Sitting in the mosque board meeting, as one issue after another was raised, I’ll confess it was difficult not to drift into my own thoughts. However, one issue was raised that caught my attention that was, perhaps not surprisingly, the issue of finance and fundraising: the mosque needed funds for refurbishing the ablution (wuḍu) area. Without much progress being made, I identified a possible source, although it was not problem-free. The source I suggested had a large proportion earned from unlawful sources; however, there was an opinion within Fiqh (jurisprudence), which allowed the utilisation of such funds for public good (maslaḥa).¹ This objection was fairly raised by some, but as I started to explain how there was a scholarly opinion – “Forget the scholars!! We only follow the Qur’ān and Sunnah,” shouted a fellow member, whom I found uncharacteristic since this brother seemed to be a calm person. He then explained how Muslims should follow the Qur’ān and Sunnah only and leave aside the scholars to their own mumblings. Unfortunately (or perhaps fortunately) he was older, held a more senior position than me, and most definitely had a louder voice than me and thus the saying “might makes right” had full effect. I looked down; although they took on my suggestion, I was somewhat frustrated at the rather superficial understanding of Islam this brother manifested. He was a brother of good character and a person who usually has a very pleasant demeanour, yet even he, when it came to Fiqh, could not escape this intolerant attitude.

This article aims to briefly take a look at the claim of some who say that they follow nothing but the “Qur’ān and Sunnah” or only the “Qur’ān and ṣaḥīḥ Ḥadīth.”

What is the purpose of this slogan? By merely using this term it seems a person alleges that any community member who does not affiliate with their group or understanding is not following the Qur’ān and Sunnah. When a person juxtaposes a valid legal (Fiqhī) opinion you’re following with “but you should follow the Qur’ān and Sunnah,” it implies that you aren’t. This attitude suggests truth is the monopoly of his/her group and the rest of the people are doomed.

What this also shows is that a person who takes this stance shows a lack of understanding of the process, by which the primary sources – the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth – are interpreted, and through which conclusions are reached.

Understanding How the Scholars Understand (fahm)

Look at the following diagram:

Figure 1

The primary sources in Islam are the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth, both which originate from Allāh. Whilst the Qur’ān is directly from Allāh using His words, the Ḥadīth is relayed to us through the words of the Prophet ﷺ though the meaning is from Allāh. These words are then recorded in the form of a text, thus both the primary sources are texts. These texts are then understood by scholars/jurists/interpreters in efforts to decipher what God intended.² This forms what is known as ‘fiqh’.³

One Understanding

Now in some issues (A – Ijmā’), there is only one understanding, one fiqh (as indicated by the red key colour in fig. 1). This means that the whole community of jurists are certain that what they have understood is actually what God intended. This is because either:

• The primary sources are clear-cut (Qaṭ’ī) in both their authenticity (thubūth) and meaning (dalāla). For example: the belief in monotheism, in the hereafter, the fact that the five daily prayers are Farḍ (obligatory).
• The primary sources are unclear (Dhannī) in either their authenticity or meaning, however a clear (ṣarīḥ), legitimate and genuine consensus has been reached. This means that there is a consensus and not just a claim of consensus.⁴ Yet such issues of agreement form the exceptions rather than the norm, as a brief look at any encyclopaedia of Fiqh proves. Based on this, Ibn Hazm explains how consensus is often erroneously claimed.⁵ What is interesting is that Ibn Hazm himself, may Allāh reward him, seems to fall into this error when he drew up his own list of issues in which he thought a consensus had been reached.⁶ Ibn Taymiyya later followed up Ibn Hazm’s list of issues of alleged consensus, and showed some areas in which Ibn Hazm erroneously claimed a consensus, when there was in fact none.⁷

Thus in such issues everyone is “following the Qur’ān and Sunnah,” therefore repeatedly chanting “only Qur’ān and Sunnah” is made redundant.

Many Understandings

Most issues however have a wide range of scholarly understandings (fig. 1. B – Ikhtilāf, the different views indicated by the different colours), all of which do go back to the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth. These varying views may be due to several reasons, which can be summarised into the following⁸:

• While the sources that relate to the particular ruling are agreed upon, the understanding of that Ḥadīth differs; hence it is the fahm (understanding) that is leading to the Ikhtilāf (difference of opinion). A clear example of this during the time of the companions is the incident of the ^cAṣr prayers at Banī Qurayẓa.⁹
• The source in relation to that issue is differed over, due to reasons such as a dispute in authenticity, or whether it was abrogated or not, or whether it is related directly to the issue under discussion.¹⁰ Thus whilst some jurists use a certain Ḥadīth and base rulings on it, others do not due to the aforementioned reasons.

Less Than Certain – Still No Rebuking
Sometimes jurists are not 100% certain that what they have understood or the ruling that they have arrived at is actually what Allāh had intended. This follows the process as:

1. Their understanding/views are all based on a sound interpretation (Ijtihād);
2. The primary sources are not clear-cut, which means Allāh deliberately did not reveal His will clearly;¹¹
3. There is no other means of verifying the will of Allāh other than through understanding the primary sources, since revelation has ceased with the demise of the Prophet ﷺ.

No one can condemn another for holding a valid view. “There is no inkār (rebuking) in matters of ikhtilāf¹²” and “an Ijtihād is not made redundant by another Ijtihād¹³”. This means that such differences will always exist and no amount of insistence on “ṣaḥīḥ Ḥadīth” will help unify them.

Is There A Way To Certainty In Such Issues?

No. The only situation in which one can be fully certain (Yaqīnan) that he is on the correct opinion in issues to which the primary sources are less than clear-cut, is if they receive further clarification from God. This is known as revelation (waḥi). Now this happened with the Prophet ﷺ when he made an Ijtihād and decided to take ransom from the captives of the battle of Badr. The companion Abu Bakr (ra) agreed with the Prophet ﷺ but `Umar (ra) disagreed. Allāh agreed with `Umar (ra) and made this known to the Prophet ﷺ using stern words (Qur’ān, 8:67-68) which caused the Prophet ﷺ and Abu Bakr (ra) to weep. As the Prophet ﷺ is no longer with us, and there is no prophet coming after him, this medium of clarification from God has ended, and thus no one can claim such an authority. And even if they did, they would have gone against clear-cut (Qaṭ’ī) texts, which negate such a possibility (i.e. wahi) after the Prophet ﷺ and thus anyone claiming this would be committing blasphemy and render their Imān (faith) void.

Points to Consider

There are several points,¹⁴ which are worth keeping in mind so that the simple notion of “only Qur’ān and Sunnah” can be avoided.

1. An Oversimplified Perception

If all that has been mentioned is understood, then it is simple to see how futile it is to continuously hurl the slogan of “only the Qur’ān and ṣaḥīḥ Ḥadīth¹⁵” especially in matter of difference of opinion (disregarding the reasons as to why the differences arose in the first place¹⁶). Indeed as Ibn Taymiyya stated,¹⁷ such differences arise rarely because the scholars based their opinion on whim or arbitrarily formed rulings. If that was the case, then chanting “ṣaḥīḥ Ḥadīth” is understandable, as one would think, “if only they knew of the Ḥadīth, then all differences will cease.” However this is not the case, thus it is useless to suggest that by following the Qur’ān and ‘ṣaḥīḥ’ Ḥadīth, all differences will cease.

Consequently, every time someone acts upon an opinion about which the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth are not clear, they are following an understanding of someone. This person can be a scholar or a non-scholar. Thus Ḥanafis, Mālikis, Ḥanbalis and Shāfi’īs are simply being honest when they admit that they are following one understanding of the primary sources out of many. However the person who refuses to adhere to the legal schools mentioned, nor admits to following any other scholar/jurist, but instead claims to follow the Qur’ān and Sunnah directly, and independently, the question remains: whose understanding are they following?¹⁸

2. Pretentious Certainty

Moreover what this also shows is that if someone, a scholar or non-scholar, gives the impression that their view regarding a dhannī (unclear) matter, is somehow objectively the only correct view, that somehow they have by-passed the ‘fahm’ as indicated in fig. 1 above, and have approached the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth directly as they may say, then one should be cautious of this person’s methodology, as this is impossible. His opinion is only one of many (as indicated by the different colours in fig. 1).  One cannot deny history, or the natural human process of interpretation. Every text thus approached and every ruling issued, was achieved by the human agent through interpretation. If one is not a prophet, then one cannot claim to have just ‘known.’ This means that there must be a methodology upon which such an understanding was based on. It is vital that we know what this methodology is to see the logic and evidence of the said opinion. If this is the case, and this person is denying this very human aspect then either:

• They themselves are unaware of their methodology and somehow think that they are actually approaching the texts ‘directly,’ similar to how Prophets receive information disconnected to history and context.
• They are either knowingly or unknowingly (good opinion obliges us to hold the former) hiding their methodology, to inject their opinion with an aura of false objectivity, and through this they wish to acquire more followers. In other words, to put it in bluntly, it is merely a marketing ploy.¹⁹

An Example

This attitude also seems to manifest itself towards how people approach the text Fiqh al-Sunnah. It is as if many people have misunderstood the purpose of the text and think this is literally what the title suggests, “The understanding of the Sunnah” without the human agent or fahm. Yet this is belied by the fact that the author, Sayyid Sabiq, states various understandings when he covers the many different issues. Thus to take this book as representing the ‘real Sunnah,’ and to take for example the Ḥanafī text Mukhtaṣar al-Qudūrī or the Maliki text Mukhtaṣar al-Khalīl as being ‘biased’ shows that one clearly fails to understand the dynamics of text-understanding, since if this applies to all human beings, it surely applied to the author of Fiqh al-Sunnah.²⁰ The blame in such a case however, rests on the reader and not on the author. One must be careful of a fetish for certainty in an area that offers none. Such indulgences are as bad as the desire for speculation in an area which is clear-cut

1. The Secondary and Tertiary sources

Another obvious fact that seems to be ignored when one insists everything must be mentioned from the primary sources explicitly is the negation of several other sources, secondary and tertiary. The fact is that everything is not explicitly mentioned in the primary texts (Qur’an and Sunnah). A quick look at the Islamic Juristic legacy shows that not only were there primary sources, but based on this, there were also secondary sources of authority – Consensus (Ijmā’) and Analogy (Qiyās) as well several tertiary sources. Moreover, there were different maxims developed after scholars’ surveyed different rulings in order to facilitate the jurist to encompass them with ease. This attitude also overlooks the highly developed maqāsid (teleological) theories of Islamic law by the likes of scholars such as imām al-Shatibi.

2. Ḥasan Ḥadīth

Lastly, when one insists on accepting nothing short of ṣaḥīḥ Ḥadīth, it implies the non-acceptance of another category of Ḥadīth, which is below the ṣaḥīḥ in authenticity, although is still used for purposes of law. This “lower classed” type of Ḥadīth is known as the Ḥasan Ḥadīth.

Is This Really Relevant?

Yes. This subject is relevant since if it was only ‘a few brothers in the mosque’ adopting such an attitude it could easily be avoided or changed. Yet it is worrying when one tunes into Islamic channels to find ‘accepted scholars’ pushing this line of thinking, helping to create a culture of narrow-mindedness and bigotry. It is not surprising that some of the masses are adopting this very attitude. So one is left to think that the TV scholar’s is the only authentic opinion, and the rest are baseless or weak. But this has many negative sociological problems, from breaking the unity in the mosque, to causing rifts within the family, and eventually creating a community at war with each other. Ultimately it means the Muslim community becomes what Prophet Ibrahim supplicated against: from becoming “a fitna²¹ for the Non-Muslims” (Qur’ān, 60:5) as their social discord projects Islam as a backward and intolerant faith.

If one hears someone adopting such an attitude it may help to remain cautious, ask them if there is a difference of opinion on the matter, and the basis of such a difference. One may also want to ask another scholar of a different orientation in order to maintain a balance and not become a fanatic (muta’aṣṣib).

Conclusion

The purpose of this short paper was not to attack specific members of the Muslim community or specific groups. It was rather to highlight an unhealthy trend that breeds a culture of intolerance. Finally it was to highlight and emphasise the fact that legal differences in dhannī matters are part and parcel of Islam, and simply insisting on following ṣaḥīḥ Ḥadīth will not decrease this. The jurists of the past and present, either directly or indirectly, ultimately base their understandings on the Qur’ān and Sunnah, hence it is nothing short of self-delusional to think it’s the luxury of a few individuals in exclusion to the rest.

Usul al-Fiqh Series: Part I

Primer in Conceptualizing Usul al-Fiqh

The following series is intended to introduce usul al-fiqh in a systematic manner. In this section, we will introduce some key concepts that outline briefly what usul al-fiqh is about, what is beneficial about this science, and why it is important.

Defining and Describing Usul al-Fiqh

Usul al-fiqh is the body of knowledge which clarifies the various research methods and principles that aid us in understanding the Qur’an and Sunnah and it shows us how to derive benefit from them.

Secondly, usul al-fiqh outlines for us what is a proof in the Shar’iah, why it is considered a proof and how to understand how to properly work with proofs especially when they are unclear in meaning and or when they appear to contradict each other.

Thirdly, it teaches us the appropriate means by which we can derive rulings from the Qur’an and Sunnah – rulings that guide human action by determining if an act is:

1. Prohibited            (haram)
2. Disliked               (makruh)
3. Obligatory            (wajib)
4. Recommended     (mandub, mustahab)
5. Permissable         (mubah)

Fourthly, usul al-fiqh outlines for us the rules that govern the patterned way the Arabic language works in the Qur’an and the Sunnah so that we know what is being communicated to us and we understand how to properly interpret them based on linguistic or textual evidence.

The process of understanding the primary sources and extracting from them guidance and ruling in a systematic manner is called ijtihad (independent research).

Benefits of Usul al-Fiqh

Usul al-fiqh gives us a research framework for understanding the language of the Qur’an and Sunnah and how to use the various types of evidences in a manner in which they serve as a guide to our Islamic practices and belief. By understanding usul al-fiqh as a research methodology, we also come to understand how scholars construct their positions through the use of evidences found in the Arabic language or in the Qur’an and Sunnah.

Through usul al-fiqh, we also learn that positions that are not constructed by referring to the principles and means found in the sciences are positions which are not considered acceptable to follow, because they are constructed and concluded without properly attending to acceptable research methodology and therefore have no binding authority. Authoritative positions in Islam are only concluded and constructed by way of proper research techniques. These techniques guide research by outlining what constitutes a source for research and what principles are to be used to understand that source. Furthermore, the techniques emphasize how, when, and why a rule is derived from that source under research and what qualifications must he or she possess as a researcher in order to qualify for such an undertaking.

Goal of Usul al-Fiqh

Usul al-fiqh helps us to develop the proper research skills and mental frame that allow us to have a systematic understanding (research method) necessary to properly comprehend the Qur’an and Sunnah. It supplies us with the necessary tools for engaging in ijtihad and developing not only legal minds and juristic capacity, but the mind capable of properly interpreting the source texts of Islam and applying them to life. In short, the goal of usul al-fiqh is ijtihad (independent reasoning, research).

Framing Usul al-Fiqh: Three Primary Concerns of the Science

There are 3 key areas of study in the science of usul al-fiqh:

These key areas of study are focused studies, which clarify the following themes.

Qualities of the Mujtahid:

By understanding these criteria we understand who is skilled and qualified in matters of scholarship versus who is not. The person not skilled in and qualified to practice ijtihad is known in usul al-fiqh literature as a muqalid.  The muqalid is a person not qualified to engage in independent investigation because he lacks the qualifications, meaning that he has not mastered the principles of research methodology. Consequently, this category of persons is obligated to follow the research of those who are qualified to research, but he is encouraged to make an effort to learn and understand with time and gradually how scholars come to conclusions and the reasoning governing their positions.

Linguistic Indications:

The Arabic language is governed by usages and patterns. Upon understanding these, it is possible to conclude what is being indicated by a particular pattern. For simplicity’s sake, we only refer to those indications which tell us if a ruling is a command to do something or not do something, or if the pattern only recommends to do or not to do an action, or just leaves the matter up to decision. There are other patterns found in the Arabic language that refer to understanding if a matter is general or specific, but we will suffice with mentioning that the language is governed by patterns which must be understood in order to conclude their meaning.

Rules for Dealing with Proofs:

In usul al-fiqh we also learn how to weigh, rank and distinguish between proofs by determining their strength and relationship to other proofs and principles. When an apparent conflict arises among these proofs, the scholar must understand how to reconcile these proofs. Upon determining that the proofs cannot be reconciled after thorough and long investigation, it may be determined that one of the two proofs is to be abrogated. The rules governing the process of ranking, reconciliation, and abrogation when working with evidences are a major concern of usul al-fiqh and this is an area wherein only the most skilled of scholarship can maneuver and show itself.

Key Questions:

1. What is the goal of usul al-fiqh?
2. Why is usul al-fiqh important?
3. What are the 3 main areas of study in usul al-fiqh?
4. Why is it proper to have methodology in understanding the Qur’an and Sunnah?
5. Who is the person that can independently research the Qur’an and Sunnah?
6. Can a person research the Qur’an and Sunnah without understanding the criteria that determines research and the researcher?

Principle 1: Have a sincere, unwavering intention.  Prophet Muhammad ﷺ said, “each person will be rewarded for what he intended” (Muslim). This calls for determination in the heart to continuously act or to abstain from something only for God’s sake. A sign of having sincere intentions is that one does not change his resolve for fleeting reasons; what is done for God, the Truth, should not be forsaken to please His creation.

Principle 2: Work purely for God, (the One) without partners or associates. Prophet Muhammad ﷺ said: “worship God as though you see Him, but if you do not see Him (know that) He sees you” (Muslim). A sign of working purely for God is to not accept anything except the truth, and to see everything else besides the truth as vain and fleeting. As the prophet ﷺ said, “Let the slave of the dinar perish” (Bukhari). One should also beware of falling into doubtful matters. As Prophet Muhammad ﷺ: “Leave what is doubtful for what is not doubtful” (Tirmidhi and Nasa’i).

Principle 3: Align one’s desires with the guidelines and rulings of the Shari`ah (Islamic law). Be patient in times of hardship and difficulty, when struggling with personal desires, and in avoiding sinful acts and pleasures. Whoever practices this regularly reaches a state whereby he is in his sleep as if he were awake [worshipping], in his mixing with people as if he were in seclusion, in his fulfillment as if he were hungry, in his pride as if he were humiliated, and in talking to others as if he were silent.

Principle 4: Base one’s actions on following [the prophet’s way and scholarly opinions], and not on innovation. This prevents the following of one’s own desires and becoming proud of one’s own opinion. Surely, a person who takes himself as his own ruler will not succeed.

Principe 5: Have high ambitions, and do not procrastinate. It is said: “do not leave today’s work until tomorrow,” because actions are built on each another; and whoever is content with a lower [status] will be deprived of a higher one.

Principle 6: Be aware of one’s incapability and insignificance. This is not referring to laziness in worship or lack of productivity in work. It is about realizing that one is not capable of doing any action without support from God, the Most Capable, and Most Generous. This awareness is also manifested in viewing other people with respect and reverence, for people are means and helpers of one another on the path to God, the Exalted and Most Bountiful.

Principle 7: Have fear and hope, and do not be sure that your good deeds are accepted until you have witnessed this [on the day of Judgment]. One should have hope not because of the good deeds themselves, but because God Himself is the Most Benevolent and Generous.

Principle 8: Be consistent in one’s wird (regular litany of worship), for the one without a wird does not have additional source of support from God.  With a wird, the soul opens up in public and private; it becomes more mindful of the rights of others; it increases in loving and hating for others what it loves or hates for itself.  Also, having that wird makes one work more for God in order to please Him, just as a person would love that God does for him what he finds pleasing.

Principle 9: Be constantly observant of your actions and do not stray away from the remembrance of God even the blink of an eye. For the one who is always observant of his heart for the sake of God, and does not let other than God enter his heart besides, is one who has truly found God, experienced His Benevolence, and has reached ‘ilm al-yaqeen (certain knowledge). This is manifested in seeing God as the Enabler or Mover of everything that remains still or in motion around us. One’s mindfulness then increases from there until he recognizes that God is the Sustainer of everything, so His interaction with the creation is characterized by the best of manners. (Exemplifying this), the Prophet ﷺ said: “My Lord taught me good manners, and He gave me the best of manners.”

Principle 10: Know what one should be occupied with, both internally and externally for whoever thinks that he is not in need of obeying [God and His messenger] is a broke man who is in opposition to God’s words: “…Say ‘If you love Allah, then follow me, Allah will love you’ ”(Qur’an 3:31).  This is the foundation upon which have been built castles like no other.

This was a joint session at the UK Islamophobia Conference in Birmingham April 2011.

by Abdullah Hasan

Someone once said that a nation can wage perpetual war for perpetual peace. Absurd isn’t it? Well, recently a so-called progressive, democratic nation decided to “enforce freedom” by taking away a woman’s right to wear the niqab.

The French ban on face veils, which took effect yesterday, legislates what a French citizen can wear in public, and invokes the coercive power of law to impose such legislation.

As David Allen Green says in the New Statesman: “Of course, to use the criminal law in such a way is illiberal and inappropriate. It may well be that, in extreme cases, the law should intervene to prevent the use of disguises for criminal activity. There are those who believe public nakedness should be banned on the basis of public decency. But any use of criminal law to govern the wearing of certain clothes, regardless of any question of criminality or decency, must be a disproportionate interference with a person’s legitimate autonomy.”

I couldn’t agree more with this sentiment. It is quite ironic that a country that promotes pluralism, a concept deeply rooted in secularism, attacks a minority of its population expressing their freedom of choice to wear what they want to wear. It was the religious and cultural intolerance of the papacy during the reformation periods that gave way to the emergence of the concept of secularism and pluralism. Has Mr. Sarkozy forgotten his own history?

But then I guess this is the flawed and quirky understanding of pluralism, where only the strongest group in society determines the cultural identity; hence the survival-of-the-fittest ideology comes into effect. If you want to use Mr. Bush’s language, “You either follow my way in everything or don’t get to have a way at all.”

Islam, through the concept of the maqasid al-shari`ah (maxims of sacred law), promotes a fair and just concept of pluralism. The five objectives of the shari`ah are: protection of religion, protection of the self, protection of wealth, protection of the intellect, and protection of honour. These engender all citizens, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, irrespective of their financial or political influence, the right to determine how they wish to live within the limits stipulated by God, the Supreme and the Sublime Master and Creator of the universe.

Islam protects the rights of non-Muslims to maintain their own cultural identity under the shari`ah. Below<sup>1</sup> is a brief and cursory look into how the shari`ah protects the rights of non-Muslims under the Caliphate (a governance based on Islamic principles):

Protection from Outside Aggression: Non-Muslims have equal rights with Muslims in this regard. The Islamic governments must protect all its citizens, including minority non-Muslim groups, from outside aggression. It is stated in the Hanbali book of fiqh (jurisprudence), Matalib Ula An-Nuha: “The ruler of the Muslim community is bound to protect the non-Muslims and to save them from aggression. Should they fall into captivity, the imam [religious leader] must marshal all resources to secure their release and punish the aggressors against their lives and properties, even if they were the sole (non-Muslim) living in a remote village.”²

Protection from Inside Oppression: There are many verses, and more specifically prophetic instructions, on obliging the Muslims to protect and not harm their fellow non-Muslim citizens. The Prophet ﷺ (peace be upon him) said: “Those who commit an act of aggression against a member of the non-Muslims, who usurp his rights, who make any demand upon him which is beyond his capacity to fulfil, or who forcibly obtain anything from him against his wishes, I will be [the oppressed]’s advocate on the Day of Judgement.”³

The Prophet ﷺ also said, “I will be the opponent of one who harms a non-Muslim, and I will speak against those whom I oppose on the Day of Judgement.”⁴

He said in another hadith, “He who harms a non-Muslim harms me, and he who harms me, harms Allah.”⁵

Protection of Persons and Lives: Muslims agree that the lives, blood, wealth, and honour of the non-Muslims living among them are inviolate. The Prophet ﷺ said, “He who kills a mu’ahid [non-Muslim living amongst Muslims] will never smell the fragrance of paradise, the fragrance of which can be smelled from a distance of 40-year travel.”⁶

Protection of Property: Besides protecting the life of the non-Muslim, the Islamic state is bound to protect his property. Imam Abu Yusuf, in his book Al-Kharaj, has quoted the Prophet’s contract with the people of Najran: “Najran and its neighbouring area [are] in the security of Allah and His Messenger. The property, religion and churches of the inhabitants, as well as all possessions, whether much or little, are under the protection of the Prophet ﷺ.”⁷

Freedom of Embracing a Religion: Just as it preserves other rights of non-Muslims, Islam also protects their right to embrace a religion of their own choice. The Qur’an unequivocally states that Muslims cannot coerce people to embrace Islam.

Allah says, “There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion. The right course has become clear from the wrong…” (Qur’an, 2:256)

And He says, “[…] would you compel the people in order that they become believers?” (Qur’an, 10:99)

In addition to the covenant made by the Prophet ﷺ with the Christians of Najran, which placed them under the protection of Allah and His Prophet ﷺ and provided for the safeguarding of their wealth, religion and churches, the one made by `Umar ibn al-Khattab with the citizens of Iliya’ (Jerusalem) stated the Islamic ethos in regards to dealing with other religious groups: “This is the protection which the servant of Allah, `Umar ibn al-Khattab, the commander of the faithful extends to them (non-Muslims): “The safeguarding of their lives, property, churches, crosses, and of their entire community. Their churches are not be occupied, demolished, or damaged, nor are their crosses or anything belonging to them to be touched. They will not be forced to abandon their religion, nor will they be harmed…”⁸

Dress of non-Muslims: Under the Islamic law, non-Muslims are not obliged to wear the attire of the Muslims, nor will the state oblige them to conform to a specific dress code. The narrations from certain companions and Muslim leaders of the past obliging non-Muslims to wear certain colours or types of clothing should be understood in the light of social dictates and the needs of a given society as we have today that each profession in a society has its own specific dress, and not that Islam compels them to wear a particular clothing they may not desire.

The French ban of the face veil only demonstrates how some of the countries in the West are exhibiting an intolerant nature toward Muslims. If Mr. Sarkozy and others wish to promote freedom, democracy and liberty, then this move is very antithetical to these principles. This does nothing but give rise to the far-right and Islamophobia.

“Many secularists and liberals would prefer a world where individuals do not want to hide their faces a part of their social interactions; many secularists and liberals would welcome a world without any face veils. But for such a world to be imposed by legal force makes it a secular and liberal world not worth striving for.”⁹

I hope the French public will see how detrimental this is to their liberty and freedom.

Books of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) usually begin with the chapter of purification (al-ṭahāra), but rarely do they dwell upon its inner aspects and spiritual dimensions. They then move on to prayer, its prerequisites, its pillars, its required actions, its recommended actions, its manners, its disliked actions, and actions that invalidate it. However, they do not discuss the internal states that should be adhered to during prayer. An example of this is the absence of discussions on how one can attain khushūʿ (deep concentration) in prayer, and what actions lead to its realization. This is despite the fact that it is recognized as a type of knowledge that will be among the first to be removed from the earth.

With that in mind, when we reflect upon the science that best completes and complements the study of fiqh, we immediately think of the science of taṣawwuf. It is the science that examines actions of the heart, such as sincerity, and the way to obtain it. It certainly develops within the individual the ability to follow the rulings detailed in fiqh. After all, a person’s commitment to fiqh rulings is intertwined with the state of their spiritual development. Usually, knowledge of Allah allows a person to taste the sweetness of belief and results in a stronger commitment to following His commands. Thus, it is very misguided for those who belittle taṣawwuf to think that the spiritual journey towards Allah is associated with trying to escape from the adherence of His rulings. How can that be possible when Allah said to the Prophet ﷺ:

“Then We put you, [O Muhammad], on an ordained way concerning the matter [of religion]; so follow it and do not follow the inclinations of those who do not know.” (Qur’an, 45:18)

This is also why (Imam) Junayd said about a group of people who associated reaching (the heights of one’s relationship with) Allah with not following the rulings of shari’ah: “Yes, they’ve reached, but they’ve reached Hell.” The scholars of old used to say, “If someone studies fiqh and not taṣawwuf, they will become corrupt; and if they study tasawwuf and not fiqh, they will become heretics. They will achieve their desired goal only if they study both fiqh and taṣawwuf.” Therefore, taṣawwuf is needed to complement the study of fiqh, and fiqh is necessary in the study of taṣawwuf to show what is allowed and what is not. Whoever neglects either of the two has missed half the point.

It is a big mistake if the two are separated from each other. This happens if the sufi strays far from the study of fiqh or if the jurist (faqīh) strays from the study of taṣawwuf. It can be avoided if the jurist studies – along with fiqh rulings – what is needed spiritually to adhere to those rulings. At the same time, the sufi should study what is required of him or her as related to fiqh rulings, and not stray from these rulings throughout his/her spiritual journey. For this reason some of the major scholars of sufism, like al-Rifāʿī said: “Verily the end goal of the scholars and the sufis is one.” We say this here because some ignorant people amongst the sufis threaten people by saying, “If one does not have a shaykh, then his shaykh is the shaytan.” Rather, Satan is the shaykh of the ignorant person who neither learns nor appreciates learning. As for the person who seeks Allah through gaining knowledge, his imam is knowledge itself, and the shari’ah.

In his book Principles of Tasawwuf, Shaykh Zarrūq discussed the concept of a seeker’s need for a shaykh. He said: “Taqwā does not need a shaykh to explain it… the intelligent one needs no more than the Qur’an to guide his or her spiritual progression, but they will not be safe from the weaknesses of their soul [without a spiritual guide].” Therefore, it is important that the person be capable of learning and implementing what they learn. This is the minimum that Allah obligated upon His servants. It can be accomplished by an able person learning and understanding through personal readings of reliable books, or it can be achieved by following one of the righteous scholars who practice what they preach – whether they are called “sufi” or not.

In conclusion, the sciences of fiqh and tasawwuf are complementary and necessary for every person. The amount of each that is needed will differ from person to person, but studying them in depth is obligatory for the community, and recommended for each individual.

Mistake #2: “The rules of Shari`ah should be constant and unchanging.”

On the opposite end of the spectrum of what was discussed in Part IV of this series are those who believe that the Shari`ah is a completely static and fixed entity.  Such people may scorn the idea of rulings of Shari`ah changing from one circumstance to another as ‘watering down Islam,’ or ‘changing Allah’s religion to please people.’  In a desire to protect religious practice from the whims of the lower self or from adulteration by modern-day trends, they may insist on applying the rulings of Shari`ah in the exact way they were articulated and practiced in the time of the early generations of Muslims, or the era of certain classical scholars and their students.  What is often overlooked here is that in one’s zeal to shield one’s religious practice from inappropriate change, one may actually be closing the doors on changes that the Shari`ah does in fact condone.  In lumping together all the rulings of Islamic law into one monolithic category – that of being fixed, independent of context, and the same through varying times and places – one is making Shari`ah overly rigid, in a way that is not faithful to its inherently balanced nature.  In this article we will discuss some of the means by which rulings of Shari`ah can legitimately change, seek to differentiate between rulings which are affected by contextual factors and those that are not, and clarify some misconceptions related to these points.

The Role of Culture and Custom in Shari`ah

Scholars of Usul distinguish between two types of rulings when considering whether cultural factors play a legitimate role in their development.  The first type are those rulings of Shari`ah that are constant, such as acts of worship, like prayer and the rites of Hajj, as well as commands and prohibitions that are clear and well-established by texts (al-m`alumu min ad-deeni bidarura), such as the obligation of mutual consent in contracts, the prohibition of the consumption of alcohol, a husband’s financial obligation to his wife, the obligation of hijab, and so on.¹ Matters of culture, custom, or factors related to time and place have no influence on the establishment of these rulings and they remain unvarying across history and geography.

The other type of rulings are those that, by their nature, must take into account the normative practices or customs of the people who are seeking to apply them.  An example of this can been seen in the rulings related to statements of divorce.  Whether a statement would be considered an overt expression of divorce (sareeh) or one that is ambiguous and connotes more than one meaning (kinaya) would depend on the customary usage of certain expressions and phrases in the language of a people.  Similarly, muru’ah, or the condition of uprightness necessary for the acceptance of one’s testimony, is determined in different ways in different places.  A man entering a public setting with his head uncovered would be a sign of immodesty and a lack of muru’ah in many traditional Eastern cultures, while in other places this would not be the case.  A third example can be seen in the command for believers to interact with others with ma`ruf, in a manner of goodness and excellence.  The exact actions one would commit and the particular words one may say to be considered behaving with ma`ruf would obviously vary, depending on the respective culture and situation.  These are all examples of rulings that are related to custom, and what is intended by the axiom that, “Common practices or customs of a people can be used as a legislative source for rulings.” (al-`aadatu muhakkamah).²

What is important to note here is that the Lawgiver, Allah the Exalted, has linked some rulings to context and situation (manat), and that this naturally leads to different manifestations of these rulings in different scenarios.  This does not mean, as some may presume, that one is deviating from the law itself, since these varying configurations are within the legitimate breadth of the original command or prohibition in question.  In the same way we find water a legitimate means of purification in some cases, and dust a legitimate means in others (in tayammum³), each depending on the circumstance, so too we find rulings applied in different ways according to context, while still maintaining the underlying directives intended.

In the examples mentioned above, we see that the underlying rules or directives of Shari`ah are not in any way challenged or altered.  The legal consequences of explicit and implicit statements of divorce remain the same.  The condition of muru’ah for a witness’s testimony remains intact, and the command for acting with ma`ruf remains constant.  However, it is in consideration of the relevant culture that a scholar assesses the situation and determines how these rulings can accurately be applied.

The Role of Maslaha in Shari`ah

A second means by which rulings may be subject to change or new rulings may be established is related to the concept of maslaha, or consideration of public interest.  Scholars may seek to establish a ruling with the objective of securing the well-being of a people, either by promoting some benefit for them or protecting them from some type of harm.

This method of legislation is limited to matters of ijtihad⁴, and excludes devotional matters (`ibadat) and issues that have been definitively established by authentic texts (qat`iyat).  Establishing this type of ruling also has certain conditions.  It must be in line with the objectives of the Lawgiver, have a realistic probability of bringing about the benefit intended to the general population, and be corroborated in some way by a definitive text or scholarly consensus.⁵ Some scholars, particularly of the Maliki and Hanbali schools, state that such a ruling would have proper grounds for legislation even if no indication about it exists in Shari`ah, as long as it does not conflict with any of the Shari`ah’s established values and principles.⁶ This is because the texts we have available to us are limited and fixed in number, while the varying and evolving situations of people are virtually limitless.

We find examples of this consideration of maslaha in the practice of even the earliest generations of Muslims, including the companions of the Prophet ﷺ.  Abu Bakr (may Allah be pleased with him) authorized the compilation of the Quran into one volume during his rule – something that was not done in the time of the Prophet ﷺ – after concern for its preservation intensified with the death of many of those who had memorized it.  Umar (may Allah be pleased with him) suspended the prescribed punishment for theft in a year of famine out of consideration for those who may have felt compelled to steal out of duress.  He intensified the punishment for drinking alcohol when many of the companions became concerned about its widespread acceptance, due to the influence of Persian culture.  He also ruled that three statements of divorce in one sitting would count as three separate divorces, in order to lay emphasis on the seriousness of such pronouncements.⁷ These were unprecedented rulings that were not seen in the earlier rule of Abu Bakr or the time of the Prophet.⁸ Uthman (may Allah be pleased with him) ruled that if a husband irrevocably divorced his wife on his deathbed with the intent of barring her from inheritance, she would still be granted her rightful share of the inheritance.  Ali (may Allah be pleased with him) would hold craftsmen and traders responsible for the loss of goods that were placed in their custody, in order to ensure greater care in safeguarding others’ property.⁹ A later example can be seen in the issue of accepting financial compensation for teaching Quran or acting as an imam or muezzin.  While Imam Abu Hanifa and his students Abu Yusuf and Shaybani prohibited people from doing so, later Hanafi scholars allowed it as a means to help preserve the Quran, and because such people were no longer provided for from the treasury of the Islamic state.¹⁰ When the circumstances changed, we find that the ruling changed as well.

From these points we can see that even in the earliest generations of Muslims, scholars had an interest in and sensitivity to the current trends and issues that were affecting their communities, and would issue their rulings in consideration of them.  The task of the scholar was not only to accurately derive rulings from textual sources, but to determine the best method of their application in a given situation, community, and culture, that would bring about the most benefit and minimize harm.  Such a task required sound knowledge not only of sacred texts, but also of context.

The Dilemma of Importing Fatwas

In light of the above, we can see why dependence on fatwas from abroad or from ages-old texts could, in some cases, be quite problematic.  A thorough understanding of the normative culture of a people is very important, particularly in matters of marriage, divorce, and other social issues.  While rulings on matters of ritual purification, prayer, fasting, and so on may be independent of context and therefore legitimately gleaned from qualified scholars in any locality or from any time period, this is not the case for many matters that we find pressing in our communities and families.  It is for this reason that the development of an indigenous scholarship in our times, that has a strong grounding the Islamic sciences as well as a deep and nuanced understanding of the environment in which their rulings will be applied, is vital.  An Arabic expression states, “the people of Mecca are most knowledgeable about its hills and valleys” – meaning that those who are native to a land are the most familiar with it and the best able to navigate its territory.  Similarly, scholars who are indigenous to a land and are currently living in it would be most adept at addressing its people’s concerns, problems, and issues.

The Question of Minority Fiqh¹¹ (Fiqh al-Aqalliyat)

Minority fiqh, or fiqh al-aqalliyyat, has been criticized by some as a means of illegitimately changing rulings to accommodate living in a non-Muslim environment.  While the term itself is relatively new, the concept of certain religious rulings changing according to context and environment is not something novel to Islamic jurisprudence, as we have clearly shown.  Having a category in fiqh that expressly relates to the concerns, questions, needs and difficulties that Muslims face as a minority – issues that are often not found in the traditional lands of Islam – should be seen as a specialization, and not a deviation.¹²

Conclusion

A desire to preserve Islam from unwarranted or illegitimate change is certainly something noble and commendable.  However, our concerns about such changes should not cause us to cling to a rigidity in our outlook that hinders Islam from being a viable, livable tradition in our times.  We should not relegate Islamic scholarship to a simple rehashing, translation, or transposition of the work of our forebears, but should give scholars of today the space to navigate and explore new and relevant issues of our times, using the legitimate means Shari`ah has granted.  This tradition of scholarship is one that needs to be enlivened, nourished and encouraged in our communities, so that the profound beauty of sacred law can become a reality by which we live our lives.

May Allah help us to understand and practice His religion in the best, most balanced, and most beautiful of ways.  May He bless our communities with leaders and scholars who can help us to live our lives in accordance to sacred law, and in a way that is pleasing to Him.  Ameen.

Mistake #4: “A daleel means a verse from the Qur’an or a hadith.” And, “If someone has daleel from the Qur’an and Sunnah for an issue, then there’s no room for differences of opinion.”

Here are some important points that must be understood before a person can competently discuss rulings of Shari’ah (Islamic law) and their respective daleels:

• A daleel may be something other than a verse from the Qur’an or a hadith (prophetic tradition).

The word daleel, often translated as proof or evidence, is defined in most books of Usul as an indication in the sources from which a practical ruling of Islamic law (hukm) can be deduced¹ While the Qur’an and Sunnah are the primary and most essential sources from which rulings of Shari’ah are derived, other legitimate sources do exist.  Scholarly consensus (ijmaa’) and analogical reasoning (qiyas) are two of the most widely recognized sources after the Qur’an and Sunnah, while there are a number of others on which scholarly disagreement has existed historically, such as consideration of public interest (istislah), custom (‘urf), juristic preference (istihsan), and so on.  It is from this body of sources that a scholar does istinbaat, or their legal deduction, to come to a ruling on a matter in Shari’ah.  Therefore, the word daleel may be referring to verses from the Qur’an or hadiths, or to one of these other sources, depending on the issue in question.

• Citing a verse from the Qur’an or a hadith as a daleel for an opinion does not necessarily mean that it is the solitary, definitive opinion on the issue.

It is important to understand that while a verse from the Qur’an or a sound hadith may be definitive, absolute and decisive in its authenticity, it may only be probabilistic (dhanni) in its evidentiary nature in relation to a certain issue.  For example, the verse in the Qur’an that details the method of performing wudu (Qur’an 5:6) is one that, obviously, no Muslim would question as being Divinely revealed, authentic and accurate.  However, because of the verse’s wording, variant legal opinions can legitimately be derived from it.  For this reason we find some scholars stating that it is obligatory to perform the steps of wudu in the order mentioned in the text, while others say that it is in fact not an obligation – both using this same exact verse as their daleel.² Most texts of the Qur’an and Sunnah are open to multiple interpretations in this way.  From this we can come to understand that when a Qur’anic verse or a hadith is used as a daleel for a particular opinion, that does not necessarily work to negate the other opinions on the same issue.

In the instances in which a Qur’anic verse or sound hadith is phrased in such a way that only one possible interpretation can be understood from it, then such a ruling would be considered authoritative and decisive.  However, in most cases, especially in relation to the issues we often find under discussion and debate in our communities, citing a verse from the Qur’an or a hadith as a daleel does not necessarily close the door on differences of opinion, as the same text can be interpreted in different ways by different scholars.

It may also be the case that a hadith that is cited as daleel for an opinion may not be definitive (qat’i) in its authenticity, such as those that are classified as aahad.³  In fact, as is implied by the name itself (aahad being the plural of ahad), what is intended here is any hadith that does not have the type or number of chains necessary to fulfill the requirements of tawattur, though they may be many in number. In such a scenario scholars may look at other sources and texts and weigh them more heavily in their analysis of the issue, and come to a conclusion that may seem to overlook or even contradict the hadith in question.  In this instance, such a hadith as a daleel would not make a ruling absolute or decisive, and would again leave room for other opinions to exist with their respective daleel.

• Extrapolating rulings from sacred texts is a complex process that requires knowledge and training.

It is further important to realize that though a Qur’anic verse or a hadith may seem clear and straight-forward in its meaning, we should not make the assumption that we can automatically derive legal rulings from it.  There are many factors that must be taken into consideration when determining such rulings.  When dealing with verses from the Qur’an, one must be well initiated into the various topics of ulum al-Quran (the sciences of the Qur’an) such as abrogation (naskh), specification of the text’s application by other verses or hadith (al-‘aam wal khaas), understanding it in light of other texts on the same subject or related subjects (istiqraa), and so on.  In terms of hadith, one must have some level of proficiency in the hadith sciences and the process of authentication.  In addition to this, one should have a level of mastery of the Arabic language in order to understand the linguistic implications of the grammar, word choice, etc. of the text in question, and a broader understanding of legal theory, which would include familiarity with the other legitimate sources from which the practical rules of Shari’ah can be derived, as well as other related Islamic sciences.

This is not to say that we cannot understand or benefit from the words of the Prophet (peace be upon him) or the Divine words of the Book of Allah.  However, this type of personal benefit is very different from the process of deducing rulings of Shari’ah, which we should defer to those with proper training and knowledge.  The seriousness of this enterprise is alluded to in the title of one of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s most famous books, I’laam al-Muwaqi’een, literally ‘Informing the Signatories’, implying that scholars who work to derive such rulings are signatories on behalf of God.

When discussing differing opinions on an issue, we may hear some people say, “I don’t want to hear other people’s opinions, I only want to hear Qala Allah and Qala Rasulullah ﷺ (“Allah said… and The Prophet ﷺ said…”).  While this statement is well intended, it in many ways oversimplifies matters.  Unless a person is trained in the Islamic sciences in the aforementioned way, he or she may not fully understand what the verses and hadiths actually imply about the strength of the opinion in question.  Such a person may be requesting daleels while they do not have the proper grounding to actually analyze and draw conclusions from them properly.  This is why Imam Shatibi is reported to have said, “The legal opinions (fatawa) of qualified scholars work for laypeople in the way the proofs and evidences from the texts (the daleels) work for scholars!”⁴

There is nothing wrong with inquiring about the basis or method by which a scholar has reached a legal ruling on a matter.  What is intended here is that one should not presume that one could engage in the actual process of legal deduction on one’s own, as it is an intricate process that takes some expertise.  Our goal should be to gain literacy in the methodology of the scholars, such that we can recognize those who are qualified from those who are not, and distinguish between opinions that have been soundly deduced from those which are baseless.

Conclusion

We see from the above points that a daleel can in fact be something other than a verse from the Qur’an or a hadith, depending on the issue being discussed, and that even if it were a verse or a hadith, room for differing opinions would still exist in most cases.  We also come to understand that extrapolating rulings from the daleels is not a simple matter.  In the same way that a layperson may possess the same tools as an artist, and yet be unable to bring beauty to a canvas in the way an artist would, we may have certain texts at hand but be unable to deduce legal rulings from them justly.

May Allah Most High grant us appreciation for the artistry of our scholars, whose careful brushstrokes paint for us a picture of how to worship our Lord and practice our religion.  May He grant us understanding and insight into Islam and allow us to worship Him in the best and most beautiful of ways.  Ameen.

*Look out for the top three mistakes in the upcoming posts in this series, coming soon insha’Allah!

Mistake #5: “Lack of knowledge is always a valid excuse.”

Just as Allah the Exalted is generous, tolerant, and compassionate, we find His Law marked by the qualities of generosity, tolerance and compassion.  An example of this can be seen in the exemption to legal accountability given in Shari`ah (Islamic law) for one who forgets, lacks competence, or, as is relevant to our discussion, one who is ignorant about a matter in certain instances.¹

We find many examples of this in the time of the Prophet ﷺ. He ﷺ excused the ‘man who prayed badly’ for not knowing how to pray with proper composure, and Muawiyah ibn al-Hakam for speaking deliberately during prayer because he did not know that it was prohibited.  He excused the people of Qubaa’ for praying in the direction of Jerusalem because they were unaware of its abrogation, and excused a companion for not praying when no water was available because he was unaware of the legislation of tayammum.² Another man came to the Prophet ﷺ with a gift of wine, to which the Prophet ﷺ responded, “Did you know that Allah has prohibited wine?”  When the man said no, he ﷺ did not rebuke or punish him.³ This principle is also underscored by the verse in the Qur’an in which Allah says, “…And never would We punish until We sent a messenger.” (17:15)

Some people take these texts to mean that there is a blanket exemption from accountability for anyone who happens to be unaware of Islamic rulings on a matter.  In believing this, we may fall into the trap of being ‘willfully ignorant,’ and step back from learning more about Islamic issues in an attempt to escape from responsibility.  We may feel that in learning more, we are somehow making ourselves more accountable, and that by knowing less, we can carry on just as we were before, unhindered by duties that we believe are hinged on knowledge.  Consciously or unconsciously, from Shaytan or our own selves, we may seek to use this as a loophole in Shari`ah to excuse or justify our behavior.  It is for this reason that it is important to clarify who is actually excused for not knowing their legal obligations, and for whom this excuse is not acceptable.

If someone is uninformed about a matter due to legitimate reasons, such as being new to Islam, or honestly being unable to access the information needed to understand it properly, then they are considered excused, and their mistake is overlooked.  However, if someone has the opportunity to learn about a matter and chooses not to, then their ‘willful ignorance’ is not considered an acceptable excuse, and they are therefore accountable for their actions.  This includes engaging in haram (forbidden) behavior out of ignorance, as well as performing acts of worship incorrectly or improperly.  From the perspective of Shari`ah, if a person has the capacity and opportunity to learn the law, he or she is presumed to know their legal obligations, and is judged the same as the one who actually learned them.⁴

As is well established from the famous hadith,⁵ seeking knowledge is an obligation on every Muslim.  This refers to knowledge about Allah Most High and the foundational principles of faith, rulings related to one’s personal worship – such as ritual purification, prayer, and fasting – as well as those related to mundane matters, such as food, clothing, and one’s behavior with others.  When one chooses to engage in an action, it is also a requirement to learn the Islamic rulings related to it – for example, learning the rulings on marriage and family for one intending to marry; the rules for buying and selling, business contracts and so forth, for one seeking to start a business; and the rulings of zakah for one who earns or acquires money.  Knowledge about these issues and others which are a regular part of a person’s life are considered fard `ayn, or a personal and individual obligation – meaning every Muslim, male or female, layperson or scholar, must take it upon themselves to know them.

If one is able to learn about these matters and chooses not to, or if one has people of whom to ask, but prefers to keep one’s own counsel, or if the doors to knowledge are opened, and yet one turns away – such a person is responsible for their deeds, and ignorance is in no way an acceptable excuse.

On a related point, if a person commits an action knowing it is haram but without knowing its legal consequences, the consequences of their action still come into effect.⁶ For example, if a married couple engages in intimacy in the daylight hours of Ramadan, knowing that it is haram but without knowing that it would break the fast, their fasts are still invalidated, and must be made up accordingly.  Also, if one commits an action that violates the rights of other people, whether done knowingly or unknowingly, one is responsible for restoring their rights.  So if a person steals from someone’s property, they are responsible for returning that wealth, whether they were aware of the prohibition of stealing at the time of the theft or not.  These points further emphasize the idea that a claim of ignorance does not automatically absolve one from one’s actions, and has specified rules and conditions.

An Arabic expression states, “An ignorant person does to himself and others what an enemy would do to his enemy.”

May Allah protect us from the harms of our own ignorance, and take us from its darkness into the light of understanding and knowledge.  May He make us people who worship Him with knowledge, in the best of ways, and may He grant us tafaqquh (deep understanding and comprehension) of His religion. Ameen.

*Read about the next four mistakes in the rest of this series, to be published soon, insha’Allah.