivatives
4. What Allāh means when he mentions hands, face, etc. in the Qur’ān
5. Women travelling without a chaperone
6. The validity of wiping over cotton socks in wuḍū
7. Whether the language of the Friday khutba (sermon) is allowed to be translated or not
8. The permissibility of music
9. The permissibility of Mīlād celebrations
10. What constitutes ‘correct’ sighting of the moon for the establishing of a new month
11. Shaking hands with the opposite gender with the absence of lust, without initiating it
12. The issue of women singing in front of non-maḥārim
13. Men wearing clothes below the ankles
14. Men wearing silver
15. The ruling of the beard and its length
16. Raising of the hands before/after rukūʻ in salāh (rafʻ al-yadain)
17. Where to place the hands in salāh
18. The issue of 3 ṭālaq’s (divorces) in one sitting
19. The validity of a couple’s marriage in which the wife decides to become Muslim and the husband remains of his faith
20. Singling out the fifteen of Shaʻbān for worship
21. The issue of following one Madhab in all issues
22. Whether or not the Prophet ﷺ saw Allāh during the Miʻrāj or not

A Declaration by al-Majma` al-Fiqhi, Mecca
Annual Convention

Background

All praises are due to Allah alone.  Peace and blessings be on the one after whom there will be no prophet – our master and prophet, Muhammad, may God bless him, his family, and his companions and grant them peace.

To proceed, the Majlis al-Majma` al-Fiqhi al-Islami [Assembly of Islamic Jurisprudence] analyzed the following issues during its 10^th annual convention, held in the honorable city of Mecca, from Saturday, 24^th of Safar, 1408 A.H., 17^th of October, 1987 C.E. until Wednesday, 28^th of Safar, 1408 A.H., 21^st of October, 1987 C.E.:

–          differences in opinion amongst the orthodox schools of jurisprudence; and
–          extreme and hateful fanaticism shown by some of the followers of these schools, which often leads to the vilification of other schools and their scholars.

Furthermore, the Assembly examined the problem found in the minds of many people today, whose perceptions regarding these differences are based on ignorance of their foundations and meaning.  As a result, the misguiding forces cast doubt in their hearts by whispering to them, “Why should we have these differences among the schools when there is one body of Islamic Law and one set of principles extracted from the Glorious Qur’an and the established Sunnah (tradition) of the Prophet ﷺ?  Why not unite them into one so that Muslims have a single school of thought and a uniform understanding with regards to all legal rulings?”

The Assembly also examined the issue of fanaticism based in the juristic schools and the problems that arise with it, especially among the followers of new, contemporary trends, whose proponents call towards a new brand of ijtihad (scholarly interpretation) and vilify the established schools that have been widely accepted by the Muslim community from the earliest Islamic era.  They wrongfully vilify all, or some, of their imams (leaders) and create discord between people.

After discussing this issue, along with its surrounding facts, circumstances, and consequences (such as misguidance and communal discord), the Assembly has decided to release the following statement to warn and instruct both the misguiding forces and the fanatics.

Declaration

First, with regards to difference among scholars –

Scholarly differences that are found in the Muslim world are of two types:

1. theological differences; and
2. juristic differences.

The first type is, in fact, a calamity that has led to numerous disasters in the Muslim world.  It has split the ranks of Muslims and created discord between them, which is terribly unfortunate.  These theological differences must not exist.  Instead, the Muslim community must unite upon the theology of Ahl as-sunnah wa al-jama`ah (people of the tradition of Muhmmad ﷺ and the community), which represents the pure and sound Islamic thought that existed at the time of the God’s Messenger ﷺ and the Rightly Guided Caliphate, which was declared by the Prophet ﷺ to be an extension of his own Sunnah, for he said, “I command you to adhere to my sunnah, and the sunnah of the rightly guided caliphs after me.  Hold fast to it and grab it with your molar teeth.”

The second type, which consists of those differences that exist among the juristic schools over some issues, is caused by academic reasons, and there is great divine wisdom behind their existence. These differences are a form of God’s mercy for His servants, and they serve to expand the methods by which rulings may be derived from the sacred texts.  Furthermore, these differences are a blessing and a juristic treasure, providing room for the Muslim community in its religious and legal affairs such that it is not restricted to a single opinion when faced with a particular legal issue without any alternatives.  Instead, if at any time or for any issue, the opinion of a particular imam becomes difficult for the Muslim community to follow, it is able to find relief, leniency, and ease in another opinion, according to (its own) legal evidences.  There is no difference in this regard between matters of worship, commerce, family, justice, or crime.

This second type of difference in opinion, i.e. juristic differences, does not represent a deficiency in our religion, nor does it diminish anything from it.  These differences are inevitable!  In fact, there is not a single community that has a complete legal system based on fiqh (jurisprudence) and ijtihad that is free from juristic and scholarly disagreements.

In reality, this type of difference in opinion is inevitable because the sacred texts are often open to more than one interpretation.  Additionally, it is impossible for the sacred texts to be inclusive of all possible situations.  The reason for this, as indicated by some scholars (may God have mercy on them), is that the sacred texts are finite in their quantity, while there is no limit to the types of situations (that may occur).  Therefore, it becomes inevitable (for the jurist) to resort to qiyas (analogical reasoning) and to analyze the operative causes behind various rulings, the intent of the Lawgiver, and the general objectives of Islamic Law, and then to apply them to new cases and situations.  This is where differences arise, due to the understanding of scholars, and what they see preponderant among various possibilities.  As a result, they reach different conclusions regarding the same issue.  All of them seek and aim for the truth, but the one who reaches the right conclusion gets two rewards (from God), while the one who is mistaken gets a single reward.  This is what creates room and removes hardship!

What is deficient about the existence of such scholarly differences, whose virtue and mercy we have clarified?  In fact, they are a blessing and a mercy from God for his faithful servants.  At the same time, they constitute a tremendous juristic treasure, so unique that it behooves the Muslim community to be proud of it.  Yet, the misguiding forces in foreign countries take advantage of the ignorance of some young Muslims, especially those who are studying there.  They distort the image of this juristic disagreement as if it was theological disagreement, thereby claiming that there is inconsistency within Islamic Law.  They fail to realize the difference between the two types of disagreements.  Indeed, there is a huge difference between the two!

Secondly, regarding those who call for a moratorium of the juristic schools of thought, wishing to convert everyone to their new brand of ijtihad, and vilifying all, or some, of the existing juristic schools and their imams – the foregoing discussion regarding the virtues of these juristic schools and their imams should be sufficient for them to restrain themselves from this hateful methodology that they pursue as a means to misguide people, disunite them, and split their ranks.  In these times, when we are faced with incredible challenges from the enemies of Islam, we are in dire need for unity among our ranks, not this divisive call.

May God bless our master Muhammad, his family, and his companions, and grant them abundant peace.  All praises are due to God, the Lord of the worlds.

Signatories:

President:
Abdul Aziz b. Abdullah b. Baz

Vice President:
Dr. Abdullah Umar Nasif

Members:
Abdullah b. Abdul Rahman al-Bassam
Dr. Bakr Abdullah Abu Zayd
Muhammad b. Jubayr
Mustafa Ahmad al-Zarqa
Muhammad b. Abdullah b. Sabbil
Salih b. Fawzan al-Fawzan
Muhammad Rashid Raghib Qabbani
Abu al-Hasan al-Nadwi
Muhammad Mahmud al-Sawwaf
Dr. Ahmad Fahm Abu Sunnah
Abu Bakr Jawmi
Muhammad al-Shadhili al-Nayfar
Muhammad Salim b. Abdul Wadud
Muhammad al-Habib b. al-Khawja

Correspondant:
Dr. Talal Umar Bafaqih

When Can A Mufti Refuse to Answer a Question?

1. The Situation Being Asked About Does Not Exist.

Often times, the questioner (mustafti), will approach the scholar and ask him a question involving a scenario which has not yet happened. Sometimes the question may make assumptions which can result in changes to the situation that would affect the legal outcome in ways that are as of yet unforeseen. Other times, it can simply be a ridiculous question not worthy of the time and effort of the legal scholar due to its non-reality, or low likelihood of becoming a reality.

Examples of such questions are:

“If we find out that there are aliens on other planets, do we need to give them da’wah to Islam?”

“If there was water on Mars, but the color of the water was slightly tainted, but I didn’t know what it was, and if we had drinking water but had to conserve it, should I make tayyammum or use the Mars water after a water filter?”

And so on.

Though we find that the Hanafi ‘ulama who, in contrast to the Maliki scholars, did not shy away from answering theoretical questions in order to ensure that future situations could be dealt with in case they arose, this is still a valid reason why a Mufti could simply refuse to answer a question.

Theoretical questions can often arise from the inquisitive mind which seeks to understand the deen and provide solutions for people, but can also arise when a person has become so involved in academia and issues of knowledge, that the focus on action, practicality, and implementation of knowledge has taken a backseat.

As questioners, we should be wary not to burden a scholar with a question which has no bearing on practical reality, and might be a waste of time and energy. Furthermore, it is always a good check for ourselves to identify what kinds of questions we intend to ask our teachers. Are they questions that are simply “intellectual gymnastics”? Are they questions to which we already know the answers? Knowing the nature of our own questions will help us stay away from frivolous intellectual pursuits, and from asking unproductive questions to the scholars.

2. The Questioner Seeks to Follow His Desires or Cause Confusion (Amongst the People)

In situations in which the scholar feels that the questioner is “Fatwa Shopping,” or that he/she is asking questions in order to bring about debate or argumentation of sensitive issues within the community, the scholar can also refuse to answer or respond to a question.

What is “fatwa shopping”? Well, Islamic Law is primarily studied around the four established schools (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali). Students of knowledge who have studied under teachers who are experts in the process of extracting Law from the Texts can in certain circumstances, venture between the schools for particular acts based on their understanding of the fundamentals and methods of Islamic Law and the source texts.

The advice often given to the layman and novice students is to stick to a trustworthy source of knowledge when seeking advice or legal opinions. Often times however, due to the availability of various opinions, instead of aiming to seek the most reliable opinion, a person may try to ask every scholar available, waiting until he/she finds the most lenient scholar who might give the easiest possible answer.

The aim of the person is not to find the opinion that is the most reliable or the most in line with what the Prophet (ﷺ) might have responded. The aim becomes to play battleship with the issue, until he/she hears a yes. Although Islamic Law aims to bring about ease for people in general, as stated by Ibn al-Qayyim, the intention here is to seek permissibility, not to seek the truth. If the scholar recognizes such a situation or has reason to believe that such intention exists, he may decide to refuse to answer a question.

A second related reason is when a person may ask a question in a gathering aiming to bring about a controversial answer that in a particular gathering, which may lead to debate or argumentation. For example, knowing that there is a diverse crowd from different theological schools within Ahl as-Sunnah or from different orientations in a group, a person may ask specific pointed questions aiming to bring about debate, about `aqeedah, minutiae of fiqh which may confuse the audience, or other subjects.  Especially when the topic of the lecture, gathering, or class may be about something entirely unrelated, such a question may be put aside for personal discussion in order to prevent harm or inappropriate debate in a public forum.

3. It Will Lead to Greater Harm

If anwsering a question may lead to greater harm, the Mufti may refuse to answer the question or give a fatwa. Situations may exist that are related to politics (war, defense, political participation), family issues (divorce, abortion, rape), or financial matters, in which, if the Mufti were to answer with a public fatwa that is meant for the consumption of a large group of people or community, it may lead to conflict, family separation, or extreme financial hardship for the one affected.

This scenario is different from Reasons 1 and 2 in that Islamic Law inherently possesses a mechanism to try and bring about ease and a practical resolution of difficult political, family, and financial matters. However, it may be that a Mufti’s personal legal opinion may lean towards a stricter opinion that would bring about extreme hardship or even a person’s leaving Islam. In this case, he may refuse to answer the question and pass it on to another scholar who may be able to provide a solution to such a situation.

Part III (next time): What are the Requirements for the One Asking the Question?